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Abstract 
The standard paradigm for exploring hypothesis testing behaviour is Wason's (1960) 
rule discovery task, which exists in two variants: the standard single goal (SG) task, 
and the logically identical dual goal (DG) fonn. Despite the close similarity of the 
two fonns of the task, the reported success rates in the two variants vary 
considerably, with approximately 20% of participants successfully solving the SG 
variant compared to over 60% correctly announcing the rule in the DG fonn. It was 
this disparity between the patterns of perfonnance across the two versions of the task 
which fonned the impetus for this thesis, as it was felt that an explanation for the 
facilitatory effect of DG instructions would lead to insights into the poor 
performance in the SG form. Several competing contemporary accounts of the effect 
are introduced, and predictions derived from them empirically tested across a series 
of seven experiments. Data analyses showed that no single contemporary theory 
could provide a wholly adequate account of the DG facilitation effect. However, 
these analyses led to a novel observation: that it is the production of a contrast class 
triple which appears to be the key predictor of success on the task, and furthennore, 
that the DG variant of the task promotes the generation of such a triple. Support for 
the "contrast class" account of the DG effect was provided by direct manipulation of 
the information provided to participants. A theoretical account of the critical role of 
contrast class cue information is developed in the thesis by situating the account 
within a proposed extension to Oaksford and Chater's (1994) "Iterative 
Counterfactual Model" of hypothesis testing. It is further suggested that rather than 
providing mutually exclusive accounts of the DG effect, competing theories (e.g., 
Vallee-Tourangeau et al. 's, 1995, triple heterogeneity theory, and Wharton et al. 's, 
1993, information quantity theory) could be subsumed within this new model, which 
would then reflect a process whereby participants' strategies change and develop 
over the course of the hypothesis testing session. Finally, it is suggested that findings 
from this thesis can be accommodated more generally within Evans' (2006) 
"hypothetical thinking framework", and thereby within contemporary dual process 
accounts of reasoning. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to Hypothesis Testing Behaviour 
1.1 Introduction 
Hypothesis testing has been described as comparing internal thoughts to external 
facts in order to interact with the world (Poletiek, 200 I). Evidence from day to day 
life suggests that humans are extraordinarily efficient at hypothesis testing; for 
example, language learning can be viewed as hypothesis testing, as can decision 
making about future possibilities (Evans, 2007). Evidence from empirical studies is, 
however, less flattering, with reported success rates in hypothesis testing tasks being 
very poor (e.g., Wason, 1960, Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney 1978). Thus the primary 
purpose of this literature review is to explore the issues around hypothesis testing 
behaviour with a view to informing a programme of study which will allow 
exploration of this mismatch of real life evidence and empirical studies of hypothesis 
testing behaviours. 
Formal hypothesis testing is seen as a stage in scientific discovery, and for this 
reason the literature surrounding the philosophy of science is initially reviewed, with 
particular attention being given to what has become known as the "problem of 
induction", that is the idea that future events will be similar to previous events, even 
though such a stance is logically erroneous. The problem of induction presents a 
challenge for the progress of science in that it involves making predictions about 
future events using evidence from previous events. Two philosophical arguments 
concerning the problem of induction are outlined: the Popperian (1959) approach of 
falsification, and the Bayesian probabilistic approach (Howson & Urbach, 2006), and 
differences between the two approaches are highlighted. 
The nature of hypothesis testing behaviour is then examined in both real life 
settings (e.g. Mitroff, 1974:Tweney, 1985b) and in the laboratory across a range of 
hypothesis testing tasks (e.g. Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Wason, 1966). 
Comparing hypothesis testing behaviours in the real world to those observed in the 
laboratory allows some judgement to be made about the ecological validity of the 
necessarily simplified tasks that are undertaken in empirical studies. A key issue, for 
example, is whether the strategies employed by lay people are similar to or different 
from those deployed by trained scientists. In this section descriptions of hypothesis 
- 13 -
Chapter 1 
Introduction to Hypothesis Testing Behaviour 
testing behaviours are presented; for example, the concept of simple enumeration is 
introduced (i.e., the idea that examples thought to belong to a target class are tested), 
which is then related to the concept of confirmation bias (i.e., the tendency to confirm 
rather than to falsify hypotheses). The detrimental effect of confirmation bias on 
successful hypothesis testing (and some of the controversy surrounding the definition 
of confirmation bias) is explored, and studies which attempt to overcome the bias are 
presented. Other theoretical ideas concerning hypothesis testing behaviours that are 
introduced include the notion that people apply a positive test strategy (Klayman & 
Ha, 1987, 1989), and that people make considerable use of counterfactuals (Farris and 
Revlin 1989a, 1989b). 
The review then moves on to examine the literature surrounding the standard 
paradigm for hypothesis testing behaviours, that is, Wason's (1960) 2-4-6 task. The 
task is described in both the standard Single Goal (SG) form and its Dual Goal (DG) 
variant which is logically identical but has very different patterns of performance with 
much higher success rates being reported in the DG form of the task. The argument is 
made that a successful account of the DG facilitatory effect would go some way to 
explaining poor performance on the standard SG task, and thus allow some insight 
into hypothesis testing behaviours in the laboratory. To this end theoretical 
explanations of the facilitatory effect of DG instructions are examined alongside the 
evidence which has been presented for these accounts, and the specific predictions 
from each theory. These predictions rely to a large extent on examining quantitative 
and qualitative changes in the types of tests that are designed to test local hypotheses, 
thus a brief description of the coding of triples (which are used to test hypotheses in 
the task) is provided. Finally a table summarising the theories, predictions and 
empirical tests of the theoretical accounts is presented which provides a framework 
for the programme of study in this thesis. 
1.2 Review of the Literature 
1.2.1 Scientific Reasoning and the "Problem of Induction" 
It has been claimed that scientific reasoning is of interest to psychologists in that 
it is analogous to humans trying to acquire knowledge about their everyday 
environment (cf. Poletiek, 2001), a view which echoes that expressed by Kelly (1955), 
who likened the acquisition of knowledge to scientific reasoning. Einstein (1950) also 
took the view that equivalent thought processes underpin scientific and everyday 
reasoning, albeit with scientific reasoning demanding more precise definitions of 
concepts and conclusions alongside more careful design of experiments. Some 
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philosophers of science have also agreed with claims for parallels between scientific 
and everyday reasoning, noting that the acquisition of scientific knowledge is a special 
case of everyday reasoning in that it is more systematic in its approach (Popper, 
1989). 
The importance of the role of science to how philosophers view the discovery of 
knowledge in the everyday world is illustrated by Locke acting as a type of 
philosophical under-labourer to Newton in the belief this would lead to him 
discovering how we come to know anything and how we understand the fundamental 
structure of the world (Couvalis, 1997). The success of Newtonian physics in making 
verifiable predictions led other thinkers to believe this strategy to be the correct course 
of action, to such an extent that philosophers during the Enlightenment came to 
believe that science would provide the underpinnings of the correct social system and 
in this way replace metaphysics, ethics and political philosophy (Couvalis, 1997). 
This latter view, however, was largely undermined by Hume (Proctor & 
Capaldi, 2006) who outlined what has become known as the "problem of induction". 
He noted that whenever we make inductive inferences (i.e., reason from particular 
instances to a general law), we presuppose what he termed the "uniformity of nature" 
(UN); that is, we assume that instances of a phenomenon not yet examined will be 
similar in relevant respects to those previously examined. Hume went on to question 
how such an assumption could be justified. He argued that it is easy to imagine a 
universe that is not uniform but which changes its course from day to day, and since 
such a "non-uniform" world is conceivable then we cannot prove the truth of UN 
because such a proof would then show the existence of a non-uniform world to be a 
logical impossibility. Hume further argued that not only would it be impossible to 
prove the existence of UN, it would also be impossible to provide good empirical 
evidence for its existence: while it is a fact that nature has behaved in a uniform way 
thus far, we cannot appeal to UN as evidence that it will continue to so in the future, 
as this would be appealing to uniformity of nature as evidence for its own existence. 
This intriguing argument has exerted, and continues to exert, a powerful 
influence on the philosophy of science, not least since science (and therefore modem 
technological society) appears to rely on induction, and Hume's argument indicates 
that induction cannot be rationally justified. There have been a variety of responses to 
the problem of induction; for example the use of probability to suggest that although 
the premises of an inductive problem do not guarantee a logically valid conclusion, 
the evidence from previous experience shows that the conclusion is highly probable. It 
should be noted, however, that this then leads to the question of what constitutes a 
high probability. A second response is that induction is so fundamental to thinking 
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and reasoning that it is not the sort of thing which can be justified, and that to demand 
such a justification is therefore incoherent. Strawson (1952) defended this view 
, 
which dissolves rather than solves the problem with the following analogy: if a person 
is concerned about the legality of an action they would consult a law text and compare 
the action with the text. However, suppose someone was worried about law itself 
, 
how could they check the legality of the law? The law is the standard against which 
legality is judged and it therefore makes little sense to question whether the standard 
itself is legal. Strawson suggests that the same argument can be made for induction. 
He claims that induction is one of the standards used to decide if claims about the 
world are justified and it thus makes no more sense to question if induction is justified 
than it does to question if the law is legal. 
Popper's (1972) response to the problem of induction was to argue that the 
problem does not in fact exist: we do not discover irregularities but rather conjecture 
that such irregularities exist. Science can then be said to be rational as we can 
sometimes falsify conjectures by confronting them with basic statements with which 
they are inconsistent. If we are lucky we will stumble on true conjectures; however, 
even if we do not we will learn from the falsification of our conjectures. Popper thus 
argued that as falsification is logically deductive there is no need for a logic of 
confirmation; indeed, there is no logic of confirmation. Popper distinguishes two sides 
to Hume's problem of induction: (a) the logical problem (i.e., are we justified in 
believing that unexperienced instances of certain phenomena will be similar to 
experienced ones?); and (b) the psychological problem (why do reasonable people 
believe that unexperienced instances will be like experienced instances?). 
Popper claimed to have solved the logical problem by showing that there is no 
role for induction in science. If we assume that there are certain regularities in the 
world, and that these postulated regularities can be falsified by finding 
counterexamples, then this, according to Popperian philosophy is all that is required 
for science. Thus, scientific reasoning can be reconstructed as being deductive. An 
example of this is that if we have a conjecture that all swans are white then a single 
example of a black swan will refute that conjecture. Popper's solution to the 
psychological problem of induction is that we conjecture the existence of certain 
regularities and test our conjectures. If our conjectures are not refuted then we 
temporarily accept them, and there is thus no need to assume the existence of an 
inductive procedure. 
One tenet of Popper's approach to scientific reasoning is that science best 
progresses by making bold conjectures which deal with largely unobserved 
phenomena. This view is tied to a second point: that when testing theories scientists 
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should use the notion of corroboration rather than confirmation. Corroboration is a 
comparative notion; that is, it has no absolute value. A theory is said to be more 
corroborated than a rival if it is more falsifiable, and has undergone more rigorous 
testing but has not yet been refuted (Popper, 1989). Thus, in terms of Popper's 
philosophy, a theory will gain most support if subjected to severe testing; that is 
sincere attempts have been made to falsify it. A recent challenge to this view comes 
from Poletiek (2001), who notes the more severe the test the less its potential to falsify 
the hypothesis. Thus, if a severe test is chosen the outcome will be either weak 
refuting evidence (because of the severe test) or strong supporting evidence; therefore 
a severe test is only really informative if it supports the hypothesis, as a refutation 
using a strong test is only weak evidence against the theory. 
An implicit assumption of the Popperian approach to hypothesis testing is that a 
hypothesis under consideration is seen as representing "the state of the world" until a 
disconfirming instance demonstrates this not to be the case: no account is taken of the 
plausibility of the hypothesis or the scientist's confidence in its veracity. At an 
intuitive level this seems to be descriptively weak: it is likely that on initially forming 
a hypothesis a scientist's confidence in it may be tentative, and that confidence (and 
therefore belief) in the hypothesis will vary as a function of evidence relating to it. In 
contrast to this "all or nothing" approach the Bayesian account suggests that belief in a 
hypothesis is adjusted in the light of empirical evidence. Initially proposed as a theory 
of subjective probability and belief revision, Bayes' Theorem has been developed into 
a philosophy of science (Howson & Urbach, 2006). According to this approach, 
probability is seen as a degree of belief, thus belief in a hypothesis (and therefore the 
subjective probability of its veracity) varies as a function of prior belief in a 
hypothesis and the diagnosticity of the evidence, formally expressed in the case of two 
competing hypotheses as follows: 
P(H, / D) = P(H,) X P(D/ H,) 
P(H2 / D) P(H2 ) P(D/ H 2 ) 
In which HI is a focal hypothesis, H2 is the competing hypothesis, D is the 
diagnosticity of the evidence and P is probability. This can be expressed more 
informally as follows: 
Posterior belief = Prior odds X Likelihood ratio 
It therefore follows that iterative testing leads to gradual revisions of belief in 
hypotheses as evidence either supporting or appearing to refute them is advanced. It is 
of note here that in his overview of the Popperian and Bayesian approaches to the 
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problem of induction Evans (2007) states that in the case of two competing, 
exhaustive hypotheses a good test of a hypothesis is equivalent from a Popperian or 
Bayesian perspective. 
The problem of induction notwithstanding, it is clear that science rests on the 
production and testing of theories. Testing of theories is by a cyclical process of 
activity: hypotheses are derived from a theory, predictions derived from these 
hypotheses, and these predictions are then tested (Poletiek, 200 I). Empirical testing 
either supports or fails to support the predictions made, with the effect of supporting 
or failing to support the theory from which they are derived. If the empirical evidence 
supports the hypotheses then the theory can be sustained. On the other hand, if the 
empirical evidence either refutes or does not fully support the hypotheses then the 
underlying theory is examined and either rejected or amended to accommodate the 
new information. This process is known as the "scientific method" (Horst, 1931). 
Hypothesis testing therefore consists of two distinct phases: the production of a 
hypothesis and the testing of the hypothesis. More formally, these phases are 
designated as the "context of discovery" and "the context of justification" 
(Reichenbach, 1938). Hypothesis testing behaviour forms the main focus of the 
present thesis. 
1.2.2 The Nature of Hypothesis Testing Behaviour 
Early work on hypothesis testing behaviour investigated hypothesis generation 
and testing of participants using a categorisation task (e.g., Bruner et aI., 1956). 
Bruner et aI. considered this type of cognitive activity to be ubiquitous and a 
prerequisite of all other cognitive tasks. In one of their studies Bruner et aI. presented 
participants with an array of 81 instances of a stimulus which varied on four attributes, 
with three possible values of each of these attributes, that is: shape (square, circle, 
cross), number of figures (one, two, three), colour (red, green, black) and number of 
borders (one, two, three). Thus all possible combinations of the attributes were 
available. Participants were required to discover the researcher's "concept" defined in 
terms of these attributes, by successive testing of individual stimuli in order to identify 
whether they exemplified the concept. 
Bruner et aI. were interested in the strategies used by participants to discover the 
researcher's concept. One strategy which they identified was "enumeration", that is, 
testing hypotheses derived from information gained by positive examples of the 
concept. However, while such a strategy can lead to correct identification of a 
sufficient hypothesis, it cannot identify whether such a hypothesis is both necessary 
and sufficient. Thus, should the target concept be more general than the participant's 
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hypothesis, an enumerative strategy would not identify the restricted nature of their 
hypothesis. Take, for example, the true concept "red shapes". If the concept "red 
squares" is formed and only shapes which display both of these attributes are selected , 
then the true nature of the concept will never be discovered. As this example 
illustrates, it is logically possible to arrive at an incorrect concept by enumeration 
because only positive evidence is utilised. Note, however, that a single negative test of 
the concept (i.e., selection of a "non-square" shape) leads to the identification of the 
overly-restricted nature of the hypothesised concept. 
Whilst the work of Bruner is usually characterised as being concerned with 
concept formation (e.g., Wason, 1960), Poletiek (200 I) neatly summarises the 
relationship between inductive reasoning and hypothesis testing behaviour when she 
observes that Bruner et aI.' s participants must have produced abstract hypotheses by 
categorising old information which had been tested against previous experience, and 
then processed and produced new information based on these abstract hypotheses. In 
this manner inferences are made about the categories, causing generalisation of 
information contained within the categories and leading to the testing of the 
boundaries of these categories by selecting examples which were assumed to fit into 
the categories, thus extending and defining categories by a process of hypotheses 
generation and testing. 
Poletiek (2001) describes several stages in hypothesis testing. In a gIven 
situation the reasoner must initially produce a hypothesis about the current situation 
and then devise a test of this hypothesis, the outcome of which must provide 
information about the truth of the hypothesis. The test is performed and the outcome 
observed. The information gained must then be assimilated into the old information 
and the impact on the hypothesis assessed. This cycle of activity is akin to the 
scientific method in which similar steps are followed. One assumption of the cycle of 
hypothesis testing described here is that the reasoner seeks new information, that is, 
they seek to extend the body of evidence on which to evaluate their hypotheses. A 
question which thus arises is how the reasoner chooses their test; it is evident that 
given any situation the realm of possible tests is likely to be extensive, and that the 
reasoner is constrained in the number of tests to be performed by the demands of the 
current situation. A reasonable assumption would be that the reasoner would choose 
the most informative test, however, this in itself is likely to be problematic in that the 
reasoner does not know either the truth status of their working hypothesis, or its 
relationship to the truth. As noted above, Popper (1959) advocated the use of 
falsification in hypothesis testing. This strategy is based on the observation that any 
number of confirming instances are unable to verify the truth of a hypothesis, whereas 
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a single disconfirming instance will falsify it. Thus, according to Popperian ideals, the 
greatest support for a hypothesis can be gained from a "strong" test, (i.e., one which is 
most likely to falsify the hypothesis) but which in fact does not do so and, therefore, 
"good" scientists will follow a strategy offalsification when testing their ideas. 
Empirical studies of the hypothesis testing strategies of scientists have, however, 
demonstrated that despite the tenets of Popperianism, scientists may well tend to 
adopt a confirmation strategy. For example Mahoney and Kimper (1976) used the 
Wason (1966) selection task to examine the hypothesis testing strategies of a group of 
scientists. In this task participants are shown four cards each of which has a number 
on one side and a letter on the other side. The facing sides of the four presented cards 
show respectively a vowel, a consonant, an even number and an odd number. 
Participants are asked to select which cards are necessary to verify the truth of the 
statement: "If there is a vowel on one side of the card, then there is an even number on 
the other side". To verify the rule participants should select the vowel (to determine if 
there is an even number on the obverse) and the odd number (to ensure that there isn't 
a vowel on the back, which would falsify the rule). The remaining cards are 
uninformative as to the truth status of the rule. Using a sample of physicists, 
biologists, psychologists and sociologists, Mahoney and Kimber found that only 10% 
of participants selected the logically necessary cards. Similarly, Kern, Mirels, and 
Hinshaw (1983) in their investigation of the performance by scientists on the task 
found that just 20% identified the logically correct cards. 
Whilst these latter success rates on the task are somewhat superior to the 4% 
reported when using "ordinary" participants (Wason & lohnson-Laird, 1970), they 
still suggest that scientists may be prone to a confirmation bias. There is, however, 
some evidence of such results being an artefact of the instructions used (Tweney & 
Yachanin, 1985). In their study involving scientists from a range of disciplines 
Tweney and Yachanin found that when asked to "find out if a rule is true or false" as 
opposed to "testing" it, then 90% of their scientists selected the falsifying cards. 
Tweney and Yachanin argued that this instructional artefact was due to the limited 
experience that scientists have with published research reporting negative results. It is 
more common practice in scientific papers that hypotheses are proposed and then 
tested by presenting empirical results which report positive effects. As a result, the 
term "test" suggests to scientists a confirmatory heuristic. According to this view the 
apparent confirmation bias displayed by scientists may be the result of cultural 
interpretation of the term "test" rather than a bias per se. This observation cannot, 
however, be extended to explain poor levels of performance among lay participants; 
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indeed, it would be interesting to apply this manipulation to a lay population to 
investigate if these same patterns of performance are evident. 
More recently the interpretation of the card choice in the standard selection task 
as representing a confirmation bias has become less pervasive, with poor performance 
being attributed to a "matching bias" in which card choices tend to mirror the lexical 
content of the conditional statement which is to be tested (Evans, 2007). Early 
evidence of this came from a study by Evans and Lynch (1973) which used the 
negations paradigm (e.g. "If there is a vowel on one side of the card, then there is 
NOT an even number of the other side"). By systematically varying the negated 
component of the conditional statement to be tested Evans and Lynch demonstrated 
both the tendency to match the terms in the conditional statement when making 
logically correct card choices, and also that when matching was controlled for the true 
consequent (vowel) and false consequent (not a vowel) card were equally preferred. 
Despite these apparently clear findings other studies have presented evidence that 
suggests patterns of performance may be attributable to a combination of matching 
and confirmation biased responses (Krauth, 1982; Reich & Ruth, 1982). More recent 
evidence has shown that although matching effects are robust when negation is 
implicit, the effect is reduced when the negation is made explicit (Stahl, Klauer, & 
Erdfelder, 2008). As such, theoretical accounts of performance on the task remain 
somewhat unclear. It should be noted, however, that studies employing the negations 
paradigm have used lay participants so it is somewhat difficult to draw conclusions as 
to the reasoning processes of scientists from them. It is however noteworthy that in a 
study of the selection task which used scientists as participants both the patterns of 
card choice and the post hoc rationalisations of those choices when using both abstract 
and thematic content were similar to those reported in studies using lay populations 
(Griggs & Ransdell, 1986), providing some evidence that it would be reasonable to 
generalise from lay to scientific populations. 
In discussing evidence for the selection task as relating to hypothesis testing it is 
important to note the differing demands of the selection task and the 2-4-6 task, and 
therefore the resulting impact on hypothesis testing behaviour. In the selection task the 
reasoner is given a hypothesis and asked to test it in a single, all-or-nothing 
experiment. Traditionally, therefore, the selection task has been characterised as 
Popperian in the demands that are made of the participant (although see Oaks ford & 
Chater, 1994, for a probabilistic theory of task performance). No account is taken of 
the reasoner's belief in the hypothesis and evidence is not collected by the reasoner 
which allows them to vary that belief. By contrast, in the 2-4-6 task (introduced in the 
next section) the reasoner generates their own hypothesis, and is expected to collect 
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evidence concerning it; thus their subjective belief in their current hypothesis may 
vary both as a function of their initial confidence in their proposed hypothesis and of 
the evidence they obtain. The demands of 2-4-6 task may therefore be characterised as 
requiring a more Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing. As such it is important to 
take care when drawing general conclusions from findings across the two tasks. 
Evidence from "real life" studies of science also tends to indicate the existence 
of a confirmation bias in scientists. In his review of the work of Michael Faraday, 
Tweney (1985a) noted on analysing Faraday's laboratory books that out of a set of 
135 experiments conducted in 1831 as part of his discovery of electromagnetism, 
Faraday appeared to follow a strategy of confirmation in the initial stages of the 
project; that is, he attempted to confirm his ideas, and only when he had gathered 
strong evidence as to the veracity of a theory did he move on to a falsificatory 
strategy. Similarly, Mitroff (1974) in his work with NASA lunar scientists noted that 
they appeared to employ a confirmation strategy in their work, as did Mahoney (1976) 
in his examination of the strategies employed by scientists in the real world. This 
evidence tends to suggest that contrary to the views of Popper, a tendency to confirm 
hypotheses may indeed be a useful strategy at least in the early stages of scientific 
research. Tweney and Chitwood (1995) suggest that in Faraday's case at least, this 
was because he was taking into account the fragility of his new hypotheses and was 
amassing sufficient confirmatory evidence before adjudging that making a falsifying 
test was worthwhile. 
In their empirical investigation of modes of enquiry in hypothesis testing, 
Kareev, Halberstadt, and Shafir (1993) gave participants a binary categorisation task 
and allowed them either to receive information about possible exemplars of the 
categories or to generate their own examples. Results showed that in early stages of 
the task participants tended to prefer the reception mode, moving to a more active 
experimentation phase only after some data had been obtained. Kareev et al. interpret 
their findings as offering support for the notion that there are two modes of scientific 
enquiry: observation and experimentation. They characterise the early hypothesis 
testing behaviour of their participants as "observe and formulate", stating that 
previous empirical and theoretical work indicated that hypothesis generation is the 
outcome of generalisations based on positive cases. Given the lack of naturally 
occurring instances of scientific phenomena, it is possible that when engaged in a 
programme of study, scientists aim to emulate this base of positive cases by devising 
experiments which are likely to provide positive instances of their working 
hypothesis. It should be noted, however, that although there might be a paucity of 
naturally occurring evidence for a scientific theory, even in the early stages of 
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hypothesis testing it is a prerequisite that some evidence must exist for the theory to 
be formulated. 
In their study of hypothesis testing in an artificial universe Mynatt, Doherty, and 
Tweney (1978) noted that the normative strategy of falsification was of little utility in 
their complex task, and that the most successful participants were those who adopted 
both confirmatory and disconfirmatory strategies. In their study of participants' 
behaviours when asked to discover the function of a novel button on a computer 
controlled robot Klahr and Dunbar (1988) showed that when using naturalistic 
materials their participants were able to appreciate the benefits of disconfirming 
information when it was elicited, even though they tended to follow a positive test 
strategy (Klayman & Ha 1987, 1989) in which tests were expected to be cases of the 
hypothesis. Tweney, Doherty, and Mynatt (1981) stated that the confirmation bias was 
not a single entity, but that at least four different types were evident: (i) the failure to 
seek disconfirmatory evidence, (ii) the failure to utilise disconfirmatory evidence 
when available, (iii) the failure to test alternative hypotheses, and (iv) the failure to 
consider whether evidence for a working hypothesis may also support another 
hypothesis. As Tweney and Chitwood (1995) note, the latter two types of 
confirmation bias imply the existence of alternative hypotheses, whereas the first two 
refer only to a single hypothesis. This is of interest in that it implies that strategies 
employed in testing a single hypothesis might vary from those used when comparing 
two competing hypotheses. 
In their work on the use of counterfactuals in hypothesis testing Farris and 
Revlin (l989a, 1989b) went some way to addressing the issue of the role of the testing 
of alternatives in successful hypothesis testing. Using a novel analysis of participants' 
protocols in which they compared their current tests to all previous hypotheses, Farris 
and Revlin demonstrated that contrary to the contemporary view of people's 
hypothesis testing strategy as being primarily confirmatory, many participants' 
strategies could instead be characterised as "counterfactual", with reasoners 
entertaining multiple hypotheses. This counterfactual strategy was, moreover, claimed 
to be the best single predictor of successful reasoning. In addition, Farris and Revlin 
showed that in their study successful reasoners could not be distinguished from 
unsuccessful ones in terms of their use of a disconfirmatory strategy. Farris and Revlin 
further noted that Faraday (in Tweney, 1985a) appeared to be employing a 
methodology akin to the counterfactual strategy as he juxtaposed competing 
hypotheses by combining his investigations of magnets and electromagnets and 
alternating between them. 
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In their research examining the use of counterfactuals in hypothesis testing, 
Farris and Revlin used what has become the standard paradigm for investigating this 
behaviour: Wason's (1960) rule discovery task. The following section describes the 
task in both its standard single goal (SG) format as well as its dual goal (OG) format 
which has featured extensively in more recent research. In addition, the following 
section reviews the patterns of performance displayed on these task variants and 
examines the theoretical implications of such performance patterns. 
1.2.3 Wason's (1960) 2-4-6 Rule Discovery Task 
While the Wason selection task (1966, described in Section 1.2.2) provides a 
useful paradigm to examine hypothesis testing strategies, it fails to mimic true 
scientific and everyday reasoning in that participants are provided with a single 
hypothesis and a limited pool of possible tests to choose from. A more valid paradigm 
which mimics such reasoning more closely is the 2-4-6 task (Wason, 1960). Wason 
originally devised the 2-4-6 task to investigate whether people naturally adhered to 
Popper's (1959) norm of falsification. As noted earlier, this norm hinges on the 
principle that whilst a single disconfirming instance can reveal that a hypothesis is 
incorrect, any number of confirming instances can never prove that the hypothesis is 
true. In the standard 2-4-6 task participants have to discover a rule that generates 
sequences of three numbers (triples). Participants are initially given an example, 
conforming triple ("2-4-6"), and they then produce further triples that the 
experimenter classifies as conforming or not conforming to the rule. Participants 
generate triples until they are confident they know the rule, at which point they 
announce it. The to-be-discovered rule is "three ascending numbers". 
Wason (1960) described the 2-4-6 task as differing from Bruner et al.' s (1956) 
task in several respects. First, rather than categories being discovered, the properties 
of which need to be enumerated (e.g., red and square), the to-be-discovered rule in the 
2-4-6 task is relational and therefore can be described in more abstract terms. Second, 
the universe of possible tests is infinite rather than being constrained by the possible 
examples offered in previous studies. The finite pool of possible tests previously used 
places a constraint on the scope of inductive thinking in that the pool of necessary and 
sufficient exemplars will, by definition, always be smaller than the pool of merely 
sufficient examples. Thus, the number of possible necessary and sufficient tests is 
limited allowing the assiduous participant to exhaust the pool of necessary and 
sufficient tests and thereby carry out a test of a merely sufficient example. Third, the 
instances are not presented as stimuli. Instead they have to be generated by the 
reasoner with the effect that an additional task demand becomes that of deciding on 
the type and number of tests to be performed. As Wason (1960) notes, in standard 
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concept categorisation tasks all possible instances are displayed and the reasoner is 
aware that all the evidence is available to them, giving them an opportunity to judge 
the scope of the required evidence collection. Finally, in the 2-4-6 task, unlike concept 
categorisation tasks, participants keep a written record of their tests and subsequent 
outcomes, thus removing any effect of memory constraints from the task. 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the 2-4-6 task people perform poorly, with 
only around 20% announcing the correct rule at their first attempt (e.g.,Tukey, 1986; 
Wason, 1960). Many incorrect announcements are restricted versions of the target 
rule, such as "numbers increasing by two" (Kareev et aL, 1993), that is, participants 
tend to announce rules which are sufficient, but not necessary. Wason (I960) also 
noted that solvers and non-solvers could be differentiated in terms of both the number 
of triples produced, with solvers generating more, and the type of triples produced, 
with solvers generating a higher proportion of triples receiving negative feedback (cf. 
Klayman & Ha, I 989b). Wason interpreted the non-solvers' strategy of testing 
positive instances of hypotheses as a failure to appreciate the benefits of falsification 
and therefore reflecting a confirmation bias - as discussed above in the context of 
other hypothesis testing paradigms (e.g., Gorman & Gorman, 1984; Mynatt, Doherty, 
& Tweney, 1977). Wason further cited evidence of this confirmation bias from 
participants' protocols; he noted some participants, following incorrect rule 
announcements, would simply reword their hypothesis and then continue to test it and 
then announce a logically identical rule. 
Efforts to improve performance by instructional manipulations emphasising 
falsification have generally proved unsuccessful (Gorman & Gorman, 1984; Gorman, 
Stafford, & Gorman, 1987; Kareev et a\.. 1993; Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1977; 
Mynatt et aL, 1978; Tweney et aL, 1980). For example, in a series of four experiments 
Tweney et aL (I980) attempted to determine whether instructions to falsify could 
improve performance on the task. Experiment 1 attempted to compare performance 
when direct instructions to falsify were employed. Participants in the confirmatory 
condition were given a hypothetical rule of "three equal numbers" and an example 
triple of 3-3-3. They were told they could test the hypothesis with positive examples 
of the hypothesis (such as 8-8-8) and if such a triple fitted the rule that would be 
evidence for the rule. By contrast participants in the disconfirmatory condition were 
given the same hypothesis and exemplar triple and told that if tested with a triple 
which didn't fit their hypothesis triple such as 5-7-9, and that this triple did indeed fit 
the rule then they knew the hypothesis was wrong. While falsification instructions 
appeared to influence the test strategy employed, raising the number of negative 
triples generated (that is, triples which do not fit the rule) this did not translate into 
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improved performance. In Experiment 2, Tweney et al. (1980) explored the idea that 
disconfirmatory instructions would be more helpful to participants at a later stage of 
the study. Consequently they varied their methodology such that strategy instructions 
were given after the first rule announcement. As with Experiment I, changes were 
observed in the types of triples produced, but again this did not translate into 
differential performance on the task across conditions. 
In contrast to Tweney et aI.' s null results, Gorman and colleagues (Gorman, 
Gorman, Latta, & Cunningham, 1984) compared success rates across confirmatory 
and disconfirmatory instructions using both groups and individuals as well as two 
different tasks. In Experiment 1 and 2 they used an alternative task, the New Eleusis 
problem, which asks participants to discover the rule for laying out playing cards. 
They showed that instructional manipulations could indeed affect both the types of 
strategies employed by participants and also success rates, although they note that use 
of disconfirmation was limited to approximately 50% of tests. In their final study they 
generalised the disconfirmatory instruction they were using to the 2-4-6 task and again 
showed facilitated performance. Gorman (1 992a) attributed the improved performance 
in his studies to the fact that participants were not given feedback on putative rule 
announcements, but were instead informed that it was up to them to decide if their 
rule was correct. Gorman suggests that by removing this second (and more powerful) 
source for testing hypotheses, participants could no longer rely on the experimenter 
for confirmation or disconfirmation, and that confirmation might be an effective 
heuristic when participants can no longer appeal to an outside authority for 
information. 
Gorman (1995) suggests that one reason for the general failure of 
disconfirmatory instructions to improve performance might be related to a 
misconception of the term "confirmation". He notes that in an earlier study (Gorman, 
1992a) he had used what he termed "confirmatory'· and "disconfirmatory" 
instructions, but that these instructions asked participants to try to produce triples 
which were "right" and "wrong" respectively. This goes to the heart of one of the 
early criticisms of the confirmation bias approach. Wetherick (1962) was an early 
critic of the 2-4-6 task noting both that the exemplar triple induced the reasoner to 
produce an overly-restricted rule and that Wason's definition of an eliminative triple 
(one which was not compatible with a previously stated reason for a choice) was 
erroneous. Wetherick argued that a triple was only falsifying when it was either: (i) an 
opposite example of a hypothesis for which positive feedback was expected (i.e., the 
participant assumed that they would be told that the triple conformed to the 
experimenter's rule), or (ii) an example of a hypothesis for which negative feedback 
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was expected. In a study designed to test this idea Wetherick asked participants to 
indicate whether they believed their test triple would or would not conform to the rule. 
In this way he was able to code accurately the participant's intention for each test. 
Wetherick found that falsificatory tests were relatively rare, with less than 10% of 
triples produced being disconfirmatory according to his revised definition. 
Poletiek (200 I) agreed with this view of disconfirmation, citing evidence from 
an earlier study of her own (Poletiek, 1996b) in which participants who were asked to 
employ a falsification strategy preferred negative tests but also expected these tests to 
fail. However, Poletiek argued that the situation is even more complex in that 
participants are in fact unable to produce falsifying tests. Interestingly this view of 
disconfirmation is directly contrary to that of Tweney et al. (I980); in their study they 
specified a "confirming" test as one which conforms to the experimenter's rule and a 
disconfirming test as one which was not expected to conform to the rule. Whilst the 
basic premise of Wetherick and Poletiek is appealing (i.e., that a disconfirming triple 
must be either a positive example of the participant's rule for which negative feedback 
is expected, or a negative example of the participant's rule for which positive 
feedback is expected) these complex definitional issues will be sidestepped in the 
present thesis by simply referring to positive tests as ones which conform to the 
experimenter's rule, and negative tests as ones which do not conform to the 
experimenter's rule. 
It remains moot why performance fails to improve in the face of disconfirming 
evidence, although the emphasis of these studies on manipulating the so-called 
"context of justification" (i.e., hypothesis testing) rather than the "context of 
discovery" (i.e., hypothesis generation) may well be implicated. It could be argued 
that both contexts are important for success on Wason's rule discovery task. Indeed, it 
may be that without an alternative hypothesis in mind reasoners are simply unable to 
make use of disconfirming information. 
Evans (2007) offers an alternative explanation for poor performance on the task 
which is based within his "hypothetical thinking framework" (a revision and 
extension of his heuristic-analytic model which attributed cognitive biases to 
selective processing; see Evans, 1983; 1989) which he situates within a broader "dual 
process" view of reasoning. Dual process theory, as the name implies, centres on the 
notion that there are two distinct processes involved in cognitive tasks. Dual process 
theory is itself a weaker version of the Dual System account of cognition which 
proposes that the two processes have differing evolutionary histories and originate in 
different neural substrates (Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 2004). Evans (2006) 
notes that this stronger account is of necessity broad, and as such may not apply to 
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specific cognitive tasks such as hypothesis testing. For this reason he situates his 
hypothetical thinking framework at an intermediate level of abstraction which allows 
models of specific tasks (including Wason's, (I 960), rule discovery task) to be 
developed. Evans (2006) identifies the following as attributes of heuristic processing: 
Unconscious and automatic 
Rapid, powerful and parallel processing 
Associative 
Not requiring working memory resources 
Not capable of domain general processing 
Low effort 
By contrast, analytic processing is seen as: 
Responsive to verbal instructions (Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999) 
Using slow and sequential processing 
Linked to general cognitive ability 
Capable of domain general reasoning 
Volitional and controlled 
Evans' (2007) hypothetical thinking theory consists of three parts: (i) a set of 
three principles that aim to describe the general nature of hypothetical thought (Evans, 
Over, & Handley, 2003), (ii) a proposal that thinking involves the manipulation of 
mental representations in the form of epistemic mental models, and (iii) a processing 
model. The first of the three principles is the singularity principle, the notion that 
people consider only one hypothetical possibility or mental model at a time. Evidence 
for this idea comes from the work of Mynatt, Doherty, and Dragan (1993) who 
showed that in a pseudodiagnosticity task people were only able to maintain and 
operate on one hypothesis at a time in working memory, and from poor performance 
levels in the THOG problem (Wason & Brooks, 1979), a disjunction task described by 
Evans (2006) as one of the most difficult reasoning tasks examined in the laboratory, 
which requires participants to hold two hypotheses simultaneously. The relevance 
principle relates to the idea that people only consider the most plausible alternative in 
the current context, and the satisficing principle suggests that models are evaluated 
according to current goals and accepted if satisfactory. Satisficing is seen as 
contrasting with optimising; whereas optimising is finding the best possible solution, 
satisficing is settling for that which is "good enough". 
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Evans (2007) suggests that it is the combination of the singularity and the 
satisficing principle which leads to suboptimal performance on hypothetical thinking 
tasks (and by extension the 2-4-6 task). The singularity principle will lead to the 
consideration of a single hypothesis which is then evaluated according to the 
satisficing principle; if this first hypothesis is found to have satisfied the demands of 
the task then it is accepted without consideration of further alternatives. Note that both 
of these principles are concerned with the context of justification, and whilst Evans 
does not make it explicit it is highly likely that the relevance principle is involved in 
the generation of the initial, overly-restricted hypothesis. Indeed, recent work by 
Cherubini, Castelvecchio, and Cherubini (2005) has shown that when formulating 
hypotheses participants retain the maximum amount of relational information 
available in the seed triple; it could, therefore, be assumed that the participant will 
establish an initial hypothesis (H) of "even numbers ascending by 2". In another 
interesting piece of recent research, Van der Henst, Rossi, and Schroyens (2002) 
demonstrated that when participants believe that the exemplar triple is generated by 
chance then success rates on the task rise substantially, indicating that participants 
believe that the information contained in the initial exemplar is highly relevant to the 
rule. 
The processing model for Evans's 2007) hypothetical thinking theory assumes 
that the two systems compete for control of behaviour and that by default the systems 
therefore work in parallel. Evans proposes that heuristic processes set up default 
responses which occur unless analytic processes intervene, although he notes that 
analytic processes are always involved if only to "approve" the default response 
produced by heuristic processes. The hypothetical thinking framework can thus lead to 
bias by two main mechanisms: heuristic processing may produce bias through 
selective representation and contextualisation (Evans 1989; Stanovich, 1999); 
alternatively, the singularity and satisficing principles may lead to bias via analytic 
processing. In his review of performance on the 2-4-6 task Evans (2007) tentatively 
attributes the positive test bias (i.e., people's tendency to test positive instances of 
their current hypothesis) to a heuristic relevance effect, but further suggests that the 
analytic system has a role in maintaining an erroneous hypothesis despite negative 
feedback following a rule announcement due to its role in rationalisation and 
confabulation. 
An alternative account of the hypothesis testing strategy adopted by participants 
in the 2-4-6 task is that of the Iterative Counterfactual Model (ICM), proposed by 
Oaks ford and Chater (1994). The ICM builds on the work of Farris and Revlin, 
(l989a, 1989b) but addresses what they describe as a logical shortcoming in this 
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account. According to the Farris and Revlin (1989a) model, a participant generates a 
hypothesis on the basis of the seed triple, for example, "even numbers". The 
complement of this hypothesis (e.g., "odd numbers") is then generated and tested 
using a positive test strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987, 1989). If "yes" feedback is given 
then the even numbers hypothesis is seen to be falsified and the odd numbers 
hypothesis is seen as plausible. However, as Oaksford and Chater point out, this is 
logically inconsistent because the complementary "odd numbers" rule is falsified as it 
is generated; thus discovering that the triple 3-5-7 is an instance of the rule (in 
addition to the original 2-4-6 exemplar) indicates that both the even numbers and the 
odd numbers rules must be incorrect. Farris and Revlin (1 989b) revised their model to 
suggest that the counterfactual strategy is only used to generate falsifying instances of 
a hypothesised rule. In the revised account "yes" feedback to an instance of a 
complementary hypothesis (H') leads the participant to reject H' as the expanded set is 
not large enough. Oaksford and Chater note that while it is correct to reject H' the 
reason given is logically incorrect, as is Farris and Revlin's proposal that at this stage 
H is not rejected, rather that a new counterfactual hypothesis is generated. Oaksford 
and Chater address these shortcomings by suggesting that on receiving "yes" feedback 
to an instance of H', this triple is added to the list of instances of the original rule and 
a new hypothesis is generated that is based on examining the list of instances 
conforming to the rule for properties common to all instances. This process of 
examining the list of exemplars for common properties and testing by a counterfactual 
strategy is iterated until the boundaries of the rule are delineated. From a 
philosophical perspective this strategy employs a Bayesian approach as alternative 
hypotheses are considered and tested throughout. 
1.2.4 The Dual Goal Paradigm 
Although first rule-announcement success on the standard 2-4-6 paradigm is 
poor, Tweney et al. (1980) introduced a manipulation that improved solution rates to 
over 60%. Tweney et al. asked participants to discover two rules, one producing 
"DAX" triples ("any ascending number sequence"). the other producing "MED" 
triples ("any other number sequence"). Evidence for superior performance with these 
Dual Goal (DG) instructions is remarkably robust (e.g., Farris & Revlin, 1989a, 
1989b; Gorman, Stafford, & Gorman, 1987; Tukey, 1986; Wharton, Cheng, & 
Wickens, 1993), but explanations for the effect remain inconclusive. Tweney et al. 
suggested that the explanation for the enhanced success rates in their DG paradigm 
was related to the restructuring of the problem in such a way as to allow participants 
to use two lines of evidence related to the two hypotheses and that this may be due to 
one or more of three possible mechanisms: 
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1. Negative labelling of non-conforming triples in the standard single goal 
(SG) paradigm interferes with the participant's ability to integrate this 
information. 
2. Distinct labelling of the DAX and MED hypotheses allows them to be 
processed separately. 
3. DG instructions fundamentally alter the logical structure of the task. 
Gorman et al. (1987) suggest that the results of their earlier study (Gorman & 
Gorman, 1984) refute the first possibility as they found that when participants could 
not ask the experimenter for feedback on their tentative hypotheses, disconfirmatory 
instructions significantly improved performance. The second alternative is less 
straightforward to assess in that it is difficult to determine what form this processing 
might take. Gorman et al. (1987) suggest that instead of separate processing of two 
rules, DG instructions promote what Wason and Green (1984) call a "unified mental 
representation". Wason and Green developed a manipulation of the selection task that 
made negative information more salient, thus facilitating performance. It is possible 
that DG instructions facilitate a representation of the 2-4-6 task which promotes the 
salience of disconfirmatory information. As Gorman (1987) notes, participants in the 
standard form of the 2-4-6 task announce their rule once they have produced a rule 
sufficient to predict correct triples. If DG instructions are employed, however, this 
would be the equivalent of stopping when a rule had been produced for the DAX 
triples but little was known about MED triples. 
Gorman (1992a) suggests, therefore, that enhanced performance is achieved on 
the DG version of the 2-4-6 task by changing the task from one in which participants 
seek the limits of one rule to one in which they explore the boundaries of two 
mutually exclusive rules. Some evidence for this view is gained from the protocols of 
participants in Gorman et al.'s (1987) study. In their experiment participants were 
required to discover an even more general rule than the usual "ascending numbers" 
(Le., "three different numbers"). On post-study questioning one participant stated that 
he was trying to "change from the first triple in all ways I could to find out what the 
MED rule was" (Gorman et aI., 1987, p. 22), that is, instead of trying to falsify his 
DAX rule he was searching for a positive instance of the MED rule. In comparing the 
protocols of participants given DG versus SG instructions who had produced the triple 
0-0-0, Gorman notes that in the former case the participants started to explore the 
boundaries of these types of triple by proposing further examples in which one or 
more numbers were the same, while the participant in the SG condition concluded this 
was an exception to the rule and proposed "three consecutive integers, each multiplied 
by the same number (but not 0)". 
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Whilst separate processing of the two rules appears to be a plausible explanation 
of this latter effect, it is important to note, however, that poor performance on the SG 
task is typically attributed to a failure to seek the limits of the initial rule. Tweney et 
al. suggest that their third explanation is somewhat akin to Platt's (1964) heuristic of 
"strong inference". The strong inference heuristic is an iterative process which 
involves the development of alternative hypotheses, the devising of crucial 
experiments which will exclude one or more of these hypotheses, and the carrying out 
of these experiments. Platt's strong inference heuristic thus involves discriminating 
between two competing hypotheses by the use of critical tests. However, as Gorman et 
al. (1987) note, the strong inference heuristic is concerned with competing hypotheses, 
whereas the to-be-discovered rules in the DG paradigm are complementary. 
Explaining enhanced performance in the DG paradigm is important, since an 
account of DG facilitation could lead to substantial progress in understanding poor 
success rates on the standard paradigm. There are, in fact, several detailed 
explanations for the DG effect, with each account making different predictions about 
the factors involved. Prominent accounts are Evans' (1989) positivity bias theory, 
Wharton et at. 's (1993) goal complementarity theory, Wharton et al.'s (1995) 
information quantity theory and Vallee-Tourangeau et al.'s (1995) triple heterogeneity 
theory. Descriptions and critiques of these theories are presented in the following 
section. 
1.2.5 Theories of DG Facilitation in the 2-4-6 Paradigm 
1.2.5.1 Positivity Bias Theory 
Evans (1983, 1989) proposed that poor performance on the standard 2-4-6 task 
can be attributed to the operation of a general positivity bias, a form of selective 
processing whereby people see positive information as relevant to a task, whereas 
negative information is dismissed as irrelevant. Evans sees this tendency not as 
motivational, but rather as a result of preconscious heuristic processes which 
determine the locus of the participant's attention. Thus, rather than assuming that 
participants fail to search for falsifying information it is instead suggested that they 
fail to attend to it. On the standard Single Goal (SG) 2-4-6 task, people are viewed by 
Evans as testing positive cases that "match" their overly-restricted hypothesis (e.g., 
"ascending with equal intervals is right"), but not negative cases (triples such as 2-4-
10) that do not match such a hypotheses. As Evans (1983) puts it, "a 'wrong' 
hypothesis is semantically negative and thus overlooked" (p. 144). Interestingly this 
notion is somewhat akin to Wason's suggestion (see Tweney, Doherty, Womer, 
Pliske, Mynatt, Gross et aI., 1980) that in the standard paradigm the highly 
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informative negative triples are called "wrong", and this may prevent reasoners from 
using all the available information. At a philosophical level Popper (1989) makes a 
similar observation when citing the observations of Katz (1937), that a hungry animal 
divides the world into edible and inedible things, and that a fleeing animal sees escape 
routes and hiding places, illustrating that objects change according to the needs of the 
animal. In line with Katz's observation, Popper suggested that a scientist's point of 
view is coloured by their theoretical interests, conjectures and anticipations which 
form their "horizon of expectations". Thus in the 2-4-6 task a reasoner will focus on 
information relating to the target rule and other information will not be attended to. 
Evans (1989) argues that when DAX and MED are exchanged for the terms 
"right" and "wrong" on the DG task, people succeed not because they attempt to 
disconfirm their DAX hypothesis, but, instead, because they test the MED hypothesis 
("not ascending with equal intervals") with positive triples (e.g., 2-4-10). Because the 
structure of the DG task means that MED is the complement of DAX, a positive test 
of MED is effectively a negative test of DAX, which is precisely what is required to 
eliminate the over-specific DAX hypothesis. 
Evans' account, however, still gives rise to the question of why people in the DG 
paradigm should concern themselves with testing the MED hypothesis. In addressing 
this, Evans (1989) clarifies that it is the creation of a positive label (MED) for the 
negative hypothesis ("not ascending with equal intervals") that changes people's 
conception of the problem, thereby promoting the testing of MED hypotheses. As 
Evans (1989) explains, "When DAX and MED are substituted for "right" and 
"wrong", the two hypotheses appear to have equal standing .... Creating a positive 
label for the negative hypothesis entirely changes subjects' representation of the task" 
(p.52). 
Whilst in his updated hypothetical thinking framework Evans (2006) fails to 
outline specifically how DG instructions lead to facilitated performance on the task, a 
clear implication is that DG instructions promote the relevance of the MED/"wrong" 
information, thus the effect occurs in the heuristic processing stage. It could, however, 
be argued that DG instructions also work at the analytic stage by overcoming the 
singularity principle. On this interpretation the task moves from a Popperian 
falsification task towards a Bayesian probability task in which two alternative 
hypotheses are pitted against each other. Whilst Evans describes the hypothetical 
thinking framework as a revision of his earlier heuristic-analytic model, this updated 
model does allow for differing interpretations of the DG facilitatory effect. 
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1.2.5.2 Goal Complementarity Theory 
The goal complementarity theory (Wharton et aI., 1993) emphasises three 
factors that promote DG success: (i) the embedding of the reasoner's initial DAX 
hypothesis (e.g., "numbers ascending by 2") within the target rule of "any ascending 
sequence" (Wetherick, 1962); (ii) the complementary nature of the DAX and MED 
rules, whereby triples fall into two perfectly opposing sets that make up the entire 
universe of possible triples (Le., the DAX set reflects the experimenter's rule of "any 
ascending sequence" whilst the MED set reflects the logical opposite of DAX: "any 
sequence other than an ascending one"); and (iii) the tendency for people to adopt a 
"positive test strategy" on the 2-4-6 task (Klayman & Ha, 1987, 1989), which involves 
generating triples that match the current hypothesis (either DAX or MED) to test its 
sufficiency. Based on these assumptions, Wharton et al. propose that facilitation arises 
through two mechanisms: first, whereas in the SG task people only pursue positive 
tests of the sufficiency of a single rule, in the DG task they alternate in positively 
testing the sufficiency of both the DAX and the MED rules. Second, a positive test 
(using a triple like "2-3-10") of the sufficiency an overly broad MED hypothesis 
(such as "any sequences other than numbers ascending by 2") will lead to unexpected 
DAX feedback, thereby enabling the participant to realise not only that their current 
MED hypothesis is too broad, but also that their current DAX hypothesis is too 
narrow, thus paving the way toward effective rule discovery. 
The positive test strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987, 1989) is identical in its 
functional consequences to Evans' (1989) notion of positivity bias: both promote the 
testing of positive exemplars of a single, overly-restricted hypothesis in the SG 
paradigm, and of the DAX and MED hypotheses in the DG paradigm. Where the 
positivity bias and goal complementarity theories differ is in their accounts of why 
people test MED hypotheses at all. Whilst Evans (1989) argues that it is the positive 
labelling of a negated DAX rule that makes MED hypotheses appear relevant and 
worth testing (albeit at a preconscious level), the goal complementarity theory holds 
that people test MED hypotheses because they are directly requested to discover the 
two rules pertaining to the task. 
1.2.5.3 Information Quantity Theory 
The information quantity theory of DG facilitation (Wharton et aI., 1993) centres 
around two pieces of evidence: (1) that prior to initial rule announcement SG solvers 
test more triples than non-solvers (Farris & Revlin, 1989a; Wason, 1960); and (2) that 
DG instructions evoke the testing of more triples than SG instructions (Gorman et aI., 
1987). These observations suggest that the quantity of triples produced, irrespective of 
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their characteristics, may mediate between DG instructions and task success. 
However, this theory lacks clarity as to the specific mechanisms that promote 
increased triple testing in DG conditions; it is also questionable why increased testing 
should be associated with task success. Tweney et al. (1980) and Gorman et al. 
(Gorman et aI., 1987) have gone some way toward addressing these issues, suggesting 
that switching between the testing of two different rules in the DG paradigm may 
counter the rigid testing of a single hypothesis, thereby increasing the number of 
hypotheses examined, the quantity of triples generated, and the likelihood of success. 
The information quantity view has some merit, but seems mostly to be a useful 
description of one aspect of the data surrounding DG superiority (i.e., that DG 
instructions lead to increased triple production), and is certainly compatible with 
either the goal complementarity or positivity bias theories. Moreover, these latter 
accounts have the advantage of providing a clear explanation of why people test more 
triples in the first place with DG instructions: people do this because they are 
explicitly requested to discover two rules (the goal complementarity position) or 
because the positive labelling of negated hypotheses encourages a broader exploration 
of the hypothesis space (the positivity bias position). It is also compatible with the 
hypothetical thinking framework (Evans, 2006). Within this framework DG 
facilitation may be attributed to the overcoming of the singularity principle and 
reframing of the task in a Bayesian probability model, as two hypotheses are now 
considered and evidence for them evaluated. Recall that the Bayesian approach is 
probabilistic in nature and allows for adjustment in the scientist's confidence in their 
working hypothesis in the light of evidence collected. It seems intuitively appealing 
that such an approach would lead to more industrious hypothesis testing behaviour 
until the reasoner is satisfied that confidence in their hypothesis achieves a satisfactory 
threshold level. Despite the apparent lack of theoretical underpinnings it remains the 
case that examination of participants' protocols indicates that DG instructions 
promote both diligent testing of hypotheses and success on the task. Evidence for 
information quantity theory has largely been through post hoc analysis of participants' 
protocols with a compelling empirical investigation of the account yet to be published. 
1.2.5.4 Triple Heterogeneity Theory 
Vallee-Tourangeau, Austin, and Rankin (1995 Exp. 1) explored the link between 
DG instructions and information quantity in a study where participants had to test 15 
triples before rule announcement. This led to 44% solvers with SG instructions and 
69% solvers with DG instructions. The fact that DG solvers outstripped SG solvers 
even though the number of tests was standardised affirms that there is more to the DG 
effect that the mere quantity of triples tested. Vallee-Tourangeau et al. (1995) 
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proposed that the crucial factor underpinning DG success is not so much triple 
quantity as triple heterogeneity (the extent to which triples discriminate between 
multiple hypotheses), with DG requirements fostering a more flexible and creative 
exploration of the triple-space. This idea provides a valuable development of the 
insights concerning multiple hypothesis testing and task success presented by Tweney 
et al. (1980) and Gorman et al. (1987). It also links with Oaks ford and Chater's (1994) 
argument that, prima facie, the more hypotheses a person tests the higher will be the 
probability of success. 
Triple heterogeneity theory gains support from Vartanian, Martindale, and 
Kwiatkowski's (2003a) study which demonstrated that successful participants on the 
SG task had higher fluency scores on a measure of creative thinking than unsuccessful 
participants, and also generated more hypotheses. Intriguingly, however, they noted 
that whilst the creativity factor was predictive of task success in a stepwise multiple-
regression analysis, the number of generated hypotheses did not prove to be a reliable 
predictor. In fact, the most important factor in rule discovery was the frequency of 
disconfirming triples generated (i.e., triples that contradicted a participant's working 
hypothesis such as stating "6-5-4" to test the hypothesis "numbers ascending by 
twos"). These findings confirm the value of testing disconfirming triples as 
highlighted in Wason's (1960) original analysis of successful 2-4-6 performance, 
where people who used disconfirmation as their dominant strategy were more likely to 
announce correct rules on their first guess. However, other data discussed previously 
suggest that disconfirmation may not always be the most efficient strategy, especially 
in the initial stages of hypothesis testing (e.g. Tweney, Doherty, Womer, Pliske, 
Mynatt, Gross et al., 1980). 
1.3 Summary 
In the preceding sections the literature regarding the philosophy of hypothesis 
testing has been reviewed alongside that concerned with hypothesis testing behaviour 
in the laboratory. It is clear that there are several competing views from the 
philosophy of science as to how science progresses and that evidence from the 
psychological literature concerning hypothesis testing behaviour is mixed. It is useful 
at this stage to summarise the status of knowledge concerning hypothesis testing 
behaviour and also the limits of current research and theorising. 
What, then, is the current position regarding research and theory on hypothesis 
testing behaviour? Evidence from everyday life suggests that in general, humans are 
very successful reasoners and are able to make successful inductive inferences about 
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their environment (Poletiek, 2001). However, evidence from empirical studies 
suggests that, in the laboratory, people are rather less successful at hypothesis testing. 
Performance in the standard form of the 2-4-6 task (Wason, 1960) has been 
characterised as being less than diligent, in terms of both the number and types of tests 
that are produced, with participants using a positive test strategy (Klayman & Ha, 
1987; 1989) which leads to announcing of rules that are sufficient but not necessary in 
scope. However, the introduction of the requirement to find a second rule appears to 
induce participants to engage in a more diligent and creative exploration of the 
problem space, with a greater number of tests of a wider variety being performed with 
a commensurate improvement in performance on the task. Thus it would seem that the 
key to successful hypothesis testing appears to be to promote this type of diligent 
hypothesis testing behaviour. The difficulty is that it is unclear why DG instructions 
promote this type of behaviour, or, indeed, if it is the type and number of tests which 
are key to success or whether they are merely an artefact of an underlying 
reconceptualisation of the problem. A second difficulty lies in the dearth of studies 
which discriminate between competing theories. Although studies have been 
published which explore the various accounts, close reading of the methodologies 
shows that many vary on minor points of methodology (e.g., the number of rule 
announcement opportunities available to participants; minor changes to wording 
which make the complementarity of rules either explicit or implicit) thus making it 
difficult to arbitrate between theories. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to carry 
out a systematic series of studies in which predictions from current theories are tested. 
Table 1.1 summarises the competing accounts, elucidates the predictions each makes 
and highlights the crucial test of each account. 
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Theories of Dual Goal Facilitation, including Predictions and Empirical Tests 
Theory 
Positivity bias theory 
(Evans, 1989) 
Prediction 
Selective processing of information means that 
negatively valenced feedback will be viewed as 
irrelevant to the task 
Goal complementarity Only complementary goals cause DG facilitation, 
theory (Wharton, Cheng, with task success being dependent on the production 
& Wickens, 1993) of at least one positive triple which does not ascend 
by equal increments 
Test 
Introduction to Hypothesis Testing 
Behaviour 
Manipulate labelling offeedback (negative vs. 
positive) across instruction type (SG vs. DG) and 
compare success rates across conditions 
1. Compare performance using complementary 
versus non-complementary goal relationships. 
2. Compare the presence of at least one triple which 
does not ascend by equal increments across 
conditions and for solvers versus non-solvers 
Information quantity 
theory (Wharton et ai., 
1993) 
DG instruction promote the generation of triples, with Control number of triples required across 
Triple heterogeneity 
theory (Vallee-
success being associated with higher number of 
triples 
DG complementarity is not critical for DG 
facilitation, which instead depends upon the 
Tourangeau et ai., 1995) production of a wider variety of triples types 
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Analyse the variety of triple types across conditions 
and for solvers versus non-solvers 
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General Methodology and Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
As noted above, minor variations in methodologies in the 2-4-6 paradigm may 
well impact in important ways on the behaviour of interest. In order to avoid possible 
confounds in the present thesis it was decided to hold constant some key aspects of the 
experimental methodology throughout all reported experiments. To prevent 
unnecessary repetition these standardised aspects of the present research are outlined 
below, along with a rationale for their employment. For the same reason details of 
some of the analytic methods that were deployed in examining the empirical data in 
this thesis are also provided below. 
2.2 Scoring Success on the DG Task 
In scoring participants as being successful or unsuccessful on the OG version of 
the task it was only necessary for their initial rule announcement to relate to the OAX 
rule. Any announcements for the MEO rule were disregarded, as is standard practice 
in research with OG task variants (e.g. Vallee-Tourangeau et ai., 1995; Wharton et aI., 
1993). 
2.3 Coding of Triples for Analyses of Hypothesis Testing Strategies 
Throughout this programme of study it was necessary to analyse participants' 
hypothesis testing strategies using both quantitative and qualitative analyses of the 
triples generated. It is straightforward to obtain measures of total triple quantity (i.e., 
the cumulative count of a participant's generated triples), and of total triples receiving 
negative feedback (i.e., the cumulative count of a participant's generated triples 
receiving "MEO" or "does not fit" responses from the experimenter). Such measures 
are computed from the datasets on a by-condition basis. 
Obtaining a measure of the variety of triples generated by participants is more 
complex, and involves recourse to techniques pioneered by Vallee-Tourangeau et al. 
(1995), which focus on two main classes of triple referred to as variable positives 
(posvars) and negative types (negtypes). Posvars are triples such as 2-8-20 that receive 
positive feedback (OAX or "fits") but that do not increase by a constant number as in 
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the 2-4-6 exemplar (described as having a "constant positive" form). Thus, if the 
numbers that make up a triple are denoted by the letters a, b, and c, then a posvar is 
any triple in which (b - a) =1= (c - b), whereas a constant positive is any triple where (b _ 
a) = (c - b). Posvar scores are computed for each participant, and are simply a 
cumulative count of the number ofposvar triples produced. 
Negtypes reflects a measure of the heterogeneity of negative triples. There are 
eight possible types of triple that could receive negative feedback, such as descending 
triples and identical-number triples. The possible set of negtypes is captured by the 
following rules: (1) a> b> c; (2) a = b = c; (3) a> b < c; (4) a < b > c; (5) a = b < c; 
(6) a = b > c; (7) a > b = c; (8) a < b = c. To obtain a negtype score for each participant 
the number of distinct types of negative triple that they produced is counted. Thus, if a 
participant generates five negative triples of the same kind (say the decreasing triples 
of the a> b > c form), then their negtype score equals one. If the participant generates 
three negatives, two decreasing and one a < b > c "hill" kind, then their negtype score 
would be two. These indices of triple heterogeneity are used throughout the present 
research to provide insight into participants' hypothesis testing strategies. 
2.4 Restricting Opportunities for Rule Announcement 
One way in which the methodology employed in the 2-4-6 task varies is in the 
number of rule announcements which are permitted. In his original study Wason 
(1960) asked participants to test triples until they were confident of the rule, at which 
point they should announce their hypothesis. If this hypothesis was incorrect, they 
were informed of this and asked to continue generating and testing triples; thus 
participants were encouraged to continue with the task until either they had discovered 
the rule or they had reached the time limit. 
Many researchers followed this methodology and allowed multiple rule 
announcements (e.g., Rossi, Cavemi & Girotto, 2001; Tukey, 1986; Vallee-
Tourangeau & Payton, 2008). However, by allowing multiple rule announcements 
participants now have a second (and more powerful) method of testing their 
hypotheses, that of asking the researcher for feedback on their hypothesis (Gorman, 
1992). This additional method lacks ecological validity in terms of modelling 
scientific discovery in that scientists are not able to appeal to an outside authority (i.e., 
the experimenter) to check the truth of a working hypothesis, and as such undermines 
the task as a method of investigating scientific enquiry. 
A second issue with allowing mUltiple rule announcements is that in this thesis 
participants' hypothesis testing strategies were delineated by the coding of triples as 
- 40-
Chapter 2 
General Methodology and Analysis 
outlined above. Allowing a secondary method of hypothesis testing may impact on 
triple generation patterns and therefore undermine the analysis of triple generation 
profiles as a method of uncovering hypothesis testing strategies. For these reasons, 
and to maintain a level of comparability across the experiments to be reported in this 
thesis, it was decided to employ the methodology of Gorman (l992b) in which 
participants are allowed a single opportunity to announce the target rule. 
2.5 Reporting of Effect Sizes 
In line with APA (2001) recommendations, effect sizes are reported wherever 
possible. As effect sizes are independent of sample size such a strategy enables 
comparison of effects across studies and analyses thereby providing a measure of the 
degree to which the phenomenon of interest is present in the population. There are a 
variety of possible effect size statistics available to the researcher, but effect size 
statistics reported here follow the recommendations of Cohen (1977; 1988), that is, for 
t tests and Mann Whitney tests Cohen's d is reported, for chi square analyses, W, and 
for two-way ANOV As, i{ Throughout the thesis the convention of regarding effect 
sizes as small, medium or large as described by Cohen is also adhered to, although 
note is taken of Cohen's caution that such descriptors may inherently be misleading 
given that qualitative concepts such as large are sometimes understood as absolute and 
other times as relative. Table 2.1 gives Cohen's descriptions of small, medium and 
large effect sizes for effect size statistics employed in this thesis. 
Table 2-1 
Descriptors of Effect Size Index (after Cohen, 1977; 1988) 
Test Index Small Medium Large 
Independent t test d .20 .50 .80 
Two-way ANOV A ,2 11 .01 .059 .138 
Chi square test of independence W .10 .30 .50 
Mann Whitney U d .20 .50 .80 
Notes: Conversion from/to i]2 by Clark-Carter (2004), and d in Mann Whitney U converted from z test 
using calculation recommended in Clark-Carter (2004). 
- 41 -
Chapter 2 
General Methodology and Analysis 
2.6 Path Analysis and Logistic Regression 
Some of the theories to be explored in this thesis predict the effect of one 
variable on the outcome variable by a third, mediating variable. For this reason it has 
been necessary to explore such mediation effects using path analysis (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). However the outcome variable in these analyses is dichotomous (solver/non-
solver; presence/absence of triple type) which required analysis using logistic 
regression. However, because the quantitative logic of path analysis does not work 
effectively with logistic regression, it was necessary to use linear regression for this 
mediation analysis. This is not ideal given the dichotomous nature of the relevant 
variables, but in such cases comparisons of obtained p values for logistic and linear 
regressions are presented to illustrate the high degree of similarity in the statistical 
outcomes of these two approaches, and thereby to validate the use of the linear-
regression procedure with the dataset. 
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Experiment 1: Comparing Positivity Bias and Goal 
Complementarity Theories 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this first experiment was to develop a crucial test to arbitrate 
between the Evans (1989) positivity bias and Wharton et aI.' s (1993) goal 
complementarity views of the 2-4-6 task as measured in terms of successful initial rule 
announcement. Recall that the positivity bias account attributes facilitation to the 
overcoming of preconscious heuristic processes which cause the reasoner to attend to 
positive rather than negative information. Relabelling the negatively valenced 
"wrong" feedback to the positively valenced "MED" feedback is proposed to cause 
the reasoner to overcome this tendency and promotes the testing of the MED 
hypothesis leading to successful delineation of the DAX and MED boundaries 
respectively. The goal complementarity account, however, suggests that facilitation is 
caused by a combination of the embedding of the initial hypothesis in the target 
hypothesis, the mutually exclusive but exhaustive set boundaries of the two rules, and 
the tendency to positive testing (Klayman & Ha, 1987, 1989). The combination of 
these three factors, along with the requirement to discover two rules, leads the 
reasoners to alternatively test the DAX and MED hypotheses leading to successful 
rule discovery. 
Despite the conceptual overlap between these accounts a crucial test is possible 
(cf. Wharton et aI., 1993). The key difference between these theories is that whilst for 
Evans (1989) DG facilitation is tied to the use of a positive label (MED) to denote a 
negative hypothesis Cnot ascending with equal intervals is wrong"), for Wharton et al. 
(1993), what is critical is the explicit instruction for participants to discover the MED 
as well as the DAX rule in the DG paradigm. One consequence of the positivity bias 
theory is that it would predict that participants given positively labelled hypotheses 
(DAX and MED) should perform better than participants given mixed valence 
hypotheses of the form "fits" (positively labelled) and "does not fit" (negatively 
labelled) regardless of whether SG or DG instructions are employed. In contrast, the 
goal complementarity theory would predict that participants given the task of 
discovering two complementary hypotheses should be more successful than those 
seeking a single hypothesis, regardless of the way in which these rules are labelled. 
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Theories 
In addition to arbitrating between the goal complementarity theory and the 
positivity bias account of DG facilitation a secondary aim of this study was to explore 
the triple heterogeneity (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995) and information quantity 
(Wharton et aI., 1993) accounts of DG facilitation by determining whether the number 
and characteristics of triples produced mediate successful rule discovery. The triple 
heterogeneity account proposes that facilitation is a result of the wide exploration of 
the problem space as indexed by the variety of triples generated which is instrumental 
to success on the task, whereas information quantity theory proposes that DG 
instructions promote increased triple production which in tum leads to successful 
performance. 
Thus for Experiment I it was decided to independently manipulate the mode of 
instruction and the linguistic labelling of feedback to arbitrate between the positivity 
bias and goal complementarity accounts of the DG facilitation effect and to undertake 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the triples participants produced in order 
to help discriminate between the competing accounts of DG performance. Predictions 
derived from the positivity bias account suggest that in terms of task performance 
participants given DAX versus MED feedback will be more successful than those 
given "fits" versus "does not fit" feedback, while the goal complementarity account 
suggests that performance will be better in the DG variant regardless of the linguistic 
labelling of the feedback. In terms of triple generation profiles the predictions for the 
different theories can be summarised as follows: (l) the goal complementarity theory 
predicts that production of a posvar triple will be associated with success; (2) the 
information quantity account suggests that DG instructions will promote generation of 
a greater number of triples and that this will be associated with success on the task; 
and (3) the triple heterogeneity theory emphasises that success on the DG variant is 
associated with a wider range of triples being generated and therefore predicts a higher 
negtype score for both those in the DG condition and successful solvers. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Sixty undergraduates from Derby University participated in the experiment for 
course credit. They had not received any prior teaching on the psychology of 
reasoning. 
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The experiment involved random allocation of 15 participants to each of four 
conditions. Two conditions presented DG instructions and included a linguistic 
labelling manipulation whereby participants were either asked to discover DAX and 
MED rules (positive label condition) or "fits" and "does not fit" rules (mixed label 
condition). The remaining two conditions involved SG instructions and simply acted 
as controls for the presented feedback in the DG conditions (i.e., feedback was either 
of the form DAX-MED or "fits"-"does not fit"). 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of up to four in a quiet laboratory. The 
following safeguards avoided social contamination of individual results: (I) 
participants sat well apart in screened cubicles, (2) participants wrote down triples and 
rules and were provided with written feedback; and (3) no spoken communication was 
permitted during the experiment (see Gorman & Gorman, 1984; Gorman et aI., 
1987for effective use of group testing with the 2-4-6 task). The SG instructions 
referred to a unique rule that needed to be discovered, and stated, "I have in mind a 
rule that specifies how to make up sequences of three numbers (triples), and your task 
is to discover this rule". In what is subsequently referred to as the SG-Fits condition, 
participants were asked to discover the target rule by generating triples that they 
would then be told either fitted or did not fit the rule that the experimenter had in 
mind. In the SG-DAX condition, participants were told that triples that fitted the rule 
were called DAX triples and those that did not fit the rule were called MED triples. It 
was explained to participants that on generating a triple they would be informed as to 
whether it was a DAX or a MED type. 
The DG instructions emphasised that there were two rules to be discovered, 
"Your task is discover this rule, and also a second rule for categorising the triples 
that do not fit my rule". In the DG-Fits condition participants were asked to generate 
triples that would be classified in terms of whether they fitted or did not fit the rule. In 
the standard DG task (DG-DAX) participants were informed that triples that fitted the 
rule were called DAX and those that did not fit the rule were called MED. They were 
instructed to produce further triples that the experimenter would classify as being 
DAX orMED. 
Participants in all conditions were given "2-4-6" as the example triple. All 
participants were also provided with an answer sheet and were asked to write "2-4-6" 
on the first row and either "fits" or "DAX" in the feedback column, as appropriate. 
They were instructed that they could produce as many triples as they wished, and that 
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when they were sure of the rule(s) they should write it/them on the answer sheet. In 
line with Gorman et aI., (I 992a) participants were allowed only one guess at the rule 
or rules. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Solution success across conditions 
Table 3.1 shows the frequency of correct and incorrect initial rule 
announcements in each of the experimental conditions. A number of findings are 
apparent. First, nearly four times the number of participants in the DG conditions 
announced the correct rule when compared with the SG baseline conditions. Second, 
the linguistic labelling manipulation associated with the DG rules had little impact on 
rule discovery, with nearly equal numbers of participants finding the sought for rule in 
the positive label and mixed label conditions. Third, the distribution of initial solvers 
and non solvers was identical across the SG conditions, indicating that the labelling of 
feedback (DAX-MED vs. "fits"-"does not fit") had no effect on the likelihood of 
successful rule announcement. 
A contingency table chi square analysis was performed on the frequencies of 
correct and incorrect announcements, collapsing across the two SG conditions and the 
two DG conditions (see Table 3.1). This revealed a highly reliable effect of Goal 
Requirement (SG vs. DG), X2 (1, N = 60) = 19.29, P < .001, W = .57. In terms of 
correct rule announcements the results arbitrate in favour of the predictions of the goal 
complementarity account of DG facilitation (e.g. Wharton et aL, 1993) and against the 
predictions of the positivity bias account (e.g. Evans 1989). 
3.3.2 Quantity and variety of triples generated across conditions 
Table 3.1 presents mean scores by condition for the number of posvars and 
negtypes generated in the present study, as well as means for the total quantity of 
triples generated and the number of triples receiving negative feedback. To examine 
whether the experimental manipulations had an effect on any of these indices, a series 
of two-way analysis of variance (ANOV A) tests were undertaken where the factors 
were Goal Requirement (SG vs. DG) and Linguistic Labelling of Feedback (i.e., the 
experimental controls involving the linguistic balancing of feedback across the SG 
and DG tasks allowed for a comparison between conditions where DAX-MED 
feedback had been given vs. conditions where "fits"-"does not fit" feedback had been 
presented). 
- 46-
Table 3-1 
Experiment 1: Comparing Positivity Bias and Goal 
Chapter 3 
Complementarity Theories 
Frequency of Correct Initial Rule Announcements (Solvers vs. Non solvers), Mean Numbers of Total Triples Produced, Types of Triples 
Produced (Posvars or Negative Types), and Triples Receiving Negative Feedback, by Condition 
N Solvers Non-Solvers Total Triples Posvars 
Negative Negative 
Condition Types Feedback 
SG-DAX 15 3 12 7.60 (1.62) 0.33 (0.16) 0.33 (0.16) 0.73 (0.33) 
SG-Fits 15 3 12 5.87 (0.71) 0.53 (0.35) 0.80 (0.37) 0.93 (0.41) 
DG-DAX 15 12 3 10.27 (1.63) 1.13 (0.27) 1.20 (0.22) 2.67 (0.50) 
DG-Fits 15 1 I 4 8.33 (0.83) 1.07 (0.28) 0.93 (0.21) 1.40 (0.32) 
Note: SG = Single Goal; DG = Dual Goal. Standard error of the mean in parentheses. 
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Consistent with the task success analyses already reported, Linguistic Labelling 
of Feedback produced no reliable differences on any of the measures of triple quantity 
or type. With regard to Goal Requirement, however, there were significant main 
effects on total number of triples produced, F(1, 56) = 4.09, p < .05, i]2 = .066, number 
of triples receiving negative feedback, F(1, 56) = 9.10,p < .01, i]2 = .129, and number 
of posvars, F(1, 56) = 5.86, p < .05, i]2 = .094, thus the effect sizes reported here are in 
the medium to large range. The difference in the number of negative types produced 
across SG and DG conditions also approached significance, F(1, 56) = 3.96, p = .052, 
i]2 = .063. There were no significant interactions between factors for any of the 
measures (all Fs < I). These results underline the importance of DG instructions as a 
determining factor in engendering quantitative and qualitative changes in triple 
generation on the 2-4-6 task. As such, the findings again favour the goal 
complementarity view of DG facilitation. 
3.3.3 Presence of triple types and solution success 
Although the previous analyses indicate an effect of DG instructions on 
measures of triple quantity and type, they do not reveal the importance of generating 
specific types of triple for actual task success. Further analyses in which the 
production of either at least one posvar or at least one negative type was crossed with 
success were therefore pursued. Such analyses are important for a simple but critical 
reason. The point is, both the goal complementarity and the positivity bias accounts 
place a central emphasis on the role of posvars in engendering successful rule 
announcement, that is, both accounts claim that once people generate a posvar (e.g., 2-
4-10) that receives DAX or "fits" feedback they should be able to ascertain 
immediately that the DAX or "fits" rule is broader than the initially hypothesised 
form. On the other hand, both theories are silent as to the value of negative testing in 
facilitating task success. 
To examine the association between generation of posvars and success a 
contingency table was produced in which the production by a participant of at least 
one posvar was crossed with successful rule discovery. Table 3.2 reveals that such an 
association is indeed evident, with substantially more participants who produced a 
posvar making a correct rule announcement compared to those who did not produce a 
posvar. A chi squared analysis confirmed the reliability of this observation, X2 (I, N = 
60) = 13.14,p < .001, w = .468. 
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Frequency of Correct Rule Announcements by Presence versus Absence of Posvar 
Triples. and by Presence versus Absence of Negative Triples 
Presence of triple type 
Posvar present 
Posvar absent 
Total 
Negative triple present 
Negative triple absent 
Total 
N 
25 
35 
34 
26 
Solvers 
19 
10 
29 
28 
29 
Success 
Non-Solvers 
6 
25 
31 
6 
25 
31 
Table 3.2 also shows a contingency table in which production of at least one 
negative triple was crossed with success. Here the association is even more striking 
than in the case of posvar production, with there being only one instance of a 
participant correctly announcing the rule but not producing a negative triple. In 
contrast, of the 34 participants who did produce a negative triple, 28 solved the task. 
A chi square analysis indicated these differences were highly significant, X2 (I, N = 
60) = 36.36, p < .001 W = .778. These latter findings - that production of at least a 
single triple receiving negative feedback is more closely associated with success than 
production of a single posvar - seem paradoxical. Since most incorrect rule 
announcements are of the "numbers ascending by equal intervals" type it would 
appear that only production of posvars could lead to the falsification of overly-
restricted hypotheses, whereas production of negative triples would seem of little 
obvious value for rule discovery. 
To clarify the association between the triple type variables and task success the 
dataset was modelled using logistic regression. An initial model using negative triple 
(present vs. absent) as the predictor variable, and success (solver vs. non solver) as the 
outcome variable, revealed that negative triple was a highly reliable predictor of task 
success, B = 4.76, Wald = 18.23, P < .001. A second model using posvar (present vs. 
absent) as the predictor, and success (solver vs. non solver) as the outcome variable 
again revealed this predictor to be reliable, B = 2.07, Wald = 11.91, P < .001. A final 
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model was assessed in which negative triple and posvar were regressed onto success 
in a hierarchical manner to examine whether the posvar predictor had an effect 
additional to the negative triple predictor. Negative triple was selected as the first 
predictor due to the considerably higher overall chi square value obtained for Modell, 
X2 = 42.95,p < .001, than for Model 2, X2 =13.68,p < .001. This third model showed 
that negative triple continued to be a highly reliable predictor of task success, B = 
4.58, Wald = 15.71, p < .001, but with negative triple controlled for the posvar 
predictor failed to achieve significance, B = 1.72, Wald = 3.55, P > .05. This finding 
suggests that the production of posvar triples may have a limited association with 
successful rule discovery on the 2-4-6 task in comparison to the more striking 
influence that the generation of negative triples seems to have. 
Since production of negative triples appeared to have such a strong association 
with task success it was important to examine what specific property of negative 
triples might underpin this phenomenon. It was clear upon scrutinising the negative 
triples which participants generated that the majority were "descending" in nature, and 
that most other types of negative triples were produced infrequently (only 10 
participants produced a negative type distinct from the descending a > b > c form). For 
this reason all negative triples apart from those of the a > b > C type were collapsed 
into a single pool. Separate analyses were then pursued comparing: (1) the effect of 
producing versus not producing at least one descending triple on task success, and (2) 
the effect of producing versus not producing at least one other type of negative triple 
on task success. Logistic regression revealed that participants generating a descending 
triple were 142 times more likely to solve the task than those not producing a 
descending triple, B = 4.98, Wald = 19.47,p < .001. Production versus non production 
of at least one other type of negative triple was also predictive of success, B = 2.60, 
Wald = 5.67, P = .017, although clearly not to such a marked degree as production 
versus non production of descending triples. 
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Summary of Mediation Analysis of the Relationship Between Goal, Production of at Least One Descending Triple, and Success, Using Linear 
Regression (Including a Comparison of the p Values Obtained Using Linear and Logistic Regression) 
Variables in Regression Analysis 
Goal onto Solver 
Goal onto Descending Triple 
Goal and Descending Triple onto 
Solver 
Goal 
Descending 
5\ 
B Beta 
.567 .567 
.500 .503 
.215 .215 
.703 .700 
p values obtained 
SE(B) Linear Logistic 
Regression regression 
.108 <.00\ <.00\ 
.113 <.00\ <.001 
.086 .015 .030 
.086 <.001 <.001 
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The results of the logistic regression analyses are instructive, but the role of 
production of a descending triple in mediating between goal requirement (SG vs. DG) 
and task success could better be illustrated using path analysis (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). However, as noted in Chapter 2, because the quantitative logic of path analysis 
does not work effectively with logistic regression, it was necessary to use linear 
regression for this mediation analysis. This is not ideal given the dichotomous nature 
of the relevant variables, but comparisons of obtained p values for logistic and linear 
regressions (Table 3.3) are presented to illustrate the high degree of similarity in the 
statistical outcomes of these two approaches, and thereby to validate the use of the 
linear regression procedure with the present dataset. Table 3.3 also summarises the 
results of this path analysis of the relationship between Goal Requirement (SG vs. 
DG), Descending Triple (present vs. absent), and Success (solver vs. non solver) in 
the 2-4-6 task. The amount of mediation relating to the production of a descending 
triple was large (0.352). A Sobel test revealed that this mediating effect was highly 
reliable, Goodman (I) = 3.87,p < .001. 
3.4 General Discussion 
Task success findings reported here indicate that the DG superiority effect in the 
2-4-6 task cannot be attributed to labelling a negatively valenced "does not fit" 
hypothesis as a positively valenced "MED" hypothesis: Participants instructed to 
discover two rules performed significantly better than those in SG conditions, 
regardless of whether the two rules were defined as DAX-MED or as "fits"-"does not 
fit". Such findings support key elements of Wharton et al. 's (1993) goal 
complementarity account of the facilitatory effect of DG instructions, and run counter 
to Evans' (1983; 1989) positivity bias account which proposes that people selectively 
attend to positively labelled information at the expense of attending to potentially 
useful information that is negatively labelled. Although the idea of positivity bias 
affecting hypothesis testing is appealing (cf. Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003), it 
seems that the concept of a generalised positivity bias cannot easily extend to an 
explanation of behaviour on Wason's 2-4-6 task. 
Despite the solution success evidence for goal complementarity theory it could 
be argued that a strong version of this theory is undermined by evidence that strict rule 
complementarity is unnecessary for rule discovery. For example, Vallee-Tourangeau 
et al. (1995) ran DG conditions that explicitly suggested a non-complementary 
representation of the DAX and MED rules. In one condition participants were told 
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that triples could be DAX, MED or neither, and in another they were told that triples 
could be DAX, MED, or both. With these manipulations 80% of people still 
discovered the DAX rule on initial announcement. One weakness of Vallee-
Tourangeau et aI.' s (1995) study was that although the apparent relationship between 
the DAX and MED rules was manipulated such that they were not represented as 
complementary, the reality was that (unbeknownst to participants) the two rules 
actually remained logically complementary and feedback other than DAX or MED 
was never given. 
As for information quantity theory (Wharton et aI., 1993) these results support 
the view that DG instructions promote increased test generation when compared with 
SG instructions. Likewise, in relation to triple heterogeneity theory (Vallee-
Tourangeau et aI., 1995), increased generation of triples receiving negative feedback 
and increased posvar triples in DG conditions relative to SG ones was observed. It 
thus seems that DG facilitation is mediated by both quantitative and qualitative 
changes in triple testing behaviour. As noted previously, however, information 
quantity and triple heterogeneity theories are perhaps more descriptive than 
explanatory in emphasis, and may be better subsumed within other contemporary 
accounts of the 2-4-6 task. 
The analyses of triple types across condition and success also offer some support 
for the hypothetical thinking framework (Evans, 2006). Recall that it was observed 
that this framework attributes poor performance on the SG variant of the task to a 
combination of the relevance principle at the heuristic processing level leading to the 
production of an overly-restricted DAX rule, and the satisficing principle at the 
analytic processing level which leads to acceptance of this overly-restricted hypothesis 
as being "good enough". It was suggested, however, that the third principle of the 
hypothetical thinking framework, singularity, may impact on DG facilitation; that the 
instruction to find the second rule may in fact lead to overcoming the tendency to 
consider only one hypothesis at a time. It was argued that such an explanation would 
lead to a more Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing as the two alternative 
hypotheses are considered. It would be expected that this would lead to more 
extensive testing of the two hypotheses as the reasoner's confidence varied according 
to the strength of the evidence collected unti I a criterion confidence level is achieved. 
Thus predictions derived from this approach would be both increased triple 
production and triple variety in the DG variant of the task as participants are required 
to test two hypotheses. These predictions are supported by the findings of this study. 
The final set of analyses also reveal a hitherto unremarked phenomenon. It has 
long been noted that people who solve the 2-4-6 task tend to produce more triples as 
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well as a greater proportion of negative triples (Wason, 1960). It has also been 
demonstrated more recently that solvers generate a greater variety of triples (e.g. 
Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995). What has not previously been shown, however, is 
that it is the production of at least a single negative triple that is so closely associated 
with success on the task. Indeed it remains possible that other indices of success such 
as the total number of triples produced or overall triple variety may well be mediating 
factors through which the critical negative triple is produced as a result of task 
manipulations. This is an area which would seem to require closer investigation. 
The basic observation that negative triple production is so closely related to task 
success, does, at first sight, appear rather paradoxical The point is, that given the 
typically overly restrictive hypotheses which participants form, it seems intuitively 
obvious that it should be the production of the discriminatory posvars (rather than 
negative triples) that would be most strongly associated with task success. Although 
these results do indicate that posvar generation is significantly linked to correct initial 
rule announcements on the task, it remains striking that the production of negative 
triples is even more predictive of task success. Why might this be the case? 
One possibility is that the production of a descending triple (and its associated 
MED or "does not fit" feedback) somehow makes the general dimension of ascending 
numbers appear to be relevant to the target DAX or "fits" rule. The concept 
"descending" may have this effect by facilitating the establishment of a salient 
contrast class that promotes an insight into the potential scope of the target rule. 
Closer investigation of the precise role of negative triples in facilitating task success -
perhaps through the invocation of clear contrast sets within the space of possible 
triples - would, therefore, appear to be essential. To achieve this a finer-grained 
system of codifying the triples that participants produce may be required. 
Overall, it could be argued that this study has progressed an understanding of 
DG facilitation effects in the 2-4-6 task. The basic task success measures provide little 
support for a positivity bias view of the DG effect (e.g. Evans 1989), as increased 
levels of task success can arise even with negatively labelled rules, so long as 
participants are still instructed to discover two rules. Although this latter result 
provides support for the goal complementarity view that direct requests to discover 
two rules are central to DG facilitation (Wharton et aI., 1993), it has also been argued 
that there is other evidence that calls into question the necessity of having logically 
complementary rules within DG manipulations. Indeed, the idea that DG instructions 
may promote production of descending triples seems to be more pivotal to enhanced 
performance of DG variants of the 2-4-6 task, an observation which runs contrary to 
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the predictions of goal complementarity theory, and as such is a notion which needs to 
be explored more fully. 
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4.1 Introduction 
While Experiment 1 demonstrated that the positivity bias account (Evans, 1983; 
1989) is not a convincing explanation of DG facilitation, the analyses did little to 
discriminate between other competing accounts of the effect. It was noted that as 
predicted by the information quantity account (Wharton et aI., 1993) solvers did 
indeed produce more triples than non-solvers. In addition, as triple heterogeneity 
account predicts (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995), the triples generated by solvers 
were seen to be of a greater variety than those of non-solvers. It was also noted that 
some support for the goal complementarity account (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995) 
was obtained in that the request to discover two complementary rules appeared to 
promote success on the task. Evidence for this was, however, somewhat equivocal in 
that, in contrast to the predictions of goal complementarity, the production of a 
descending triple was more closely associated with success on the task than was the 
production of a posvar triple. However, this is the first time that such an association 
has been reported and, as such, this finding needs to be replicated. 
These observations led to the second experiment in this series of studies, which 
instituted a manipulation that aimed to test directly the information quantity account 
of DG facilitation. Although Wharton et al. (1993, Exp. 3) tested the information 
quantity account of the task against the goal complementarity account, their 
manipulation required participants to generate at least 5 triples prior to rule 
announcement. However, participants were actually allowed to generate more than 5 
triples, and, as such, triple generation was therefore not strictly controlled. The results 
of the study showed that individuals in the DG condition did, in fact, produce more 
triples than those in the SG condition, and that they were also more successful. 
However, while it is the case that DG instructions both increase triple production and 
improve performance, these observations both rely on post hoc analyses of 
performance, thus a claim of a causal mechanism cannot be made. Indeed it may be 
that some other mechanism underlies both of these observations. 
A stronger test of the information quantity hypothesis would be to manipulate 
the number of triples participants are required to produce across instruction type and 
compare success rates. If merely quantitative changes in triple production are 
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sufficient to promote success on the DG variant of the task then simply requiring 
participants to produce more triples would have a favourable effect on performance 
regardless of instruction type. Wharton et al. do not provide analyses of the types of 
triples produced and it is thus unclear whether there were qualitative differences in the 
types of triples produced by their DG and SG participants, which would indicate 
differing hypothesis testing strategies. Vallee-Tourangeau et al. (1995, Exp. 1) 
implemented a manipulation which addressed these issues when they required 
participants to generate exactly 15 triples in both their SG and DG conditions before 
announcing the rule. Analysis of triples produced in their study showed that 
participants in the DG condition were more successful than those in the SG goal 
condition, that on average they produced more than twice the number of negative 
triples, more posvar triples and more types of negative triple. These results suggest 
that DG instructions do indeed cause qualitative changes in triple production and it 
might therefore be that increased triple production is merely an artefact of this. 
One criticism of Vallee-Tourangeau et aI.' s study is that there are few reported 
instances of participants producing 15 triples with either SG or DG instructions, and it 
is a possibility that the requirement for such a large number of triples affected the 
hypothesis testing strategies of their participants. For this reason it was decided to 
replicate the study with the additional requirement that participants produce either 6, 
12 or 18 triples. These numbers of triples were selected after an informal review of the 
rule discovery task literature which showed that in the majority of studies the mean 
number of triples produced before the first rule announcement was just under six 
when using SG instructions (e.g. Wason, 1960; Wharton et aI., 1993). It is more 
difficult to ascertain the typical number of triples produced in the DG condition, but 
Experiment 1 indicated that when responding to standard DG instructions the mean 
number of triples generated was just over 10. With 11 being an unusual request, and to 
avoid alerting participants to the relevance of the number of triples demanded, it was 
decided to ask for 12 triples as being representative of DG triple production. The 18 
triple condition was introduced as a final comparator on the basis that if the 
information quantity has a role to play in dual goal facilitation then participants in this 
group would be more successful than those asked to produce six or twelve triples. As 
with Experiment 1, a series of post hoc analyses was planned to arbitrate between 
other competing theories of DG facilitation, including the notion that contrast class 
cues may have a role to play, as mentioned n the previous chapter. Table 4.1 
summarises the various theories, the predictions that can be derived from them and the 
planned analyses. 
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Theories of Dual Goal Facilitation Examined in the Present Study, Including Predictions and Empirical Tests 
Account 
Information quantity 
theory (Wharton et 
aI., 1993) 
Goal 
complementarity 
theory (Wharton et 
aI., 1993) 
Triple heterogeneity 
theory (Vallee-
Tourangeau et aI., 
1995) 
Contrast class theory 
(Experiment I) 
Features To Test 
DG instructions promote triple generation. Manipulate number of 
Task success is dependent on producing a triples across instruction 
high number of triples regardless of condition. type. 
Only complementary goals cause DG 
facilitation. 
Task success dependent on the production of 
at least one posvar triple 
DG facilitation depends upon the production 
of a wider variety oftriples types 
DG instructions promote production of 
descending triple 
Descending triple generation associated with 
task success 
Compare presence of 
posvars across conditions as 
well as for solvers versus 
non-solvers 
Analyse the variety of triple 
types across conditions as 
well as for solvers versus 
non-solvers 
Compare presence of 
descending triple across 
instruction mode and for 
solvers versus non-solvers 
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Prediction 
Success rates will rise with 
requirement to produce more triples 
regardless of instruction type 
Production of a posvar triple 
mediates between type of 
instruction and success on the task 
Variety of triples produced mediates 
between type of instruction and 
success on the task 
Production of a Descending triple 
mediates between instruction mode 
and success on the task 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Ninety sixth form students from local schools and colleges (aged 18 or over) took 
part voluntarily in the study. No participants had received training in logic or 
reasoning before the experiment. 
4.2.2 Design 
A fully between participants design was employed that manipulated two factors: 
Goal (Single Goal vs. Dual Goal), and Number of Triples (6, 12 or 18). Fifteen 
participants were randomly assigned to each of the six resulting conditions. 
4.2.3 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of two to four, with each participant producing 
written triples and receiving written feedback. Participants were provided with a sheet 
on which to record triples, feedback and their best guess at the rule after producing the 
required number of triples. 
Single Goal (SG) instructions referred to a unique rule and are reproduced here in 
full: "1 have in mind a rule that specifies how to make up sequences of three numbers 
(triples), and your task is to discover this rule. Triples that fit my rule are called DAX 
triples, and those that do not fit my rule are called MED triples. To start you off, I can 
tell you that 2-4-6 is a DAX triple. In order to discover the DAX rule you should 
produce further number triples, and I will tell you whether they are DAX triples, or 
whether they are MED triples ". They were further instructed to test 6, 12 or 18 triples 
after which they would be asked to write what they thought was the rule for producing 
DAX triples. 
Dual Goal (DG) instructions differed from those for the SG condition by the 
insertion of the phrase: " ... your task is to discover this rule, and also a second rule for 
categorising the triples that do not fit my rule". DG participants were instructed to test 
6, 12 or 18 triples according to condition, after which they would be asked to write 
what they thought was the rule for producing DAX and MED triples. 
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4.3 Results and Discussion 
4.3.1 Task Success across Conditions 
Table 4.2 shows the percentage of correct and incorrect initial rule announcements 
in each of the experimental conditions. A number of findings are apparent. First, 
contrary to the prediction of the information quantity account (Wharton et aI., 1993) 
nearly twice the number of participants in the DG condition solved than in the SG 
condition. Second, success rates did not improve as the number of triples generated 
increased. Indeed, there is some indication that in this study 12 triples was the 
optimum number of triples to be produced. 
Table 4-2 
Percentage of Successful Participants as a Function of Instruction Type and Number 
of Triples Generated 
Number of Triples Demanded 
Instruction Type 6 12 18 Overall 
Single Goal 20 53 26 33 
Dual Goal 46 73 60 60 
Total 33 63 43 
A chi-square test of independence was performed on the frequencies of correct and 
incorrect announcements, collapsing across the three SG conditions and three DG 
conditions. This revealed a highly reliable effect of instruction type (SG vs. DG), X2 
(1, N = 90) = 6.43, p < .05, W = .27. Further chi square analyses showed there to be no 
effect of triple numbers produced within either instruction types: DG - X2 (2, N = 45) 
= 2.22, p > .05; SG - X2 (2, N = 45) = 4.20, P > .05. However, collapsing the two less 
successful conditions (6 and 18 triples) together and comparing success rates against 
those achieved in the 12 triple condition confirms that in this study generating 12 
triples was significantly associated with success on the task, i (2, N = 90) = 5.02, P < 
.025, w= .34. In terms of correct rule announcements, then, the results of this study go 
some way toward arbitrating against the predictions of the information quantity 
account (Wharton et aI., 1993). 
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4.3.2 Analysis of Triples Generated 
4.3.2.1 Analysis of Triple Generation Profiles across Solvers and Non Solvers 
Further analyses of the data across those solving and not solving were carried out 
to help arbitrate between competing accounts of DG facilitation. Recall that the triple 
heterogeneity theory (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995) proposes that a wide search of 
the problem space (as indexed by the variety of triples produced) will lead to success 
on the task, whilst the goal complementarity theory (Wharton et aI., 1993) suggests 
that it is the production of posvar triples which is critical for success. 
Since participants were forced to produce 6, 12 or 18 triples and this may impact 
on the numbers of triple types produced, a proportional score of the number of each 
triple type generated relative to the number of triples required was calculated and used 
in the analysis (see Table 4.3). A series oft tests showed that with the exception of the 
proportion of posvar triples (which approached significance), (88) = 1.98, p = .051, 
there was a significant difference between the proportions of all measures of triple 
heterogeneity across success. Solvers produced a lower proportion of constant 
positives, t(88) = 5.89, p < .001, d = 1.06, and a higher proportion of both negative 
triples (88) = 8.124,p < .001, d= 1.31 and types of negative triples (88) = 5.42,p < 
.001, d = 1.00. These results offer support to the triple heterogeneity account of DG 
facilitation, and while they do not offer direct support for the goal complementarity 
account it would be difficult to make the claim that they arbitrate against it. 
4.3.2.2 Analysis of Triple Generation Profiles across Number of Triples 
Generated 
Given the observation of the differing patterns of triple production across 
successful and non-successful participants and the pattern of performance across the 
requirement to produce different numbers of triples, it was decided to explore whether 
the requirement to produce more (or fewer) triples impacted on the types of triples 
produced. This analysis was conducted using the proportion of each triple type 
produced relative to the total number of triples elicited. Exploration of the data 
showed the data were not normally distributed for any of the variables; furthermore, 
transformation of the data did not achieve normal distributions. Kruskal Wallace one-
way ANOV As were therefore performed. 
Table 4.4 shows the medians and IQR of the proportions of types of triples 
generated across conditions. Analysis showed that in common with the triples 
produced by solvers and non-solvers there were differences across all measures of 
triple heterogeneity with the exception of production of posvar triples, which 
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Table 4-3 
Proportions a/Triple Types Produced across Solvers and Non-Solvers 
Triple Type Success N Mean SE 
Constant positives Solver 42 0.412 0.032 
Non-solver 48 0.818 0.058 
Posvars Solver 42 0.146 0.025 
Non-solver 48 0.085 0.019 
Negative feedback Solver 42 0.438 0.025 
Non-solver 48 0.133 0.027 
Number of negative Solver 
types 42 0.181 0.014 
Non-solver 
48 0.072 0.014 
approached but failed to achieve significance: proportion of constant positives, H (2) = 
17.70, P < .001; proportion of posvar triples, H(2) = 5.49, P = .064; proportion of 
negative feedback, H(2) = 19.13,p < .001; and proportion ofnegtypes, H(2) = 17.70, 
P <.001. Note that effect sizes are not reported here as although Leech and 
Onweguegbuzie (2002) call for their use in non-parametric tests, an effect size 
measure is not available for comparisons across three independent groups with data 
that violates the requirement for homogeneity of variance; in addition, effect size 
measures that assume homogeneity of variance are adversely affected when that 
assumption is violated. 
To tease out where these differences lay Mann Whitney tests were used with a 
Bonferroni correction applied to all analyses leading to an alpha of .017. These 
showed no significant differences between the types of triples generated by those who 
produced 12 or 18 triples. Those producing six triples differed from those producing 
both 12 and 18 triples in terms of the proportion of constant positives produced; U = 
168, P < .001, N = 60, d = .13 and U = 264.5, P = .005, N = 60, d = .77, with those 
asked to generate six triples producing a higher proportion of constant positive triples. 
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Those asked to generate six triples also differed from those asked to produce 12 triples 
in terms of both the proportion of negtypes to triples produced, U = 256, p < .005, N = 
60, d =.82, and the proportion of triples receiving negative feedback to triples 
produced, U = 169.5, p < .001, N = 60, d =1.32, with both more negtypes produced, 
and a greater proportion of triples with negative feedback being produced by 
participants generating 12 triples. These analyses suggest that participants asked to 
generate six triples failed to develop a hypothesis testing strategy. Instead, they appear 
to stay at the early stages of hypothesis testing behaviour in which confirmatory 
evidence (in this case positive instances of the hypothesised rule) is first collected 
before moving on to the falsification strategies as described by Tweney in his reviews 
of "real life" hypothesis testing amongst scientists (Tweney, 1985a, 1989). 
Table 4-4 
Comparison of Proportions of Triple Types Generated across Triple Number 
Requirements 
Number of 
Median IQR 
Triples Produced 
Proportion of triple types 
Constant positive 6 0.83 0.50 
12 0.41 0.25 
18 0.47 0.58 
Posvar 6 0.00 0.17 
12 0.08 0.17 
18 0.11 0.22 
Negative feedback 6 0.00 0.33 
12 0.41 0.17 
18 0.23 0.50 
Negtypes 6 0.00 0.33 
12 0.17 0.17 
18 0.11 0.22 
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4.3.2.3 Comparison of Triples Produced Across Instruction Type 
The triple heterogeneity account of facilitated performance on the DG version of 
the task evokes the observation that DG instructions promote a wider search of the 
problem space as indexed by the range of triples generated. To test this idea 
comparisons were performed on the types of triples produced by participants given SG 
versus DG instructions (Table 4.5). Data on all measures were skewed so Mann 
Whitney U tests were performed. Contrary to the predictions of the triple 
heterogeneity account of DG facilitation these analyses showed no differences in the 
types of triple generated across instruction type, although caution should be exercised 
when drawing conclusions since the requirement to produce specific numbers of 
triples may have impacted on the hypothesis testing strategies of the participants. 
Table 4-5 
Comparison of Proportion of Triple Types Generated across Instruction Type 
Instruction 
Median IQR Triple Type 
Type 
Constant positive SG 0.58 0.67 
DG 0.50 0.39 
Posvars SG 0.00 0.17 
DG 0.08 0.17 
Triples with negative feedback SG 0.33 0.42 
DG 0.33 0.38 
Negtypes SG 0.08 0.17 
DG 0.16 0.17 
4.3.2.4 Analysis of the Effect of Generating a Descending Triple 
To explore the contrast class account discussed in the previous chapter it was 
necessary to examine the role of the presence of at least one descending triple on task 
success (Table 4.6). A chi-square analysis showed a significant association between 
presence of a descending triple and success on the task, X\I, N == 90) == 29.0\, P < 
.001, w == .57, lending support to the notion that the presence of at least one 
descending triple plays a critical role in promoting rule discovery. 
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Table 4-6 
Frequency of Correct Rule Announcement by Presence or Absence of Descending 
Triple 
Success 
Solver 
Non-solver 
N 
42 
48 
Descending Triple 
Absent 
6 
34 
Present 
36 
14 
However, examination of the presence or absence of a descending triple by 
instruction type showed that there was no significant difference between the two 
groups on this measure, x2(l, N = 90) = 1.62, P = .70 (see Table 4.7). This militates 
somewhat against the idea that DG instructions facilitate performance on the task by 
promoting the production of descending triples which in turn lead to success. It is 
important to note once again, however, that hypothesis testing strategies in the present 
study may well have been constrained by the requirement to produce specific numbers 
of triples. 
Table 4-7 
Frequency of Descending Triple Generation as a Function of Instruction Type 
Descending Triple 
Instructions 
DG 
SG 
N 
45 
45 
Absent 
17 
23 
Present 
28 
22 
Given the observation that the number of triples demanded may constrain the 
strategies adopted and therefore success on the task it was decided to explore the 
absence or presence of descending triples over number of triples demanded (see Table 
4.8). As those asked to produce twelve triples were differentially more successful than 
those required to produce either six or eighteen triples, it would be expected that if the 
presence of a descending triple is crucial to success participants producing twelve 
triples would be more likely to produce a descending triple. A chi-square analysis 
supported this notion, l (2, N = 90) = 11.43, P < .005, W = .36. A series of 2 x 2 chi-
square tests of independence were performed to identify where this association lay, 
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with Bonferroni corrections applied giving an alpha value of .017. These showed that 
the only difference to be found was between those participants asked to generate six 
triples and those asked to produce twelve triples, i (l, N = 60) = 11.38, P < .005, w = 
.43. 
Table 4-8 
Frequency Counts of Presence of Descending Triple by Number of Triples Demanded 
Number of Triples Descending Triple 
Demanded N Absent Present 
6 30 20 10 
12 30 7 23 
18 30 13 17 
4.3.3 Analysis of the Effect of Generating a Posvar Triple 
The goal complementarity theory (Wharton et aI., 1993) predicts that it is the 
production of posvar triples which is key to success on the 2-4-6 task; for this reason a 
similar set of analyses to those just described exploring the production of negative 
triples was performed. These showed that the production of a posvar triple was indeed 
associated with success, (see Table 4.9), i (1, N = 90) = 4.59, P < .05, w = .22, but 
that there was no association between instruction type and production of a posvar 
triple, i (1, N= 90) = 2.18,p > .05. 
Table 4-9 
Frequency of Correct Rule Announcement by Presence or Absence of Posvar Triple 
and Presence of Posvar Triples by Instruction Type 
Success 
Solver 
Non-solver 
Instruction type 
SG 
N 
42 
48 
45 
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Absent 
15 
28 
25 
Present 
27 
20 
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DG 45 18 20 
Finally, the effect of the number of triples generated on the production of a posvar 
triple was explored. Chi-square analysis showed there to be an effect of number of 
triples demanded, l(l, N = 90) = 6.50, P < .05, W = .28 (Table 4.10). A series of chi-
square tests of independence with Bonferroni adjustments identified that there was a 
difference between those asked to produce 6 and 18 triples, l(l, N =60) == 5.41, P < 
.05, w == .30, and those asked to produce 6 and 12 triples, l(l, N= 60) == 4.28,p < .05, 
w == .26. There was no difference between those asked to produce 12 and 18 triples, 
that is, the difference was between those required to produce 6 rather than 12 or 18 
triples, which tends to indicate production of a posvar is associated with both 
increased triple production and successful rule discovery. 
Table 4-10 
Frequency of Presence of Posvar Triple as a Function of Number of Triples 
Demanded 
Number of Triples 
Demanded 
6 
12 
18 
4.4 Discussion 
N 
30 
30 
30 
Posvar Triple 
Absent 
20 
12 
11 
Present 
10 
18 
19 
The results this study have produced some interesting findings. First, it is clear 
that the information quantity account (Wharton et aI., 1993) does not appear to be an 
adequate explanation of the facilitatory effect of DG instructions in that even when the 
number of triples is controlled for, participants given DG instructions are more 
successful on the task than those given SG instructions. However, as mentioned 
throughout the analysis, some care must be taken in interpreting this finding as the 
requirement to produce a fixed number of triples may have impacted on hypothesis 
testing strategies. Indeed, in terms of Bayesian hypothesis testing, by explicitly 
requiring a particular number of triples the participants may not have reached the 
criterion level of confidence before being forced to announce their hypothesised rule. 
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It is also evident that successful rule discovery was not associated with increased 
levels of triple production; indeed, there was a hint that there may be an optimum 
number of triples that need to be produced to facilitate rule discovery. Again, this 
conclusion should be viewed with caution as it is possible that this observation may be 
an artefact of the requirement for participants to produce a specific number of triples. 
It was argued in Chapter 3 that the association of improved performance with 
increased triple production may be due to the relaxation of the singularity principle 
within the hypothetical thinking framework (Evans, 2006), and the resultant 
institution of a Bayesian approach to the task. It was argued that this would lead to 
increased triple production as participants strove to achieve a threshold level of 
confidence in their hypotheses. On this interpretation increased triple production is an 
artefact of the hypothesis testing strategies adopted by participants, and the 
requirement to produce a specific number of triples may impact on the participants' 
strategy and therefore undermine performance. 
It is, however, encouraging for the 2-4-6 task as a model of scientific reasoning 
that the analysis of triple types produced seems to indicate that those who were 
required to produce only six triples overwhelmingly generated constant positive 
triples, that is, they appeared to be collecting confirmatory evidence for their assumed 
hypotheses. This reflects the hypothesis testing behaviour reported in reviews of "real 
world" examinations of scientific discovery in which it is reported that early tests of 
theories focus on confirmatory tests and then move onto disconfirmatory testing 
(Tweney, 1985a, 1989) 
Analysis of the types of triple produced offers support for triple heterogeneity 
account (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995) of DG facilitation in that differences were 
found between successful and non successful participants in all of the measures of 
triple variety with the exception of the proportion of posvar triples, suggesting that 
producing a wide range of triples does indeed promote success on the task. This same 
finding militates against the goal complementarity theory of DG facilitation in that 
contrary to predictions of this account successful reasoners did not produce more 
posvars than unsuccessful participants. However, further analyses reveal that 
production of at least one posvar is associated with success on the task which tends to 
indicate that production of a single instance is sufficient to alert the reasoner to the 
overly-restricted nature of their hypothesis. 
The novel finding from Experiment 1, that DG instructions promote the 
production of a descending triple, which in tum promotes salience of the 
ascending/descending axis, is partially supported by this study. The association 
between production of a descending triple and success on the task shows a large effect 
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size (Cohen, 1988); however, the failure to find an association between instruction 
type and the production of a descending triple presents some difficulty for the idea of 
contrast class theory. Thus further work is needed to explore the notion of contrast 
class information playing a role in successful solving of Wason's 2-4-6 task. 
The findings of this study tend to suggest that information quantity theory 
(Wharton et a!., 1993) in its original form is not a convincing account of DG 
facilitation on the Wason's 2-4-6 task, although it is possible that this account may be 
subsumed within other accounts. Neither triple heterogeneity theory (Vallee-
Tourangeau et a!., 1995) nor the goal complementarity account (Vallee-Tourangeau et 
a!., 1995) are fully supported, although methodological concerns centred around the 
demand to produce specific numbers of triples, (especially low numbers which did not 
seem to allow participants to develop their hypothesis testing strategies) suggest that 
further studies are required to investigate these accounts. A similar approach should 
also be taken to the observation that descending triples provide a cue to the salient 
ascending/descending dimension of the rule, and future studies should investigate this 
contrast class account of the effect both by post hoc analyses and direct manipulation. 
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Chapter 5 
Experiment 3: The Goal Complementarity Theory of 
Dual Goal Facilitation 
5.1 Introduction 
Experiments 1 and 2 undermine both the positivity bias (Evans, 1983; 1989) and 
information quantity (Wharton et aI., 1993) accounts of DG facilitation. However 
there is some supporting evidence for both the goal complementarity (Wharton et aI., 
1993) and the triple heterogeneity (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995) accounts of the 
DG effect. In addition, analyses have been presented which suggest that contrast class 
information may have a role to play in successful performance on the DG task. It was 
therefore decided to investigate these competing accounts of DG facilitation, with a 
particular focus on the most intuitively appealing account, that is, goal 
complementarity theory. As with Experiments 1 and 2, post hoc analyses will also 
consider the evidence for other accounts of DG facilitation. 
Recall that Wharton et aI.' s (1993) goal complementarity theory relies on three 
assumptions: (1) the embedding of initial hypotheses within the target rule 
(Wetherick, 1962); (2) the complementary nature of the DAX and MED rules (triples 
can only be DAX or MED); and (3) the tendency for people to adopt a "positive test 
strategy" on the 2-4-6 task (Klayman & Ha, 1987, 1989), which involves generating 
triples that match a current hypothesis. Based on these assumptions, Wharton et al. 
propose that facilitation arises because a positive test of an overly broad MED 
hypothesis (using a triple like "2-3-10") can lead to DAX feedback, which then 
promotes the realisation that the current DAX hypothesis is too narrow. 
Although the first assumption of Wharton et aI.' s framework is indisputable. and 
the third assumption has received considerable support, the second assumption-that 
goal complementarity is essential for facilitation-has led to contradictory findings. In 
Tweney et aI.' s (1980) original DG study the relationship between DAX and MED 
rules was ambiguous, yet success was high. Wharton et al. (1993), however, showed 
that when the complementary nature of the DAX and MED rules was not made 
explicit then DG instructions failed to facilitate performance. In contrast, Vallee-
Tourangeau et al. (1995) claimed to have undermined goal complementarity theory by 
demonstrating DG facilitation even when participants were explicitly given non-
complementary DAX and MED rules. On closer inspection, however, Vallee-
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Tourangeau et al. 's evidence seems fragile. This is because although participants were 
told that triples could be HDAX, MED, or neither" (and, in another condition, "DAX, 
MED, neither or both"), it remained the case that standard (complementary) DAX and 
MED rules and feedback were always used. Thus, unbeknownst to participants, the 
logical relationship between rules remained strictly complementary and they never 
received feedback other than DAX or MED. As such, Vallee-Tourangeau et al.'s 
methodology contained flaws that could well have produced artefactual evidence 
opposing goal complementarity theory. The present experiment tackled such flaws 
through a more effective manipulation of the presence versus absence of goal 
complementarity. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of Vallee-Tourangeau et aI.' s (1995) results 
there is other evidence that undermines the viability of the goal complementarity 
account of DG facilitation. As noted above, goal complementarity theory claims that it 
is the positive testing of overly broad MED hypotheses (using triples like "2-3-
IO")-and the surprising DAX feedback that results-which then leads to an 
appreciation that the DAX hypothesis needs broadening. The theory therefore predicts 
that it is the production of a "posvar triple" (an ascending triple that does not increase 
by equal intervals) that is essential for task success. Experiments I and 2, however, 
have demonstrated that it is the production of "descending triples" (e.g., "6-4-2" or 
"9-4-3") rather than posvar triples that is the dominant predictor of task success. This 
effect could be explained by the suggestion that the production of a descending triple 
provides a strong class cue to the likely scope of the DAX rule (i.e., that it relates to 
"ascending" sequences as opposed to "descending" ones). Further work is required, 
however, both to replicate these findings and to flesh out the details of the contrast 
class theory of triple testing in the DG paradigm. 
In the case of triple heterogeneity theory, Vallee-Tourangeau et al. (1995) have 
demonstrated that DG instructions foster more creative triple exploration in terms of 
the variety of triples that are tested compared with standard instructions. It remains 
unclear, however, why the mere breadth of triples examined should enhance rule 
discovery. As such, triple heterogeneity seems more descriptive than explanatory. In 
addition, direct testing of the theory has not been undertaken, possibly because it is 
difficult to imagine a manipulation that would allow such direct testing. For this 
reason post hoc analyses will once again include an assessment of the range of triples 
produced in order to provide further evidence pertaining to this theory 
Table 5.1 lists the three main theories of DG facilitation that were examined in 
this experiment along with associated predictions relating to the triple-generation 
profiles expected to mediate task success. The crucial test of goal complementarity 
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theory in the present experiment involved manipulating the relationship between the 
DAX and MEO rules such that in two DG conditions OAX and MED were no longer 
perfect complements. Standard SG and DG tasks were retained as control conditions 
and triple generation was kept constant at 10 triples. Although the results of 
Experiment 2 tended to undermine information quantity theory, in the present 
experiment triple generation was kept constant as a way of controlling for any 
influence of triple number. The decision to impose a 10-triple limit derived from two 
previous studies (Klayman & Ha, 1989; Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995) that used a 
similar constraint as an effective way to standardise any influence of information 
quantity on rule discovery, whilst still affording participants an opportunity to 
examine a variety of triple types should they wish to. Vallee-Tourangeau et al. (1995) 
note that 10 triples seems a particularly good cut-off since a majority of participants 
are eager to announce their hypotheses just before this point is reached. As such, this 
criterion is likely to be minimally disruptive to participants' natural triple testing 
behaviour whilst permitting tight controls over the quantity of triples tested across 
conditions. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Eighty students at sixth-form colleges local to the University of Derby 
voluntarily took part in the study. No participants had received training in logic or 
reasoning. 
5.2.2 Design 
An independent measures design was employed. This entailed a standard single 
goal (SG) condition in which participants were asked to discover the DAX rule, with 
feedback for generated triples in the form of DAX or MED. There were three dual 
goal (OG) conditions in which participants were asked to discover both the DAX and 
the MEO rules. For OG-2 a standard DG task was used that entailed a complementary 
goal structure and OAX or MEO feedback. OG-3 was a non-complementary 
condition where feedback could be DAX, MED or "neither DAX nor MED". DG-4 
was another non-complementary condition, where feedback could be OAX, MED, 
"neither OAX nor MEO" or "both DAX and MED". 
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Theories of Dual Goal Facilitation, Including Predictions and Empirical Tests 
Account 
Goal complementarity theory 
(Wharton et ai., I 993) 
Triple heterogeneity theory 
(Vallee-Tourangeau, Austin, 
& Rankin, 1995) 
Contrast class theory 
(Experiment I) 
Features 
Only complementary goals cause 
DG facilitation. 
Task success dependent on the 
production of at least one posvar 
triple 
DG facilitation depends upon the 
production of a wider variety of 
triple types 
To Test 
Manipulate complementarity of 
DAX and MED rules 
Prediction 
DG facilitation not evident when 
non-complementary rules used 
Compare presence of posvars across Production of a posvar triple 
conditions as well as for solvers mediates between type of 
versus non-solvers instruction and success on the 
task 
Analyse the variety of triple types 
across conditions as well as for 
solvers versus non-solvers 
Variety of triples produced 
mediates between type of 
instruction and success on the 
task 
DG instructions promote production Compare presence of descending Production of a descending triple 
of descending triple triple across instruction mode and for mediates between instruction 
Descending triple generation 
associated with task success 
solvers versus non-solvers 
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5.2.3 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of two to four with each partl'cI'pa t d' . 
, n pro ucmg wrttten 
triples and receiving written feedback. Participants were provided with a sheet on which to 
record triples, feedback and their best guess at the rule after producing 10 triples. As with 
Experiments 1 and 2 participants were informed that they would be permitted only a single 
attempt at stating the rule. 
Participants in the SG condition received instructions relating to a unique to-be-
discovered rule: "I have in mind a rule that specifies how to make up sequences of three 
numbers (triples), and your task is to discover this rule. Triples that fit my rule are called 
DAX triples and other triples are called MED triples. To start you off, I can tell you that 2--1-6 
is a DAX triple. In order to discover my rule you should produce further number triples, and I 
will tell you whether they are DAX triples, or whether they are MED triples ". Participants in 
other conditions were instructed to discover two rules, one called DAX , the other called 
MED. In all conditions the DAX rule was "any ascending sequence". In DG-2 the MED rule 
was "any other sequence" (logically complementary to DAX), in DG-3 the MED rule was the 
non-complementary "descending triples", whilst in DG-4 the MED rule was the non-
complementary "odd numbers". 
5.3 Results and Discussion 
5.3.1 Task Success across Conditions 
As with previous DG studies only participants' DAX rule statements were considered 
when determining task success. The data presented in Table 5.2 for "total solvers" and "total 
non-solvers" indicate that participants in the DG-4 condition had the most difficulty with the 
task with only 15% correctly announcing the rule, which reflected worse performance than in 
the standard SG condition where there were 35% solvers. One reason for the poor 
performance in the DG-4 condition may relate to the nature of presented feedback, where 
triples could be both DAX and MED. This feedback certainly appeared to confuse 
participants, perhaps hindering their understanding of the task requirements. There are, 
however, deeper conceptual reasons for the difficulty of the DG-4 condition which relate to 
the theoretical assumptions of the contrast class theory. These issues are discussed below 
when examining the mediating role of descending triple production for task success. 
In contrast to the poor performance seen under DG-4 and SG instructions, the number 
of participants discovering the correct DAX rule in the DG-3 condition (75%) was 
comparable (indeed marginally superior) to the standard DG-2 condition (65%, see Table 
5.2). A chi-square test of independence indicated that these differences in solvers versus non-
- 74-
E Chapter 5 
xperiment 3: Investigating Goal Complementarity Theory 
solvers across conditions were reliable, I (3, N = 80) = 18 24 < 00 I - . 
. . , p . , w - .48. The hIgh 
success rate In the non-complementary DG-3 condition does not I d. en support to Wharton et 
a\"s (1993) goal complementarity theory. 
Table 5-2 
Frequency a/Correct and Incorrect DAX Rule Announcements across Conditions 
Condition N Solvers Non-solvers 
SG 20 7 (35%) 13 (65%) 
DG-2 20 13 (65%) 7 (35%) 
DG-3 20 IS (75%) 5 (25%) 
DG-4 20 3 (15%) 17 (85%) 
Note: Percentages in parentheses. 
5.3.2 Triple Types across Condition 
To code participants' triple generation profiles an extension of the triple-coding system 
introduced by ValIee-Tourangeau et al. (1995) was used. According to this scheme a "negtype 
score" can be denoted by an integer between 0 and 8, and is distinct from the total number of 
generated triples receiving negative feedback. One further index of triple variety was also 
computed: the mean number of alI types of triple produced, whether positive or negative. This 
index, which ranged from I to 10, is referred to as the "triptype score" and could be argued to 
be a truer reflection of the variety of hypotheses considered than the more restricted negtype 
index. 
According to the triple heterogeneity theory of DG facilitation, DG instructions foster success 
by encouraging a wide exploration of the problem space, as indexed by the variety of triple 
types produced. To investigate this notion further a series of one way ANOV As was pursued 
on the types of triples produced across conditions. Table 5.3 summarises participants' triple-
generation profiles across conditions for the indices of triple heterogeneity. A significant 
effect of condition was found on the number of triples receiving negative feedback, F(3, 76) == 
3.62, p = .017, ..,2 = .13, and the number of constant positive triples, F(3, 76) == 3.38, P == .023, 
..,2 = .12. No other effects were found. Post hoc Bonferroni tests indicated that the only reliable 
differences were between the number of triples with negative feedback in the SG versus DG-2 
conditions (p == .04), and the number of constant positive triples in the SG versus DG-2 
conditions (p = .05). These analyses show that although the standard DG-2 instructions 
increase production of negative triples and decrease production of constant positives relative 
to SG instructions there is no increased range of triple production under any DG instructions, 
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Table 5-3 
Participants' Triple-Generation Profile across Conditions 
Constant Positives Posvars Negtype Score Negative Feedback Triptype Score 
Condition Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
SG 6.75 .78 1.15 .41 1.05 .52 2.05 .26 2.50 .34 
DG-2 4.40 .48 1.80 .36 2.00 .43 4.05 .31 3.75 .34 
DG-3 4.50 .58 1.75 .52 1.95 .52 3.75 .24 3.45 .29 
DG-4 4.60 .58 2.85 .43 1.55 .56 2.50 .35 3.30 .34 
Note: SE = standard error. Triple-generation profiles in terms of mean number of constant positive triples, mean number of posvar triples, 
mean negtype score (ranging from 0 to 8), mean number of triples receiving negative feedback, and triptype score (ranging from 1 to 10). 
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despite high rates of task success in the DG-2 and DG-3 conditions. These results 
undermine the notion that DG instructions lead to success by promoting more creative 
triple testing. Likewise, the failure to find reliable effects across conditions relating to 
the generation of posvar triples contradicts the supposed importance of such triples for 
task success claimed by goal complementarity theorists. 
5.3.3 Triple Generation Strategies Associated with Task Success 
To elucidate the triple-generation strategies which lead to rule discovery it was 
necessary to compare the triple production profiles of solvers versus non-solvers, 
collapsing data across conditions (Table 5.4). A series of t-tests revealed that solvers 
produced fewer constant positives than non-solvers, t(78) = 2.98, p = .004, d = .64, 
and more triples receiving negative feedback, t(78) = 4.61, p < .00 I, d = .66. Solvers 
also showed larger negtype scores, (78) = 2.19, p = .031, d = .48, larger triptype 
scores, t(78) = 2.19, P = .031, d = .48, and produced more descending triples, t(78) = 
6.02, P < .00 I, d = 1.12. These analyses lend some support to the idea that people who 
solve the 2-4-6 task exhibit rather different triple-generation strategies than non-
solvers, producing a greater range of triple types as well as more triples receiving 
negative feedback. 
Table 5-4 
Triple-Generation Profile across Solvers and Non-Solvers when Collapsed across 
Conditions 
Solvers Non-Solvers 
Measure of Heterogeneity Mean SE Mean SE 
Constant Positives 4.11 0.34 5.93 0.50 
Posvars 1.76 0.33 2.00 0.31 
Negtype Score 1.97 0.19 1.33 0.22 
Negative Feedback 4.24 0.33 2.05 0.34 
Triptype Score 3.63 0.20 2.90 0.26 
Descending Triples 2.50 0.28 0.69 0.13 
Note: SE = standard error. Triple-generation profiles in terms of mean number of constant 
. I ty s ore (ranging from 0 to 8), mean positive triples, mean number of posvar trip es, mean neg pe c 
number of triples receiving negative feedback, and triptype score (ranging from 1 to 10). 
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5.3.4 The Role of Descending Triples in Mediating Task Success 
Finally, the contrast class account of DG facilitation was examined. This theory 
proposes that task success is not determined by the range of triples that are generated 
(as espoused by triple heterogeneity theory) but rather by the production of at least 
one descending triple (i.e., where a > b > c) as part of this varied triple exploration. 
Under the contrast class theory the generation of a descending sequence is viewed as 
being a necessary condition for task success, since receiving MED feedback for such a 
triple is vital for cueing the reasoner toward the realisation that the MED versus DAX 
contrast class falls on the dimension "descending versus ascending". To support the 
necessity of descending triple production for task success two pieces of evidence are 
essential. First, it is critical to demonstrate that task success is very likely given the 
production of at least one descending triple. Second, it must be shown that task 
success is very unlikely given the generation of at least one triple that is neither 
descending nor ascending (NB: "ascending" triples are non-diagnostic in that all 
participants are given the ascending 2-4-6 sequence as their seed triple). 
To examine the first prediction a chi square test of independence on the presence 
versus absence of a descending triple across conditions (Table 5.5) was conducted. 
This revealed a reliable effect, I (3, N= 80) = 9.02, P = .029, W = .34, with the lowest 
levels of descending triple generation arising in non-facilitatory SG condition and the 
highest levels arising in facilitatory conditions (DG-2 and DG-3). The DG-4 
condition presents an interesting counterpoint to this general pattern, since around 
50% of participants in this condition generated a descending triple, yet task success 
was very limited. However, it is possible to interpret this finding in line with contrast 
class theory, which claims that to solve the task people first need to generate the 
"MED equals descending" hypothesis before they can then be cued toward the 
realisation that the MED versus DAX contrast class potentially falls on the dimension 
"descending versus ascending". In the DG-4 condition the underlying MED rule was 
actually "odd numbers" such that there was little or no opportunity for participants to 
receive the cue that the MED rule might relate to descending triples. Indeed, most of 
the MED feedback that participants received would have had little to do with the 
descending nature of triples. It is thus unsurprising that descending triples were 
generated but task success was low. 
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Frequency of Participants Producing at Least one Descending Triple across 
Conditions 
Descending Triple 
Condition N Absent Present 
SG 20 11 (55%) 9 (45%) 
DG-2 20 3 (15%) 17 (85%) 
DG-3 20 4 (20%) 16 (80%) 
DG-4 20 7 (35%) 13 (65%) 
Note: Percentages in parentheses. 
To examine the prediction that no other types of triple (apart from descending 
ones) have the capacity to promote task success, a second chi square test of 
independence was conducted on the dataset depicted in Table 5.6, which crossed 
instructions with production of triples ofthese types. This showed that instruction type 
was not associated with the production of triples that were neither ascending or 
descending, ;( (3, N= 80) = 7.27, p = .064 In sum, these findings attest to the 
importance of descending triple production in mediating task success, as predicted by 
the contrast class account. 
Table 5-6 
Presence versus Absence of at Least One Triple that was neither Descending nor 
Ascending across Conditions 
Triple that was Neither Descending nor 
Ascending 
Task Success N Present Absent 
SG 20 6 14 
DG-2 20 12 8 
DG-3 20 14 6 
DG-4 20 12 8 
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5.3.5 Discriminating between the Goal Complementarity and Contrast 
Class Information Accounts 
The goal complementarity theory emphasises that production of posvar triples is 
instrumental in facilitating success, whereas the contrast class theory dismisses the 
importance of such triples, instead proposing that production of at least one 
descending triple is the critical determinant for rule discovery. To clarify the relative 
roles of posvar and descending triples for task success the dataset was modelled using 
logistic regression. An initial analysis in which the dichotomous predictor variable of 
descending triple was present versus absent was regressed onto solution success was 
highly significant, B = 2.55, Wald = I4.24,p < .001. Indeed, participants generating a 
descending triple were twelve times more likely to discover the DAX rule than those 
who didn't generate a descending triple. A second model in which presence versus 
absence of a posvar triple was regressed onto solution success failed to reach 
significance, B = .51, Wald = 1.16, p > .05. This finding undermines a key prediction 
of goal complementarity theory that it is posvar generation that is critical for success 
on the task 
5.3.6 Path Analysis 
The final examination of the dataset involved conducting a path analysis (Baron 
& Kenny, 1986) to establish whether producing at least one descending triple played a 
mediating role in task success (intervening between task instruction and rule 
discovery). In preparation for this analysis data from the DG-2 and DG-3 conditions 
were collapsed since the triple-production profiles of these participants were very 
similar. The DG-4 data was also excluded because of the difficulty that participants 
had found with this task. Since the quantitative logic of logistic regression does not 
allow for path analysis it was necessary to use linear regression. As noted previously 
this is not ideal given the dichotomous nature of the relevant variables. The p values 
obtained from calculations based on logistic and linear regression are therefore 
presented to assess the viability of this procedure (Table 5.7). Figure 5.1 shows the 
path diagram obtained when the mediating role of producing at least one descending 
triple was examined to determine its effect on success. A Sobel test indicated that the 
mediating effect was significant, Goodman (1) = 2.62, P < .01. 
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Table 5-7 
Summary of Mediator An~lysis of the Relationship between Goal, Production of at 
Least One Descendmg Triple, and Success, Using Linear Regression 
Variables in Regression Analysis 
Goal onto success 
Goal onto descending triple 
Goal and descending triple 
onto success 
Goal 
Descending triple 
p values obtained 
Linear Logistic 
Regression Regression 
<.001 .012 
.009 .004 
.168 .164 
<.001 <.001 
Note: Goal is dichotomous (SG vs. DG); Descending triple is dichotomous (present 
vs. absent); Success is dichotomous (solver vs. non-solvers) 
Figure 5-1 
Path Diagram Showing the Mediating Effect of Producing at Least One Descending 
Triple on Task Success 
.35 
Goal 
Descending 
5.4 General Discussion 
This study was designed to arbitrate between theories of facilitation in DG 
variants of Wason's rule discovery paradigm using instructional manipulations that 
altered the relationship between the to-be-discovered rules. Wharton et al. 's (1993) 
goal complementarity theory is challenged by these results in two key respects. First, 
when DAX and MED rules were no longer logically complementary (some triples 
fitted neither rule) performance on this DG version remained high-which contradicts 
the theory'S central assumption that the complementary nature of DAX and MED 
rules is critical for facilitated performance. Second, the theory assumes it is production 
of posvar triples that promotes rule discovery, yet the logistic regression demonstrated 
this was not the case. 
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It must be acknowledged, however, that the experimental design contained a 
confound in that the conditions differed not only in terms of the relation between the 
DAX and MED rules, but also in the definition of MED (e.g., it denoted "descending" 
triples in one condition and "odd numbers" in another), whereas the definition of 
DAX remained constant across conditions. One way to disentangle the effects of the 
relation between the rules and actual rule content would be to implement a second set 
of conditions where the MED rule remains constant but where DAX changes across 
conditions. A successful replication of the present findings would be predicted in this 
case given the considerable body of evidence to support the assumption that the 
precise definitions of the target rules do not differentially affect solution rates (e.g., 
Gorman et aJ., 1987; Klayman and Ha, 1989; Poletiek, 1996; Rossi, Cavemi, & 
Girotto, 2001). In Rossi et aJ.'s (2001) study, for example, the target rule was 
"descending triples" yet rule discovery rates (16%) were comparable to those 
observed for the standard "ascending triples" rule. Given the evidence in the literature, 
it is therefore unlikely that the results are explicable in terms of a rule-content 
confound rather than in terms of the rule complementarity manipulation. 
In terms of triple heterogeneity theory (Vallee-Tourangeau et al., 1995) the 
analysis of triple-generation profiles across conditions provided little support for the 
idea that people pursue broader explorations of the problem space under DG 
instructions, with no measures of triple variety revealing reliable differences. At the 
same time, triple variety did seem to be implicated in task success when triple-
generation profiles were collapsed across conditions, since solvers demonstrated 
larger negtype and triptype scores. However, the lack of any significant differences in 
indices of triple variety across conditions remains difficult to reconcile with a simple 
triple-heterogeneity explanation of DG facilitation, although this account may be 
subsumed within other accounts of DG facilitation. For example, it is possible that the 
generation of a wide range of triples is instrumental in producing a contrast class triple 
which in tum leads to facilitated performance on the task (see below). 
The final theory of interest-the contrast class theory-achieved a good degree 
of support from the observation in Experiment 3 that production of at least one 
descending triple of the form a > b > c was highly associated with task success, 
whereas production of triples other than descending ones was a weaker predictor of 
rule discovery. In addition, since the contrast class theory views neither goal 
complementarity nor the generation of posvar triples as relevant factors for task 
success, this theory can accommodate the observations that non-complementary DG-3 
instructions promoted high solution rates yet posvar triples were not related to 
success. In addition to undermining goal complementarity theory both the high rate of 
success in the non complementary DG-3 condition and the poor performance in the 
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DG-4 conditions can be readily explained by the contrast-class theory. In the DG-3 
condition the MED rule provides an explicit contrast class cue to the "ascending" 
dimension of the DAX rule; indeed the cue provided by the MED rule in this 
condition is stronger than that provided in the standard DG condition in which 
"descendingness" is only one of a number of possible relational rules which are 
represented by MED feedback. On the other hand, in the DG-4 condition the MED 
rule does not specify opposite contrast sets, rather it focuses on non-relevant "object 
properties" (Cherubini et el., 2005), that is, attributes of numbers in the generated 
triple, rather than relational regularities which are concerned with comparing 
relationships across triples. This focus on object regularities means that rather than the 
MED rule providing a cue to the scope of the to-be-discovered DAX rule it instead 
provides a distraction as participants seek two unrelated rules. It is perhaps 
unsurprising, therefore, that performance in this condition was the poorest. 
The observations arising from Experiment 3 led to a decision to pursue a small-
scale and highly focussed follow-up study to explore whether the findings could be 
generalised to a DAX rule other than the standard "ascending numbers" one. In order 
to allow comparability across studies it was decided to vary the DAX rule in line with 
the MED rules used in Experiment 3. Table 5.8 summarises the DAX rules and 
associated MED rules across conditions, as well as the presented exemplar triple for 
each DAX rule. It can be seen from the table that when seeking DAX rules of 
descending numbers and odd numbers the standard "ascending numbers" is the MED 
rule in the DG-3 and DG-4 conditions respectively, thus providing some measure of 
comparability with Experiment 3. 
A further 149 students (all aged over 18 years old) at sixth-form colleges local to 
the University of Derby voluntarily took part in the study. A 2 (rule) x 4 (relationship 
of rules) fully independent measures design was employed. The two rules used were 
"any descending sequence" and "three odd numbers". In the standard SG conditions 
participants were asked to discover the DAX rule, with feedback for generated triples 
in the form of DAX or MED. For each rule there were three DG conditions in which 
participants were asked to discover both the DAX and the MED rules. For DG-2 a 
standard DG task was used that entailed a complementary goal structure and DAX or 
MED feedback. DG-3 was a non-complementary condition where feedback could be 
DAX, MED or "neither DAX nor MED". DG-4 was a second non-complementary 
condition, where feedback could be DAX, MED, "neither DAX nor MED" or "both 
DAX and MED" (see Table 5.8). The procedure was identical to that employed in 
Experiment 3 with the exception that both the target DAX rule and the associated 
exemplar were varied across conditions 
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Definitions of DAX and MED Rules across Experiment 3 and th P E . e resent xpenment 
DAX Rule and SG 
exemplar 
DG-2 
MED Rule 
DG3 DG4 
Ascending Any non Any non Descending Odd 
2-4-6 
Descending 
6-4-2 
Odd numbers 
3-3-3 
ascending triple ascending triple numbers 
Any non 
descending 
triple 
Any triple 
containing an 
even number 
Any non 
descending 
triple 
Any triple 
containing an 
even number 
Ascending 
All even 
numbers 
Odd 
numbers 
Ascending 
The purpose of the present experiment was to verify that varying the to-be-
discovered rule did not affect the rule discovery performance of participants in 
standard SG, DG or non-complementary DG conditions. Based on the success rates 
achieved in Experiment 3 it was expected that success rates would be highest in the 
facilitatory DG-2 and DG-3 conditions, and poorest in the DG-4 condition. Chi 
square tests of independence were performed on the data for each rule and these 
showed that this pattern of performance was evident for both of the rules used in this 
experiment, X2 (3) = 25.68, N = 77, p < .001, W =.58, and X2 (3) = 19.59, N = 77, P < 
.001, W =.50, for the "descending numbers" and "three odd numbers" rules 
respectively (see Table 5.9). As such, it is clear that DG facilitation in the absence of 
logical complementarity is a generalisable phenomenon. Furthermore, the pattern of 
performance in this study is in line with the predictions of the contrast class theory 
which proposes that facilitation will be greatest when the MED rule provides clear 
contrast class information. The MED rule is simply not useful in providing contrast 
class information in the DG-4 condition for either rule; in the "odd numbers" rule the 
DG-4 MED rule is "ascending sequences", whereas in the descending numbers rule 
the MED rule is "odd numbers". On the other hand it is apparent for all three DAX 
rules explored that it is the DG-3 condition which provides the best contrast class 
cues in terms of the definition of MED; indeed, for the "odd numbers" DAX rule the 
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SG and DG-2 MED rules are not really that helpful in terms of co ttl n ras c ass cues so 
it is therefore not surprising that DG-3 leads to the best tacI'II'tat' . thO d'" Ion In IS con Ihon. 
Table 5-9 
Percentage of Solvers across Rule and Success 
Target DAX Rule 
Descending sequence Odd numbers 
Condition N Successful N Successful 
SG 16 44 20 30 
DG-2 20 80 21 57 
DG-3 16 88 20 80 
DG-4 20 15 16 13 
The patterns of performance in both this experiment and Experiment 3 appear to 
undermine the goal complementarity explanation of DG facilitation by directly 
manipulating the logical relationship between the two rules and, instead, seem to 
provide some support for the contrast class account. Other accounts of DG facilitation 
rely more heavily on post hoc analyses of triple generation profiles of participants 
across both success and instruction type. Triple heterogeneity theory (Vallee-
Tourangeau et ai., 1995) proposes that it is the range of triples generated which is 
instrumental in facilitating performance using DG instructions, thus according to this 
theory DG instructions should elicit a greater range of triples tested, and that solvers 
will produce a wider range of triples than non solvers. The variation of the DAX rule 
in the present study meant that the definition of types of triples would need to varied; 
thus for the "descending sequence" rule a constant positive triple would become a 
triple which descends in equal increments, and a posvar triple one that descends with 
unequal intervals. However, the definition of a constant positive and a posvar in the 
"odd numbers" rule is far more problematic. One possibility would be to elicit the 
types of hypotheses generated by participants in the SG condition and use these as a 
basis for the coding of triples; thus a constant positive triple would be one which was 
an example of an over-restricted DAX hypothesis, and a posvar one which relaxed 
that restriction. A review of the incorrect rule announcements in the SG condition 
showed that eleven of the fourteen incorrect rules were indeed over-restricted forms of 
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an "odd numbers" rule, however, there were four different restrictions on the rule 
(repetition, prime numbers, multiples of three, ending in three). It was therefore 
decided that it would be inadvisable to pursue this method for defining a posvar for 
this rule and therefore any analyses relating to posvar generation. 
The negtype and triptype measures of heterogeneity are also somewhat 
problematic when using the two rules in this present experiment. In terms of the "odd 
numbers" target rule a negative triple is one which contains at least one even number' , 
the relational coding of negative triples used thus far is therefore redundant. Whilst it 
was recognised that the negtype measure for the "descending sequences" rule is 
conceptually equivalent to the negtype measure for the standard "ascending numbers" 
rule (with the exception of coding constant positives as descending in equal intervals, 
and posvars as descending with non-equal intervals) it was decided that the difficulties 
associated with triple coding in the "odd numbers" condition prevented the use of 
negtypes as a meaningful measure of triple heterogeneity. A similar position is taken 
with the "negative feedback" measure in the present experiment. Definitional issues 
relating to the coding of triples in the "odd numbers" rule therefore prevented post hoc 
analyses of triple generation profiles, and therefore no evidence regarding triple 
heterogeneity theory or contrast class account of DG facilitation can be gained from 
these data. 
Overall, then, the two experiments reported in this chapter appear to provide 
some good support for the assumptions of the contrast class theory of DG facilitation. 
How, though, can the evidence for the contrast class account be placed within a 
broader theoretical framework that describes the processes that underpin DG 
facilitation? To address this question it is first necessary to tackle the issue of how a 
descending triple can lead to rule discovery and also to consider the mechanism by 
which DG instructions encourage production of a descending triple in the first place. 
DG findings may best be accommodated within the general "iterative counterfactual 
model" (ICM) of hypothesis testing developed by Oaksford and Chater (1994), an 
extension of Farris and Revlin's (l989a, 1989b) counterfactual model (see Fig 5.2). 
The ICM can readily be illustrated by an example that starts with the participant 
being given the 2-4-6 triple as an instance of the experimenter's rule. Cherubini et al. 
(2005) have shown that this seed triple encourages the formulation of a hypothesis 
that maintains the maximum amount of relational information; we could, therefore, 
assume that the participant will establish an initial hypothesis (H) of "even numbers 
ascending by 2". According to the ICM the participant would test this H by 
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developing an alternative hypothesis (H'), which would vary from the original H on 
only one axis.An example H' would be "odd numbers ascending by 2", which varies 
on the odd/even axis but which retains "ascending numbers" and "intervals of 2". A 
triple that matches H' would then be generated (e.g., 3-5-7), which would receive 
positive feedback. The participant adds this triple to the list of positive instances of 
their current H, and searches for common properties of triples within this list to derive 
a new H, which would then be tested counterfactually via a new H'. 
By this method H is continually expanded and adjusted to fit new information 
such that the ICM explains both the context of justification (testing triples that match 
the new H') and the context of discovery (the generation of a new H). Contrast class 
theory - which claims that task success is dependent on the production of an a > b > c 
triple that matches the H' "descending numbers" - maps readily onto the ICM. A 
descending triple differs from the previous 3-5-7 example in that it receives negative 
feedback. Rather than increasing the list of positive instances of H the participant now 
has a triple that does not conform. Furthermore, comparison of triples which conform 
to H against those which do not will show that one axis in which they differ is that of 
ascending/descending. While it is true that participants may suggest a triple that varies 
on more than one axis, iterative counterfactual testing is concerned with exploring one 
common feature at a time; it is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that when comparing 
examples that fit or do not fit a hypothesis participants will focus on one axis on 
which triples contrast. 
This tendency to focus on one axis at a time also seems to concur with Vallee-
Tourangeau and Payton's (2008) findings showing that SG success is dramatically 
improved by deploying external, graphical representations of triple properties. One 
explanation of this finding is that external representations lessen demands on limited 
working memory resources. It may be, then, that working memory constraints are the 
root cause of participants considering and testing single common features when 
examining the list of positive triples, or single contrasting features when comparing 
positive and negative triples. 
Having discussed a possible mechanism linking descending triple production to 
task success the issue of why DG instructions promote the generation of descending 
triples is now addressed. One mechanism might be that under DG instructions 
participants first attempt to find the DAX rule (i.e., the first phase of DG testing is 
identical to SG testing). From this it could be assumed that participants will produce 
an overly-restricted DAX rule such as "numbers ascending by 2", and, having 
seemingly asatisfied the requirement to discover DAX, will move on to discovering 
MED. Unlike DAX participants have no instance of the MED to inform initial 
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hypotheses, but they do know that DAX and MED are different and that DAX seems 
to be "numbers ascending by 2". It seems reasonable to assume that participants will 
use this information to generate their initial MED hypothesis so that it differs from 
their DAX hypothesis as much as possible (i.e., it is the "opposite" of DAX). It is 
easier to produce the opposite of "ascending" (which logically opposes "descending") 
than of "by 2" (where the opposing set of "by all numbers other than 2" is fuzzy and 
confusing). It could be contended that this is the mechanism through which the 
requirement to search for the MED rule triggers the generation of a descending triple. 
Whilst this mechanism explains the production of an all-important descending triple it 
does not explain how this facilitates the generalisation of the overly-restricted 
"numbers ascending by 2" DAX hypothesis, and further investigation is required to 
explore this issue. For example, no research appears to have examined participants' 
stated MED rules, although it has been suggested that people formulate MED rules 
that are a subset of DAX, such as "ascending odd numbers" (Rossi, Caverni, & 
Girotto, 2001). 
Results of this study have helped to advance the theoretical understanding of DG 
facilitation in Wason's 2-4-6 task. The study demonstrates that complementary rules 
are not essential for task success, which indicates that goal complementarity theory 
provides an inadequate account of DG facilitation, although it was noted that a 
possible confound may have been introduced by varying the definition of the MED 
hypothesis. For this reason it would be prudent to carry out a follow up study in which 
the definition of the DAX rule is systematically varied in line with the MED rules 
used in this study to explore what effect this may have on hypothesis testing 
behaviours. While the analyses of participants' triple-generation profiles do provide 
some support for triple heterogeneity theory of DG facilitation as being linked to more 
varied and creative triple testing, it is suggested that a more convincing account of DG 
effects-including the vital role of descending triples in enhancing rule discovery-is 
provided by the contrast class theory, which itself maps well onto the broader 
hypothesis testing framework offered by Oaksford and Chater's (1994) iterative 
counterfactual model. However this model needs to be extended to account fully for 
DG instructions and additional empirical work is required to clarify the mechanism by 
which the production of a descending triple leads to the generalisation of overly-
restrictive hypotheses. 
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Chapter 6 
Experiment 4: Extending the Contrast Class Theory of Dual Goal 
Facilitation to Different DAX Rules 
6.1 Introduction 
The work presented in the thesis so far has explored contemporary accounts of 
DG facilitation in Wason's rule discovery paradigm and has demonstrated that no 
current theory appears to provide a fully adequate explanation of the DG effect. It is 
acknowledged, however, that evidence against the triple heterogeneity theory (Vallee-
Tourangeau et aI., 1995) and the information quantity theory (Wharton et aI., 1993) is 
less convincing than evidence that is contrary to the positivity bias theory (Evans, 
1989) and the goal complementarity theory (Wharton et aI., 1993). A new account of 
the DG facilitation effect has been developed which suggests that it is the production 
of a contrast class triple which is most associated with success on the task, and it has 
been argued that this contrast class account can be accommodated within Oaksford 
and Chater's (1994) iterative counterfactual model (ICM). However, with the 
exception of the study that was briefly reported in the discussion of Experiment 3 -
which tested the generality of the evidence against the goal complementarity theory -
the majority of research reported in the thesis has only been concerned with Wason's 
(1960) standard "ascending numbers" rule. It was decided, therefore, that before 
developing the contrast class account more fully it would be prudent to investigate 
whether the presence of a contrast class triple can also be demonstrated to be 
associated with task success in the DG paradigm when other DAX rules are employed. 
One candidate rule that has been reported in the literature as an alternative to Wason's 
traditional "ascending numbers" is Gorman's (1987) "three different numbers" rule. 
Despite the difficulty that participants have in discovering this rule - which is even 
more general than Wason's original rule - Gorman reported a DG facilitation effect, 
thus making it highly suitable for use in the present experiment. 
Whilst the primary aim of Experiment 4 was to investigate whether contrast 
class information remained an important predictor of DG task success using the "three 
different numbers" rule, it was also useful to explore other accounts of the DG 
facilitation effect, as these have also not been tested in the literature using different 
DAX rules to the standard "ascending numbers" one. It should be noted, however, that 
the use of the "three different numbers" rule has a major impact on the way in which 
generated triples can be coded, which in turn means that predictions that derive from 
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different theories also differ markedly from predictions that are established in the 
context of Wason's original rule. For example, triple heterogeneity theory (Vallee-
Tourangeau et aI., 1995) claims that success is associated with a wide exploration of 
the hypothesis space as indexed by the range of triples produced. While this prediction 
remains intact, the coding of triples used in Experiments 1 to 3 reflects the relational 
nature of the target rule and centres on positive triples (i.e., ascending triples of two 
types: posvars and constant positives) and negative triples (i.e., the eight types of non-
ascending triples). The more general rule used in Experiment 4 requires a different 
coding system, with positive triples being any triple in which no number is repeated 
regardless of the relational properties of the triple, and negative triples having one 
number repeated at least once. What this means, however, is that the negtype variable 
has a much smaller range of examples contained within it (i.e., two numbers the same, 
or three equal numbers). As such it is clear that the negtype measure of heterogeneity 
becomes of limited use as an index of the breadth of search of the hypothesis space. 
The negative feedback measure suffers from the same limitation. However, given that 
the DAX seed triple (2-4-6) remains the same in Experiment 4 as in the standard DG 
task then it could be assumed that similar types of hypotheses to those for the standard 
rule would be entertained by participants (at least in the initial stages of hypothesis 
formation and testing). For this reason it was decided to employ the triptype measure 
introduced in Experiment 3 in the present experiment. While this measure is based on 
relational properties of triples generated it is not restricted to the production of triples 
which do not match the target hypothesis and therefore overcomes this limitation of 
the negtype measure. 
With the variation to the rule and the coding of triples it is useful to make 
explicit the predictions made by competing theories. Previous experiments reported 
here have demonstrated that neither Evans' (1989) positivity bias theory nor Wharton 
et aI.' s (1993) goal complementarity theory provide a convincing account of the DG 
facilitation effect. However, to maintain control across experiments in terms of 
possible linguistic effects of feedback, any "three different number" triples produced 
by participants were designated as DAX triples, and those not fitting the rule were 
labelled MED in both the SG and DG conditions. Goal complementarity theory 
predicts that in the standard ascending rule a posvar triple allows the relaxation of the 
"increasing by twos" constraint. Such a triple would clearly not be expected to have 
any impact on success using the more general rule. Given that in the SG condition 
similar triple generation profiles to those in the standard "ascending numbers" rule 
would be expected it is unclear what particular type of triple would lead to relaxation 
of the participant's rule as there appears to be no equivalent to a posvar using the three 
different numbers rule, thus testing of the goal complementarity account using triple 
- 91 -
" Chapter 6 
Experiment 4: ExtendIng Contrast Class Theory to Different DAX Rules 
analysis would be difficult. Experiment 3 also provided powerful evidence against 
goal complementarity theory; this account was therefore not tested in Experiment 4. 
As with Experiment 3 information quantity was controlled for by asking all 
participants to produce exactly 10 triples before announcing a rule. 
The primary predictions of triple heterogeneity theory (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 
1995) remain intact: DG rules wiIl elicit a wider exploration of the hypothesis space 
as indexed by a greater range of triples, and this increased range of triples will be 
associated with success on the task. Contrast class theory (Experiment 1 to 3) predicts 
that it is the production of a triple of the "psychological set complement" (Oaksford & 
Stenning, 1992) which would be predictive of success on the task; thus contrast class 
theory predicts that it is the production of a "three equal numbers" triple which would 
be the key determinant of success on the task. 
In summary, then, Experiment 4 aimed to discriminate between the triple 
heterogeneity and contrast class accounts by exploring the triple generation patterns of 
those given SG and DG instructions and between those of solvers and non-solvers on 
Wason's (1960) 2-4-6 task, using the more difficult "three different numbers" rule. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Forty students at sixth-form coIleges local to the University of Derby voluntarily 
took part in the study. None of the participants had received training in logic or 
reasoning. 
6.2.2 Design 
An independent measures design was employed, in which the instructions were 
manipulated such that half of the participants received SG instructions and the 
remainder DG instructions. 
6.2.3 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of up to four, with each participant producing 
written triples and receiving written feedback. Participants were provided with a sheet 
on which to record triples. feedback and their best guess at the rule after producing 10 
triples. As with previous experiments participants were informed that they would be 
permitted only a single attempt at stating the rule. 
Participants in the SG condition received instructions relating to a unique to-be-
discovered rule: "[ have in mind a rule that specifies how to make up sequences of 
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three numbers (triples), and your task is to discover this rule. Triples that fit my rule 
are called DAX triples and other triples are called MED triples. To start you off, I can 
tell yo/( that 2-4-6 is a DAX triple. In order to discover my rule you should produce 
further number triples, and I will tell you whether they are DAX triples, or whether 
they are MED triples". In the DG condition the instructions were varied to refer to 
two rules, called DAX and MED: "I have in mind a rule that specifies how to make up 
sequences of three numbers (triples), and your task is to discover these rules. Triples 
that fit one of my rules are called DAX triples and those that fit my other rule are 
called MED triples. To start you off, I can tell you that 2-4-6 is a DAX triple. In 
order to discover my rule you should produce further number triples, and I will tell 
you whether they are DAX triples, or whether they are MED triples". Participants in 
both conditions were asked to test exactly ten triples after which they should write 
down their best guess at the rule(s). The DAX rule in both conditions was "any three 
different numbers" while MED triples were of any other form. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Task Success across Condition 
Before embarking on an analysis of the types of triples produced across 
conditions and solvers versus non-solvers it was essential to first establish that DG 
instructions do indeed have a facilitatory effect when the more general "three different 
numbers rule" is used. The data presented in Table 6.1 show the success rates of 
participants in the DG and SG conditions. It is clear that participants in the SG 
condition did indeed find the task very difficult with only one participant correctly 
announcing the rule. It is also apparent that there was there is a strong facilitatory 
effect, with 60% solving the task in the DG condition, compared to 5% in the SG 
condition; this difference was found to be highly reliable, X2 (l, N = 40) = 13.79, P < 
.001,w=.58. 
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Table 6-1 
Frequency of Solvers and Non-Solvers across Conditions, Broken Down According to 
the Presence versus Absence of at Least One Contrast Class Triple 
Presence of Contrast Class Triple 
Solvers Non-Solvers 
Condition Present Absent Total Present Absent Total 
SO 0 1 (5%) 0 19 19 (95%) 
DO 10 2 12 (60%) 7 8 (40%) 
6.3.2 Triple Generation Profile of Successful versus Non-Successful 
Participants 
Having demonstrated the facilitatory effect of DO instructions it was apparent 
that the dataset was a suitable vehicle for exploring theories of DO facilitation. Recall 
that contrast class theory predicts that task success should be associated with the 
generation of a triple of the "three equal numbers" form. To explore this prediction 
data were collapsed across condition and success crossed with the presence or absence 
of a contrast class triple (see Table 6.1). A chi-square test of independence showed 
that the association between the production of a three equal numbers triple and 
successful rule discovery was indeed the case, X2 (1, N = 40) = 27.36, P < .001, w = 
.83, with only two participants solving the task in the absence of such a triple. It was 
also important to check that DO instructions promoted the generation of a contrast 
class triple. Again a strong effect was found, X2 (1, N = 40) = 11.91,p = .001, w = .55, 
with 55% of those in the DO condition producing such a triple, compared to 5% in the 
SO condition (Table 6.1). Thus the data presented here again offer support for the 
contrast class account of DO facilitation 
To examine the prediction that only contrast class triples promote task success, a 
chi-square test of independence was conducted on the dataset depicted in Table 6.2, 
which crossed instructions with production of triples that were neither all different or 
all the same (i.e., triples with two equal numbers). This showed that instruction type 
was not associated with the production of these types of triples, Fisher's Exact = .661 
(low expected frequencies means that assumptions of a chi-square were violated). 
Further analysis in which success was collapsed across instructions showed that these 
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types of triples were not associated with success on the task, Fisher's Exact = .075. 
Taken together these findings attest to the importance of contrast class triple 
production in mediating task success. 
Table 6-2 
Frequency of Solvers and Non-Solvers across Conditions, Broken Down According to 
the Presence versus Absence of at Least One Triple Containing 2 Equal Numbers 
Presence of Two Equal Numbers Triple 
Solvers Non-Solvers 
Condition Present Absent Total Present Absent Total 
SG 0 1 (5%) 2 17 19 (95%) 
DG 4 8 12 (60% 0 8 8 (40%) 
The contrast class account of DG facilitation focuses on the production of a 
single triple of the "three numbers the same" form. Triple heterogeneity theory 
(Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995) on the other hand focuses on the range of triples 
produced by participants. As discussed in the introduction it is difficult to code triples 
meaningfully in relation to the target rule used in this experiment since the non-
relational form of the target hypothesis makes the relational emphasis of the triple-
coding scheme used thus far somewhat restrictive. However, given the identical seed 
triple it seems reasonable to assume that similar hypotheses will be considered by 
participants seeking the target rule used in this experiment as those seeking the 
standard "ascending numbers" rule, at least in the initial stages of their hypothesis 
testing. Also as noted in the introduction the definition of a negative triple is different 
in this experiment compared with Experiments 1 to 3. In the current study only two 
types of negative triple are possible: a triple with two equal numbers and a triple with 
three equal numbers. Thus it was argued that the range of negtypes in this experiment 
is too limited to provide a sound test of triple heterogeneity theory whilst the negative 
feedback measure suffers from a similar limitation. By contrast, the triptype index 
introduced in Experiment 3 does provide a reasonable measure of the range of triples 
being tested, therefore this measure of triple heterogeneity was used in the present 
analyses. In addition the constant positive measure is also analysed as inspection of 
the rules announced by unsuccessful solvers showed a high rate of ··numbers 
ascending by two" types, thus it could be argued that the constant positive measure 
remains an index oflimited hypothesis testing. 
- 95 -
" Chapter 6 
Experiment 4: Extendmg Contrast Class Theory to Different DAX Rules 
Table 6.3 shows the measures of triple heterogeneity across success. There were 
significant effects of both measures across success with solvers producing fewer 
constant positive triples than non-solvers t(38) = 429 P < 001 d - 1 2 b t 
' "', - ., u more 
triptypes, (38) = 5.85, p < .001, d = 1.98. These results offer support for the triple 
heterogeneity theory ofDG facilitation. 
Table 6-3 
Triple Generation Profiles as a Function of Success 
Success 
Non-Solvers Solvers 
Measure of Heterogeneity Mean SE Mean SE 
Constant Positive Triples 2.92 .50 6.96 .61 
Triptype Score 5.08 .40 2.40 .25 
6.3.3 Triple Types across Condition 
While the previous analyses showed that solvers produced a wider range of 
triples there remains the need to ascertain that the generation of these triples was 
promoted by DG instructions. A second set of analyses was therefore performed in 
which the effect of instruction type on triple generation profiles was examined. These 
analyses showed an effect of instruction type on triple generation profiles with those 
in the SG condition producing more constant positive triples, (38) = 4.32,p < .001, d 
= 1.13, but fewer triptypes, (38) = 4.86, P < .001, d = 1.66, demonstrating that DG 
instructions promoted the generation of a wide range of triples as suggested by triple 
heterogeneity theory ofDG facilitation (see Table 6.4). 
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Table 6-4 
Triple Generation Profiles as a Function of Instruction Type 
Instructions 
SG DG 
Measure of Heterogeneity Mean SE Mean SE 
Constant Positive Triples 7.55 0.74 3.75 0.48 
Triptype Score 2.15 0.33 4.40 0.33 
6.3.4 Discriminating between the Triple Heterogeneity and Contrast Class 
Accounts 
The triple heterogeneity theory emphasises that production of a wide range of 
triples is instrumental in facilitating success, whereas the contrast class theory 
dismisses the importance of variety of triple types, instead proposing that production 
of at least one descending triple is the critical determinant for rule discovery. To 
clarify the relative roles of triptypes and the presence versus absence of a contrast 
class triple for task success the dataset was modelled using logistic regression. An 
initial analysis in which the dichotomous predictor variable of contrast class triple 
present versus absent was regressed onto solution success was highly significant, B = 
4.96, Wald = 15.16, P < .001. Indeed, participants generating a three equal numbers 
triple were 142 times more likely to discover the DAX rule than those who didn't 
generate such a triple. A second model in which triptype score was regressed onto 
solution success also reached significance, B = 1.83, Wald = 7.30, P = .007. A final 
model in which the presence versus absence of a contrast class triple and triptype 
score was regressed onto success was run. This showed that when both variables were 
regressed onto success the presence of a contrast class triple remained predictive of 
success, B = 6.19, Wald = 5.27, p = .02, whereas the triptype measure no longer 
achieved significance B = 2.37, Wald = 3.72, P > .05. These analyses show that while 
both contrast class triples and triple variety (as indexed by the triptype measure) have 
a role to play in solving the task, for the present dataset it appears that the production 
of a contrast class triple is the more critical determinant of successful rule discovery. 
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6.4 Discussion 
This experiment was designed to test the generalisability of contrast class theory 
to DAX rules other than the standard ascending numbers rule. Analysis of the data has 
shown that DG instructions are effective in facilitating performance on this more 
difficult version of the task, an important precursor to exploring theoretical 
explanations of a general contrast class account. In addition, analysis of the triple 
generation profiles of successful and non-successful solvers demonstrated that 
production of a contrast class triple is closely associated with success on the task. It is 
also clear that DG instructions promoted the production of contrast class triples. 
Modelling the data using logistic regression showed that instruction type (SG vs. DG) 
was predictive of the production of such a triple and also that generation of a contrast 
class triple was predictive of success, thus offering further support for the contrast 
class account. 
An important finding evident here is that the generation of a "two equal 
numbers" triple was not associated with success. This finding points to the importance 
of the psychological set complement (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992) aspect of contrast 
class theory. The dataset presented here shows that DG instructions induced the 
generation of triples which were examples of psychological set complements rather 
than logical opposites (i.e., "three equal numbers" rather than "two or more equal 
numbers"), and that these contrast class triples were associated with success, whereas 
the apparently equally informative "two equal numbers triples" were not. However 
there were few participants who produced these latter sorts of triples, so it is difficult 
to draw conclusions from the data with regard to this. 
The second theory of interest was that of triple heterogeneity. Initial data 
analysis offered some support for this theory as it was evident both that DG 
instructions promoted a wide range of triples, and that this wide range of triples was 
associated with success on the task. Modelling of the data using logistic regression 
showed that instruction type (SG versus DG) was predictive of the generation of a 
wide range of triples and that producing a wide range of triples was predictive of 
success. However this effect disappeared when production of a contrast class triple 
was controlled for. Results from this study therefore offer some support for triple 
heterogeneity theory although contrast class theory appears to provide a better account 
of the data 
To summarise, the data presented here offer further support for the contrast class 
account of DG across a different DAX rule, which represents an important 
generalisation of the theory. Further, there was some support (albeit slightly weaker) 
for triple heterogeneity theory. One weakness of investigations of both of the accounts 
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discussed here is that testing of the theories depends on a post hoc analysis of the 
triple generation profiles of participants rather than direct manipulations of the types 
of triples used in hypothesis formation and testing. A stronger test of the theories 
could be made by manipulating the types of information available to participants, an 
approach which is adopted in the following experiment. 
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Chapter 7 
Experiment 5: Testing the Contrast Class Account 
7.1 Introduction 
The experiments that have been reported in this thesis so far have pointed to the central 
role of descending triples in successful rule discovery in the 2-4-6 task. The observation that 
solvers in both the SG and DG paradigms are more likely to have generated at least one 
descending triple has, in turn, led to the development of a contrast class account of task 
success, whereby the production of a descending triple provides a salient contrast class cue to 
the ascending nature of the DAX rule. It has also been proposed that DG instructions are 
more likely to induce participants to produce a descending triple, thereby providing a novel 
theoretical explanation of the general DG facilitation effect. 
The contrast class theory of DG facilitation is based on post hoc analyses of hypothesis 
testing strategies and, as such, it is not possible to make causal claims as to the importance of 
contrast class information. The primary aim of the present experiment was, therefore, to 
explore further the contrast class theory by manipulating the information available to 
participants in order to test the theory more directly. To this end, in addition to the standard 2-
4-6 DAX exemplar participants were also provided with a MED exemplar that provided 
either a "useful" or a "non-useful" contrast class cue. Half of the participants were therefore 
told that an example of the MED rule was the triple 6-4-2 (useful contrast class information). 
It was predicted that this MED exemplar would promote identification of the DAX rule since 
6-4-2 and 2-4-6 are oppositional on the salient - and crucially relevant - dimension of 
"ascending" versus "descending". The other half of the participants were told that an example 
of the MED rule was the triple 4-4-4 (non-useful contrast class information) with the 
prediction that this MED triple would not promote successful DAX discovery as 4-4-4 and 2-
4-6 are oppositional on the salient - but non-relevant - dimension of "three identical 
numbers" versus "three different numbers". 
In addition to the introduction of the notion of contrast class information playing a 
crucial role in successful rule discovery evidence presented within this thesis has also offered 
support to the triple heterogeneity account of DG facilitation (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 
1995). In Experiment 3, for example, it was shown that successful solvers produced a greater 
range of triples than non-solvers, and that those given DG instructions reliably produced a 
wider range of triples. In the present experiment, then, post hoc analyses of triple generation 
profiles were likewise planned as a means to explore the triple heterogeneity account. It was 
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Theories of Dual Goal Facilitation. Including Predictions and Empirical Tests 
Account 
Contrast class cue theory 
(Experiment I) 
Triple heterogeneity theory 
(Vallee-Tourangeau, Austin, 
& Rankin, 1995) 
Goal complementarity theory 
(Wharton et aI., 1993) 
Features To Test 
DG instructions promote production Compare presence of descending 
of descending triples triples across instruction mode and 
Descending triple generation is 
associated with task success 
DG facilitation depends upon the 
production of a wide variety of 
triples types 
Only complementary goals cause 
DG facilitation. 
Task success is dependent on the 
production of at least one posvar 
triple 
for solvers versus non-solvers 
Analyse the variety of triple types 
across conditions as well as for 
solvers versus non-solvers 
Manipulate the complementarity of 
the DAX and MED rules 
Compare presence of posvars across 
conditions as well as for solvers 
versus non-solvers 
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Prediction 
Production of a descending triple 
mediates between instruction 
mode and success on the task 
Variety of triples produced 
mediates between type of 
instruction and success on the 
task 
DG facilitation is not evident 
when non-complementary rules 
are used 
Production of a posvar triple 
mediates between type of 
instruction and success on the 
task 
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also decided to err on the side of caution and perform post hoc analyses of posvar 
generation as an additional test of the goal complementarity theory. Additionally, as 
with Experiment 3 and the associated follow-up study presented in the same chapter, 
an instruction that exactly 10 triples were to be produced was used in this experiment 
so as to control for any effect that information quantity might have on task success 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants 
Forty-three first-year psychology students from the University of Derby took part 
in the study on a voluntary basis. None had received any teaching relating to reasoning 
or logic. 
7.2.2 Design 
An independent-measures design was employed with the manipulation reflecting 
the usefulness of the contrast class cue (CCC) that was salient in the presented 
example of the MED rule. One group of participants received a useful CCC (6-4-2) 
and the other group were given a non-useful CCC (4-4-4). Participants were randomly 
assigned to the two conditions. The DG paradigm was used in both conditions of this 
experiment. 
7.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory. Standardised DG 
instructions were read out to all participants as follows: "/ have in mind two rules that 
specify how to make up sequences of three numbers (triples), and your task is to 
discover these rules. Triples that fit one of my rules are called DAX triples and those 
that fit my other rule are called MED triples ... ". All participants were given 2-4-6 as 
an example DAX triple. Those in the useful CCC condition were given 6-4-2 as a 
MED exemplar, while those in the non-useful CCC condition were given 4-4-4 as a 
MED exemplar. Participants were then asked to produce exactly 10 triples, and they 
received feedback for each triple in the form of HOAX" or "MED". After 1 0 triples 
had been generated participants were asked to write down their best guess at the two 
rules. 
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Solution Success across Conditions 
Table 7.2 shows the frequency of correct rule announcements for the DAX rule 
across experimental conditions. It is clear that the usefulness of the CCC that had been 
provided had a dramatic effect on success rates for this task, with success rates being 
over three times higher for those participants given useful contrast class information. 
A chi-square analysis showed this effect to be highly significant, X2 (1) = 12.44, N = 
43, P < .001, w = .54. These success rates are very similar to those typically reported 
in the literature for the DG and SG paradigms respectively (e.g., Wharton et aI., 1993). 
This observation suggests that it may not be DG instructions per se that lead to task 
success in the DG paradigm, but rather that DG instructions facilitate participants' 
production of a salient contrast class that, in turn, promotes successful discovery of 
the target DAX rule. 
Table 7-2 
Percentage of Correct and Incorrect DAX Rule Announcements across Conditions 
Condition 
Useful CCC 
Non-Useful CCC 
N 
23 
20 
7.3.2 Production of Descending Triples 
Solver 
74 
20 
Success 
Non-solver 
26 
80 
The purpose of this study was to test the idea that the key to success on the DG 
2-4-6 task relates to the availability or discovery of useful contrast class information 
that facilitates identification of the potential scope of the DAX rule. In Experiments 1 
to 4 it was noted that successful solvers are those who uncover at least one , 
descending triple during their hypothesis testing, and that DG instructions promote the 
production of at least one such descending triple. It was therefore decided to examine 
the present dataset for any effect of the presence versus absence of the participants' 
production of a descending triple on their task success. Table 7.3 presents data 
collapsed across the useful versus non-useful CCC manipulation. This shows that 
while the majority of participants produced at least one descending triple, there was no 
single instance of a participant solving the task in the absence of a descending triple. 
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A chi-square analysis indicated that this effect was highly reliable, l (1) = 12.44, N = 
43,p < .001, w =.54. 
Table 7-3 
Percentage of Correct DAX Announcements by Presence versus Absence of at Least 
One Descending Triple 
Success 
Descending Triple N Solver Non-solver 
Absent 10 o 100 
Present 33 64 36 
The data were further explored to ensure that the type of CCC that had been 
provided had a reliable influence on whether or not at least one descending triple was 
produced (see Table 7.4). This analysis (colIapsing across solver vs. non-solver) 
showed that alI participants receiving a useful CCC produced at least one descending 
triple, while only 50% of participants receiving a non-useful CCC produced a 
descending triple, X2 (1) = 14.99, N = 43, P < .001 w = .59. It can thus be concluded 
that the CCC manipulation was successful in terms of its capacity to induce the 
generation of descending triples. 
Table 7-4 
Percentage of Participants Producing at Least One Descending Triple by Condition 
Descending Triple 
Condition 
Useful CCC 
Non-Useful CCC 
N 
23 
20 
Absent 
o 
50 
Present 
100 
50 
7.3.3 Analysis of Triple Types Produced across Condition 
One stated aim of the present study was to further explore other accounts of DG 
facilitation such as ValIee-Tourangeau et a\"s (1995) triple heterogeneity theory. 
According to this theory task success is dependent on the production of a wide range 
of triples, with this wide range of triples being promoted by the use of DG instruction. 
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Predictions derived from the theory are somewhat problem t' . th 
. . a IC 10 e present study; all 
participants were given DG instructions which would lead to th d" h 
' e pre Ictlon t at there 
would be no difference in the number of triples produced a d' . cross con ItlOn. On the 
other hand, the differential performance across conditions would t d t h 
. en 0 suggest t at 
those 10 the more successful "useful" contrast class condition would produce a wider 
variety of triples. 
Table 7-5 
Participants' Triple-Generation Profile across Conditions 
Type of Contrast Class Cue 
Useful Non-useful 
Measure of Heterogeneity Mean SE Mean SE 
Constant positives 4.78 .26 3.70 .46 
Posvars 0.48 .20 0.90 .28 
Number of triples receiving negative 4.61 .20 5.25 .40 
feedback 
Negtypes 1.26 .13 2.80 .46 
Triptypes 2.52 .16 4.15 .42 
Descending triples 4.04 .26 0.85 .23 
To explore these ideas a series of t-tests were pursued to examine aspects of 
participants' triple generation profiles across conditions (Table 7.5). Reliable 
differences were found between conditions in the number of constant positive triples, 
t(41) = 2.12,p = .04, d= .62, the number ofnegtypes, t(41) = 3.41,p = .001. d= .93, 
the number of triptypes t( 41) = 3.76, P = .001, d = 1.00, and the number of descending 
triples, t( 41) = 9.14, P < .001, d = 1.62. The descending triple measure is, of course, 
not a measure of heterogeneity, and as such is of little relevance to triple heterogeneity 
theorists; it is, however, included here since the generation of such triples is predicted 
by the contrast class theory. The mean triple variety scores for participants were lower 
in the useful contrast class group than the non-useful contrast class group on all 
measures except for constant positives, where the mean was higher. The differences in 
the types of triples produced across conditions tend to militate against the triple 
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heterogeneity theory, which would suggest that since all partici' t . 
. ' . pan s were given DG 
instructIOns then tnple generation profiles would be sl'ml'lar d' . across con ItlOns. 
7.3.4 Analysis of Triple Types Produced across Success 
To examine the triple heterogeneity theory more closely a second set of analyses 
explored the differences in the triple generation profiles of successful versus non-
successful participants (see Table 7.6). These showed that that there were no 
differences evident across solvers and non-solvers on any measure of triple 
heterogeneity, with the exception of descending triples, t( 41) = 5.18, p< .00 I, d = 
1.25. 
Table 7-6 
Participants I Triple-Generation Profile across Success 
Success on Task 
Non-Solver Solver 
Measure of Heterogeneity 
Constant positives 
Posvars 
Number of triples receiving negative 
feedback 
Negtypes 
Triptypes 
Descending triples 
7.4 Discussion 
Mean 
3.86 
0.64 
5.18 
2.32 
3.55 
1.36 
SE Mean 
049 4.71 
.25 0.71 
.37 4.62 
044 1.62 
Al 3.00 
.37 3.81 
SE 
.25 
.23 
.21 
.21 
.27 
.29 
The primary aim of Experiment 5 was to test directly the contrast class account 
of DG facilitation on the 2-4-6. The contrast class account posits that it is not DG 
instructions per se which promote task success, but rather that DG instructions 
promote the production of a salient contrasting descending triple, and it is the 
production of such a triple which facilitates performance. It was, therefore, predicted 
that the DG facilitatory effect would be suppressed by giving participants non-relevant 
information about the MED rule which would inhibit the production of a salient 
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contrast class triple. Results of the study do indeed support this notion, with success 
rates of participants given the non-useful contrast class information approximately 
equivalent to those demonstrated in the standard, SG form of the task. This is only the 
second time that non-facilitated performance has been reported using DG instructions 
(cf. Wharton et aI., 1993). Further support for the contrast class theory was gained 
from analyses of the triples produced by participants. These showed that there was no 
single case of solving the task in the absence of a descending triple, and that all 
participants in the useful contrast class group did indeed produce at least one 
descending triple, whereas only half of the participants given the non-useful contrast 
class cue did so, thus offering support to the notion that it is the production of a 
descending triple which is crucial to success on the task. 
A secondary aim of the study was to explore other theories of DG facilitation. 
By requiring all participants to generate exactly 10 triples the experiment controlled 
for information quantity (Wharton et aI., 1993) whilst analysis of the 10 triples 
produced enabled the quantification of key aspects of the triple heterogeneity account 
(Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995). The results showed differential performance on the 
task despite controlling for the number of triples produced, whilst analyses of the 
triples indicated that contrary to the prediction of the triple heterogeneity account 
solvers varied from non-solvers on only one aspect of the triple production, that is, the 
number of descending triples produced. As such, solvers and non-solvers generated a 
similar number and range of triple types, thus indicating that DG facilitation cannot be 
attributed to a creative exploration of the problem space. 
The analyses of triple generation profiles presented here seem to indicate that 
participants appreciate the value of a descending triple in delimiting the scope of the 
DAX rule, and that when given an example of such a triple they engage in less 
exploration of the problem space than those given the non-useful contrast class triple. 
These findings tend to indicate that it is not a wide exploration of the hypothesis space 
which leads to success, but rather that it is this wide search which mediates between 
DG instructions and the production of a useful contrast class triple and therefore 
success. It is possible that rather than being competing accounts of DG facilitation, the 
contrast class theory and the triple heterogeneity theory may both represent important 
aspects of people's hypothesis testing strategies (cf. Roberts, 2000; Siegler & Chen, 
2002) 
The data presented here appear to show a convincing case for the contrast class 
account of DG facilitation. What remains, however, is the need to provide the details 
of a fully-fledged theoretical framework to underpin the contrast class account. In 
Chapter 5 it was argued that the contrast class account could be accommodated within 
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what appears to be the most psychologically plausible account of behaviour on the SO 
version of the 2-4-6 task, that is, Oaksford and Chater's (1994) Iterative 
Counterfactual Model (ICM), itself a development of Farris and Revlin's (1989ab; 
1989ba) earlier counterfactual strategy. The ICM focuses on how hypotheses are 
created rather than on how they are tested, with one key aspect being how hypotheses 
are revised when falsifying evidence is obtained. The ICM is a normative model and 
thus describes the strategy used by successful hypothesis testers and applies in its 
original format to the SO paradigm. How then does the model explain the facilitatory 
effect of DO instructions, in particular the contrast class account of the effect? 
To answer this question an extension to the ICM is proposed (see Figure 7.1). In 
this revised model the processes by which the DAX hypothesis is generated and tested 
remain in place, and it is only when the participant has tested and become reasonably 
confident in their DAX hypothesis (Box 14) that the extension to the model becomes 
activated: after having produced their DAX hypothesis the participant moves on to 
discovering the MED rule. Unlike the initial stages of DAX hypothesis discovery they 
do not have a seed triple and they must therefore generate the MED hypothesis using a 
different strategy. They do know that DAX and MED are different and that DAX 
seems to be "numbers ascending by 2". It seems reasonable to assume that participants 
will use this information to generate their initial MED hypothesis so that it differs 
from their DAX hypothesis as much as possible (i.e., it is the "opposite" of DAX). 
Note that this hypothesis contains two axes, "ascending" and "by 2". Iterative 
counterfactual testing is concerned with exploring one common feature at a time; it is, 
therefore, reasonable to suppose that when generating their MED hypothesis 
participants will focus on one axis of the DAX hypothesis and vary that. Evidence for 
the view that a single feature is considered at a time comes from Tschigi (1980) who 
showed that when testing hypotheses reasoners used a strategy of varying only one 
aspect of their materials at a time. The participant therefore selects one of these 
properties (e.g., "numbers rising by 2", Box 15), generates a contrast of this property 
("numbers rising by 3", Box 16) and produces an instance (I) of their MED hypothesis 
(Box 17), which is tested (Box 18). Feedback for this (I) is, of course, DAX. Their 
tentative MED H must therefore be rejected and I added to the list of the DAX 
instances (Box 22). The participant is now aware that their DAX hypothesis is wrong 
and moves back to discovering the DAX rule using iterative counterfactual testing 
(Box 2). Once satisfied with their amended DAX hypothesis (Box 14) they then once 
again move to the generation and testing of the MED hypothesis. Conversely the 
participant may vary the "ascending" aspect of their DAX hypothesis and generate a 
"decreasing by 2" MED hypothesis, subsequently producing an instance of their MED 
hypothesis (e.g., 6-4-2, Box 17). On testing (Box 18) they will receive MED feedback. 
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The participant may now move into a MED positive sub-loop, generating and testing 
instances of their MED hypothesis until (Box 19) they have reached the criterion level 
set for sufficient confidence in their MED hypothesis (Box 21). The process is then 
terminated and their MED hypothesis is compared to the DAX hypothesis (Box 22) 
for any common properties (Box 23). In the example given the common property of" 
by 2" is noted as being common to both hypotheses, leading to the generation of a 
complement to that property (Box 3) and an iteration of the DAX and MED 
hypothesis testing procedure as outlined above. If no common properties of the DAX 
and MED hypotheses are perceived then the rules are announced. It is this process of 
counterfactual testing of the DAX hypothesis and production of contrasting MED 
hypotheses which leads to the facilitatory effect ofDG instructions. 
Supporting evidence for an extended ICM that incorporates ideas of contrast 
class identification is provided by the solution success results of Experiment 5. In 
relation to the non-useful CCC condition, for example, it had been expected that 
participants who were given the illustrative 4-4-4 MED triple would generate a "three 
equal numbers hypothesis" for MED, and would, therefore, be lured toward 
considering a (non-relevant) "three different numbers" hypothesis for DAX. The 
results did indeed show instances of participants going as far as announcing a final 
DAX rule as being "three different numbers" in the non-useful MED condition. This 
supports the notion that reasoners are highly susceptible to focusing on the apparent 
relevance of available contrast class cues during their rule induction and hypothesis 
testing. It is envisaged that the provision of non-useful contrast class information 
hindered performance on the task by interfering with the MED hypothesis stage in 
which a single property of the DAX hypothesis is varied, thus the salient useful 
contrasting MED hypotheses are not generated. Furthermore, the instructions in use 
did not explicitly state that the two rules were exclusive and exhaustive, so it may be 
that reasoners were pursuing two SG rules rather than two related rules. This second 
explanation is somewhat undermined, however, by noting that those participants 
receiving useful contrast class information were given exactly the same instruction but 
successfully solved the task and therefore did not appear to be looking for two 
unrelated rules. 
The data from this study demonstrate the importance of contrast class 
information in solving the rule discovery task. However, as noted earlier, the MED 
exemplar provided to participants in the useful contrast class cue condition was 
oppositional to the DAX rule on a single dimension only, that of ascending versus 
descending. The universe of descending triples is, however, infinite and contains 
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triples with a wide variety of properties, for example, only odd numbers, unequal 
interval between integers, prime numbers etc. It is also notable that the useful contrast 
class exemplar was not the logical opposite of the most commonly reported DAX 
hypothesis (i.e., "numbers rising by 2"), but rather represents its psychological set 
complement (i.e., "numbers descending by 2"). Oaksford (2002) has argued that a 
contrast class is "made up of the most likely or relevant members of the complement 
set" (p.140), and is thus not necessarily a logical concept. It could be argued that a 
descending triple which varied from the original DAX exemplar on a multiplicity of 
properties would not constitute a psychological contrast class, and would therefore not 
facilitate performance on the task. This argument is in line with an implicit prediction 
of the extended ICM: that should MED information which varies on a variety of axes 
be provided then this should interfere with the working of the model, thereby 
hindering performance on the task. It was, therefore, decided to test this prediction by 
manipulating the MED information such that whilst it differed from DAX information 
on the salient ascending/descending axis, it also varied on other axes. 
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Chapter 8 
Experiment 6: Manipulating Contrast Class Information across 
More than One Axis 
8.1 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 7, the extended ICM model presented in this thesis suggests 
that when given DG instructions the participant first generates and tests their DAX 
hypothesis to a preset level of confidence, and then turns to generating and testing the 
MED hypothesis. It has also been proposed that the MED hypothesis is typically 
drawn from two pieces of information: the reasoner's DAX hypothesis and their 
knowledge that the two rules are different. As such, it is assumed that participants 
generate a MED hypothesis which is "opposite" to their DAX hypothesis. The model 
asserts that this latter process is achieved by the participant selecting a single property 
of their DAX hypothesis and then generating a contrast to that property. 
One implicit assumption of the proposed model is, therefore, that should a MED 
exemplar be given which varies on more than one axis then this would interfere with 
processing and hinder performance on the DG task. To this end it was decided to 
manipulate the MED information given such that 9-8-2 was presented as an 
illustrative MED triple as this contrasts with 2-4-6 on: (1) several, non-relevant 
dimensions (e.g., "mixed odd and even numbers" versus "only even numbers", 
"unequal intervals" versus "equal intervals", and "middle number is not arithmetic 
mean of the outer numbers" versus "middle number is the arithmetic mean of the 
outer numbers"); and (2) a single, relevant dimension (Le., "descending numbers" 
versus "ascending numbers"). In addition, given that only one previous instance of 
DG instructions not facilitating performance has been reported (Wharton et a\., 1993), 
it was decided to collect a further set of data from participants given 4-4-4 as non-
useful CCC information, to check the replicability of performance levels observed in 
Experiment 5. Finally, a control group was given 6-4-2 as a MED exemplar. It was 
predicted that the multiplicity of the available contrast class cues in the 9-8-2 
condition would hinder performance on the DG version of the task as compared to the 
useful contrast class condition. 
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8.2 Method 
A further 64 first year students at the University of Derby took part in this study. 
The procedure employed was identical to that in Experiment 5 with the exception that 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: one group was told that 6-
4-2 was an example of a MED triple, the second group that 4-4-4 was a MED triple, 
and the final group was informed that 9-8-2 conformed to the MED rule. 
8.3 Results and discussion 
8.3.1 Success Rates across Conditions 
Comparison of success rates across conditions shows that success in the "useful" 
CCC condition was double that achieved in the "multiple-axes" CCC condition, and 
three times higher than for the group receiving the "non-useful" CCC (see Table 8.1). 
A chi-square test of independence indicated that these differences were reliable, X\2, 
N = 64) = 12.38, P =.002, w = .44. Multiple chi-square analyses were performed with 
Bonferroni corrections applied (giving an alpha of .017) in order to determine where 
this difference lay. Results of these analyses showed there to be significant differences 
in success rates between those given the 6-4-2 exemplar and either the 4-4-4 
exemplar, l (1) = 11.48, N = 42, P = .001, W = .52, or the 9-8-2 exemplar, X2 (1) = 
6.31, N = 42, P = .012, W = .39. No difference was found between the 4-4-4 and 9-8-2 
conditions, X2 (l) = .98, N = 44, P = .32, W = .15, (see Table 8.1). 
Table 8-1 
Percentage of Correct and Incorrect DAX Rule Announcements across Conditions 
Success 
Condition N Solver Non-solver 
Useful CCC 20 75 25 
Multiple Axes CCC 22 36 64 
Non-Useful CCC 22 23 77 
8.3.2 Production of Descending Triples 
The focus of this experiment was to test the idea that a key feature of the 
extended ICM was that to be maximally useful to the reasoner the initial MED 
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e~emplar should ~ary only on a single axis that optimised the salience of descending 
trIples. It was decIded, therefore that it would be prudent to ass th' f 
. ' ess e Importance 0 
the productIOn of a descending triple for task success. Table 8.2 presents data 
collapsed across conditions. This table shows that while the majority of participants 
produced at least one descending triple, there was no single instance of a participant 
solving the task in the absence of a descending triple. A chi-square analysis indicated 
that this effect was highly reliable, l (1, N= 64) = 9.22,p < .01, w = .38. 
Table 8-2 
Frequency of Correct DAX Announcements by Presence vs. Absence of at Least One 
Descending Triple in Experiment 6. 
Success 
Descending Triple N Solver Non-solver 
Absent 10 o 10 
Present 54 28 26 
8.3.3 Analysis of Triple Types across Condition 
In order to explore further the strategies pursued across condition the data were 
analysed in terms of the types of triples produced (see Table 8.3). Recall that triple 
heterogeneity in its original form suggested that DG instructions promote success on 
the 2-4-6 task by inducing a wide search of the hypothesis space. However, analyses 
from Experiment 5 tended to suggest that a wide search of the hypothesis space 
mediated between DG instructions and the production of a contrast class triple, and 
that once such a triple had been identified the search of the hypothesis space was 
abandoned in favour of testing of the DAX and MED hypotheses. To discriminate 
between these ideas a series of one-way ANOV As was undertaken which examined 
the triple generation profile of participants across condition. These ANOVAs showed 
that across conditions there were reliable differences in both the number of negtypes 
produced, F(2,61) = 4.11, P = .02, ~ 2= .12, and the number of descending triples 
produced, F(2,61) = 15.36, p < .001, ~2 = .33. Post hoc Bonferroni tests showed that 
for the negtype measure this difference was between the useful CCC and the non-
useful CCC conditions (p = .02), while for descending triples there were differences 
between the useful CCC and the non-useful CCC conditions (p < .001) and between 
the multiple axis CCC and the non-useful CCC conditions (p = .008). These analyses 
indicate that when given a useful CCC triple, participants were able to recognise its 
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~alue an~ rather th~n searching the hypothesis space focussed on testing potentially 
mformatlVe descendmg triples. 
Table 8-3 
Summary of Triple Generation Profiles across Conditions 
Type of CCC Information 
Useful Non-useful Multiple axes 
(6-4-2) (4-4-4) (9-8-2) 
Measure of Heterogeneity Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Constant positives 4.30 0.40 3.68 0.31 3.59 0.31 
Posvars 0.85 0.24 0.86 0.23 1.23 0.32 
Number of triples 4.90 0.34 5.55 0.29 5.00 0.27 
receiving negative 
feedback 
Negtypes 1.75 0.28 2.95 0.35 1.19 0.25 
Triptypes 3.25 0.34 4.41 0.39 4.00 0.25 
Descending triples 3.55 0.29 1.18 0.30 2.50 0.31 
8.3.4 Analysis of Triple Types across Success 
A further series of analyses explored the triple generation profiles of successful 
versus non-successful participants. Triple heterogeneity theory suggests that solvers 
will engage in a wider search of the hypothesis space than non-solvers, while contrast 
class theory is concerned with triples that reflect a reasoner's "psychological set 
complement". The triple generation profiles of solvers and non-solvers are shown in 
Table 8.4. This table shows that the only measure in which there was a reliable 
difference across conditions related to the number of descending triples produced, 
t(62) = 2.42, P = .02, d = .59. It is acknowledged that "number of descending triples" 
is not a measure of heterogeneity; instead this analysis indicates that successful 
solvers were more likely to produce iterations of informative descending triples. 
- 115 -
Chapter 8 
Experiment 6: Manipulating Contrast Class Information across Axes 
Table 8-4 
Summary of Triple Generation Profiles across Success on the Task 
Type of Contrast Class Cue 
Measure of Heterogeneity 
Constant positives 
Posvars 
Number of triples receiving negative 
feedback 
Negtypes 
Triptypes 
Descending triples 
8.4 General discussion 
Non solver 
Mean SE 
3.64 0.25 
0.97 0.21 
5.44 0.24 
2.69 0.23 
4.11 0.23 
1.94 0.30 
Solver 
Mean SE 
4.11 0.31 
1.00 0.23 
4.79 0.24 
2.07 0.28 
3.64 0.34 
2.93 0.26 
The purpose of Experiment 6 was to test empirically the contrast class account 
of DG facilitation by manipulating the information available to participants. The 
experiment offered support for the contrast class account of the DG facilitation effect 
and close analysis of participants' triple generation profiles failed to provide much 
support for competing accounts. The goal complementarity approach suggests that it is 
the production of posvar triples which is most closely associated with success on the 
task; the data in Experiment 6 do not support this account. Neither do the data support 
the information quantity approach, as there are differences in performance across 
conditions despite the fact that the number of triples being elicited was kept constant. 
The triple heterogeneity account suggests that solvers will differ from non-solvers in 
the range of triples produced, a prediction which is again not supported by the present 
dataset. 
However, it was previously suggested that triple heterogeneity may be 
instrumental in promoting success on the DG version of the task in that a wide search 
of the hypothesis space leads to the generation of a contrast class triple which, in tum, 
leads to task success. According to this view triple heterogeneity is seen as a useful 
preliminary stage in successful hypothesis testing. Some support for this idea is 
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provided by the data analyses for Experiment 5 and 6. In both of these experiments 
participants were provided with contrast class information (albeit of varying utility) 
with the effect that they did not engage in an initial search of the hypothesis space, but 
were instead lured into the testing of a MED hypothesis informed by the initial 
exemplar. It could be argued, therefore, that the findings from both Experiment 5 and 
Experiment 6 offer a level of support for the triple heterogeneity theory of DG 
facilitation if a wide search of the hypothesis space is seen as an important first step in 
producing a potentially informative contrast class triple. 
The findings of Experiment 6 are readily explained by the Extended Iterative 
Counterfactual Model (E-ICM) presented in Chapter 7. Experiment 6 demonstrated 
that it is not DG instructions per se which promote success on the task, but rather that 
it is useful contrast class information that differentiates solvers from non-solvers on 
the task. It was also suggested that standard DG instructions promote the production 
of these types of triples. The data from both Experiment 5 and 6 shows that DG 
facilitation can be hindered if the discovery of this useful contrast class information is 
impeded by presenting participants with a logically correct but psychologically non-
useful MED triple. The E-ICM shows that participants initially generate and test a 
DAX hypothesis using iterative counterfactual testing until they have reached a 
criterion level of confidence in it, and then switch to the discovery and testing of the 
MED hypothesis. The model suggests that an initial MED hypothesis is based on the 
participant's current DAX hypothesis: that knowing that the MED rule is different to 
the DAX rule they generate a MED hypothesis which is seen as "opposite" to the 
DAX rule. Using a similar strategy to that of the iterative counterfactual testing of the 
DAX rule they select a single property of the DAX rule and use this to generate a 
contrasting property - and therefore a triple which is an instance of this MED 
hypothesis. Thus, it would seem that one prediction of the extended ICM is that when 
asked for the opposite of a complex number rule (e.g., "even numbers ascending by 
two") participants should produce a rule which varies on a single axes only (i.e., "even 
numbers descending by two", "odd numbers ascending by two", or "even numbers 
ascending by three"). The final study to be presented in this thesis tests this idea. 
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Chapter 9 
Experiment 7: Exploring Contrast Class Generation for Presented 
Number Rules 
9.1 Introduction 
This work presented in this thesis so far has explored contemporary accounts of 
DG facilitation and has concluded that no single previously published account can 
adequately explain the effect, although it has been suggested that the triple 
heterogeneity account may be subsumed within the contrast class theory that has been 
developed as part of the present research programme. Chapter 7 described a study 
which aimed to explore the contrast class account of the DG facilitation effect and 
went on to present an extension of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) iterative 
counterfactual model (ICM) so as to demonstrate how contrast class ideas could be 
incorporated within the ICM so as to explain of the performance benefits that arise 
from DG instructions. 
The extension to the ICM proposed that DG instructions facilitate rule discovery 
by encouraging the production of a MED triple based on the hypothesised DAX triple. 
It was suggested that due to the lack of direct information about the MED rule, two 
pieces of information are exploited by participants to allow them to form the basis of 
an initial working MED hypothesis: (1) their knowledge that the MED rule is different 
to the DAX rule; and (2) their current best hypothesis as to what the DAX rule might 
be. It was suggested that, in a similar manner to the counterfactual strategy utilised to 
generate and test the DAX hypothesis, a single property of this DAX hypothesis is 
selected and a triple is generated that varies from the DAX hypothesis on this axis 
only. This triple is then tested and if feedback is DAX the reasoner is made aware that 
their posited DAX hypothesis is erroneous and returns to testing the DAX hypothesis. 
If, however, feedback is MED the reasoner adds this triple to the list of MED triples 
and moves into the MED sub-loop, in which a number of positive instances of the 
MED hypothesis are tested (Klayman & Ha, 1987, 1989). Once the reasoner has 
generated sufficient evidence to be confident in their MED hypothesis they move out 
of the positive sub-loop and perform a comparison oftheir DAX and MED hypotheses 
in which any perceivable common properties of the two hypotheses are searched for. 
If none are perceived the reasoner announces the two rules. If, however, a common 
property is perceived this violates the assumption that the two rules are different and 
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the process of DAX, and then MED hypothesis generation and testing is restarted 
using this common property as a basis for testing of the DAX hypothesis. Thus, 
throughout the model the reasoner examines their posited rules for common properties 
to inform their hypothesis formation and testing by varying a single property at a time. 
Such a model presumes a consistency across DAX and MED hypothesis generation 
and testing which would seem to be psychologically plausible, while the emphasis on 
examining a single property at a time allows for possible cognitive constraints on the 
process of hypothesis generation and testing. 
One prediction of the extended iterative counterfactual model as presented here 
is that the initial MED hypotheses would differ from DAX hypotheses on a single axis 
only, regardless of the number of properties present in a reasoner's working DAX 
hypothesis. This notion is based on Oaksford and Stenning's (1992) notion of contrast 
class information. They note that psychological contrast class information is different 
from the logical opposite of a set of information, arguing instead that the most likely 
contrast class member should be as similar as possible to the negated constituent. 
Oaksford and Stenning use the example "Johnny didn't travel to Manchester by train" 
and point out that this sentence can be negated in one of three ways: 
1) It was not Johnny who travelled to Manchester by train 
2) That it was not to Manchester that Johnny travelled to by train 
3) Johnny travelled to Manchester by some method other than by train. 
They suggest that any of these three interpretations would be a valid contrast 
class to the sentence "Johnny travelled to Manchester by train". Oaksford and 
Stenning argued that in this real world example it is assumed that people will use a 
combination of world knowledge (a person would be unlikely to travel by ship from 
London to Manchester) and intonation which directs the listener to the relevant 
constituent of the sentence to disambiguate where the negated constituent should lie. 
Note that the negations used to illustrate the contrast class to "Johnny travelled to 
Manchester by train" only negate a single constituent of the original sentence; it is this 
aspect of contrast class information which is employed in the extended iterative 
counterfactual model when suggesting that the reasoner seeking the opposite of the 
DAX hypothesis will vary it along one axis only. 
One test of the extended iterative counterfactual model would, therefore, be to 
examine whether participants who are asked for the "opposite" of a number rule 
containing two or more constituents would, in fact, vary only a single constituent of 
that rule. During the course of this thesis a large body of data has been collected in the 
SG condition concerning incorrect initial rule announcements made by participants. It 
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was decided, therefore, that to improve the validity of this study it would be valuable 
to use these rule-announcement data as a basis for the number rules to be tested. It was 
predicted that when asked for the opposite of a number rule with two or more 
properties, participants would vary only one of these properties. 
9.2 Method 
9.2.1 Participants 
One hundred and thirty-six staff and students from the University of Derby took 
part in the study on a voluntary basis. None had received any teaching relating to 
reasoning or logic. 
9.2.2 Design 
An independent measures design was used in which each participant was asked 
to state the opposite to one of the five number rules derived from a review of the 
incorrect rule announcements made in the single goal (SG) conditions of the previous 
experiments reported in this thesis that employed the standard "ascending numbers" 
target rule (i.e., Experiments 1 to 3). The rule allocated to each participant was 
randomly selected from the set of five available, with the constraint that thirteen 
participants were given the "numbers rising by two" rule for every one participant 
presented with each of the other rules (see Materials section for further explanation). 
9.2.3 Materials 
The rules to be used were generated by reviewing the rules produced by 
participants in the SG condition in previous studies in this thesis. A total of 90 
participants had received SG instructions with a target rule of ascending sequences, 48 
of whom had announced an over-restricted rule (a further seven had produced other 
incorrect rules). These over-restricted rules were of the form: 
I. Rising by two 
ii. (Going up) in two times tables 
Ill. Going up in equal intervals 
IV. Even numbers going up. 
v. Even numbers going up in twos. 
These rules were announced by participants in an approximate ratio of 13: 1: 1: 1: 1. If 
the extended ICM is an accurate reflection of people's DG hypothesis testing strategy 
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then these rules represent participants' working DAX hypotheses as they move on to 
the generation and testing of the MED rule. Although the primary aim of the present 
study was to examine whether participants varied complex rules on either single or 
multiple axes, it was decided that given the context of the experiment the most valid 
approach would be to mirror the incorrect DAX hypotheses produced in the SG 
condition. For this reason these rules were presented in the above proportions to 
participants in the present experiment. 
9.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and verbally. Each participant was given a 
number rule from the above pool, and was asked what they thought the "opposite of 
the rule" would be. Answers were scored on a simple tick sheet which recorded which 
the rules they were asked about and possible contrasting rules. For rules (i) to (iv) 
there were three possible alternatives which were expected to be generated; two which 
varied from the given rule on a single axis, whilst the third varied on two axes. For 
example possible alternatives to the first rule (rising by two) are: 
a. Descending in twos (single axis) 
b. Rising by a number other than two (single axis) 
c. Descending by a number other than two (two axes) 
There were seven possible "opposites" to rule (v); three varied on a single axis, three 
on two axes and one rule mentioned the opposite of all three components in the 
example rule: 
a. Odd numbers going up in twos (single axis) 
b. Even numbers going up in other than twos (single axis) 
c. Even numbers going down in twos (single axis) 
d. Odd numbers going down in other than twos (two axes) 
e. Even numbers going down in other than twos (two axes) 
f. Odd numbers going down in twos (two axes) 
g. Odd numbers going down in other than twos (three axes) 
9.3 Results 
It had been predicted that when asked for the opposite of a number rule with two 
or more properties, participants would vary only one of these properties. Of the 136 
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participants in the study only a single idiosyncratic answer was given (zero) and this 
was removed from the dataset. No participant produced a rule which varied on more 
than two axes, although such an eventuality was possible in rule (v). To analyse the 
data a comparison was therefore made of the number of participants who generated a 
rule which varied on a single axis against the expected frequency of 50% predicted by 
chance. The analysis showed that 89% of the participants generated a "single axis" 
variation, which a binomial test indicated was highly reliable,p < .001. 
9.4 Discussion 
The results reported here unequivocally support the notion that when asked for 
the opposite to complex number rule, participants focus on a single axis and negate 
that single axis only. This finding is in line with a prediction of the extended ICM 
presented in Chapter 7. According to extended ICM when asked to find two rules with 
the DG paradigm a participant initially focuses on discovering the DAX rule; although 
this in not made explicit by the model this is assumed to be the case because the 
reasoner has an exemplar triple on which to base their initial hypothesis, whilst they 
have no information about the MED rule. Once confident of their DAX hypothesis the 
reasoner then turns their attention to the MED rule. Unlike the DAX rule they do not 
have a MED exemplar (in the standard form of the task), and they must therefore 
induce the MED rule from information that is available to them: they know that MED 
is different from DAX and they think that DAX is (for example) "numbers rising by 
two". It was argued that they would therefore induce a MED rule which exploited 
these two pieces of information and generate a MED hypothesis which differs from 
the DAX hypothesis as much as possible (i.e., produce a rule which is "opposite" of 
DAX). Based on Oaksford and Chater's (1994) ICM - which is concerned with 
exploring one common feature at a time - it was suggested that rather than generate 
the logical opposite of their "number rising by two" DAX hypothesis participants 
would instead vary only one of the two possible axes. 
It was suggested in Chapter 5 that when seeking to find the "opposite" of their 
DAX rule it is likely that participants will vary the axis which has a logical opposite 
(i.e., ascending versus descending), rather than the more fuzzy "by two". A second 
analysis was therefore performed which focused on those participants whose 
presented rules contained both a "fuzzy" and a "non-fuzzy" component. This analysis 
showed that 83% of "opposite" rules announced varied the non-fuzzy component of 
the rule, which was significant with a binomial test, p < .001. By contrast, when 
participants were asked for the opposites of rules containing two "non-fuzzy" 
components (e.g., "even numbers going up") it emerged that the axis which was 
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varied was split more evenly (46% versus 54%). However, there were very small 
numbers in this latter group, making it difficult to draw conclusive inferences. 
In summary, the data presented here offer support for the extended ICM model 
(Chapter 7) in two ways. First, when asked to produce the opposite of a complex 
number rule it is evident that participants will vary only a single axis of the rule. 
Second, when presented with rules which vary on both "fuzzy" and "non-fuzzy" axes 
it is clear that participants will produce many more rules in which the "non-fuzzy" 
aspect is varied rather that the more difficult "fuzzy" axis. 
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10.1 Introduction 
Chapter 10 
General Discussion 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore contemporary accounts of DG 
facilitation in Wason's (1960) rule discovery task in an attempt to discriminate 
between them with a view to providing an overarching theory of the DG effect. It was 
also hoped that a clearer understanding of why DG instructions improved performance 
would go some way toward explaining the poor performance in the SG variant of the 
task. In this final chapter an overview of the experiments performed in this thesis is 
provided, along with a description of the development of a novel "contrast class" 
account of the DG facilitation effect. In addition, it is shown how Oaksford and 
Chater's (1994) iterative counterfactual model (ICM) can be extended to provide a 
process model which accounts for the data presented in this thesis and the DG 
facilitatory effect more generally. An evaluation of this model is also presented. The 
Extended-ICM (E-ICM) is then situated more broadly within ideas relating to the 
philosophy of science, and it is argued that the model promotes the use of a range of 
hypothesis testing strategies. More specifically it promotes the use of a simplified 
form of Bayesian hypotheses testing in which it is not necessary for the reasoner to 
engage in a priori estimates of the diagnosticity of proposed tests. Finally, suggestions 
are made for further studies designed to explore the ideas implicit in the E-ICM and 
hypothesis testing strategies more generally. 
10.2 Overview of Experiments 
10.2.1 Testing Evans' (1989) Positivity Bias Theory of DG Facilitation 
In Experiment 1 Evans' (1989) positivity bias theory was explored. According to 
this theory DG facilitation is attributable to the linguistic labelling of the feedback 
given to participants rather than the specific requirement to discover two rules. Evans 
claims that relabelling the negatively valenced "does not fit" feedback as "MED" 
overcomes a preconscious tendency to attend to positive information and discard 
negative information. In Experiment 1 these assumptions of the positivity bias theory 
were tested by independently manipulating instruction mode (SG versus DG) and 
linguistic labelling of feedback ("fits/does not fit" versus "DAXIMED"). Contrary to 
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the predictions of the positivity bias theory no effect of linguistic label I ing of feedback 
was apparent, with participants being more successful in the DG condition regardless 
of the form of feedback. In terms of solution success, then, Experiment 1 appeared to 
undermine the positivity bias account of DG facilitation. 
Analysis of the triple generation profiles in Experiment 1 allowed observations 
to be made regarding other accounts of DG facilitation. Some support was gained for 
triple heterogeneity theory (Vallee-Tourangeau et a\., 1995), with DG instructions 
promoting a wider variety of negtype triples, more triples receiving negative feedback 
and more posvar triples. The association of posvar generation with success on the task 
also supported Wharton et al.'s (1993) goal complementarity theory of DG 
facilitation. Furthermore, the greater numbers of triples that were produced by those in 
the DG condition lent some support to Wharton et al.'s (1993) information quantity 
theory of DG facilitation. 
Overall, then, Experiment 1 gave rise to a degree of support for all contemporary 
theories of DG facilitation with the exception of the positivity bias account. Careful 
exploration of the data, however, revealed a previously unremarked phenomenon: that 
it was the production of a descending triple rather than the intuitively more 
informative posvar triple which was most closely associated with success on the task. 
This novel finding was intriguing in that contemporary theories of DG facilitation 
have generally been silent on the role of negative triples in the task. Moreover, if the 
effect was found to be robust then a theoretical account for the finding would seem to 
be essential. 
10.2.2 Testing Wharton, Cheng, and Wickens' (1993) Information 
Quantity Account of DG Facilitation 
Experiment 2 was designed to explore (Wharton et a\., 1993) information 
quantity account of DG facilitation. This theory is based on two premises: that solvers 
produce more triples than non-solvers before announcing the rule (cf. Wason. 1960), 
and that participants given DG instructions reliably produce more triples than those 
given SG instructions (Gorman et a\., 1987). Testing the information quantity account 
therefore involved manipulating the number of triples participants were required to 
produce across instruction mode. Thus participants were given either DG or SG 
instructions and were required to produce 6, 12 or 18 triples. Results of this study 
were equivocal with regard to the information quantity theory. First, contrary to 
information quantity theory predictions, performance in the DG condition was 
superior to that in the SG condition. Second, however, those participants asked to 
produce 12 triples were more successful than those in the 6 and 18 triple conditions. 
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This latter observation tends to indicate that although the relationship between number 
of triples produced and success is not linear, there is an optimum number of triples for 
success on the task. The observation that participants who were asked to produce 12 
triples had the highest rate of rule discovery concurs with previous reports in the 
literature suggesting that the mean number of triples produced by solvers deploying 
"natural" hypothesis testing strategies is between 10 and 12 (e.g., Farris & Revlin, 
1989a, Experiment 1; Gorman, 1987, Experiment 1 ; Vallee-Tourangeau & Payton, 
2008). It would seem, therefore, that the number of triples generated by people may 
well have a role to play in successful hypothesis testing, but this role is more complex 
than suggested by information quantity theory. 
In terms of other theories of interest, the data from Experiment 2 offered some 
support for both the triple heterogeneity theory (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995) and 
the goal complementarity theory (Wharton et aI., 1993). It was further noted that the 
presence of a contrast class triple was again associated with success on the task, 
although for all three accounts the evidence was not entirely convincing. Given the 
equivocal evidence for all theories of interest it was decided that none could be 
discarded and that all should be considered in further experiments, but with controls 
being put in place for the information quantity account by limiting triple production to 
10 triples in order to mirror naturally successful hypothesis testing behaviour. 
10.2.3 Testing Wharton, Cheng, and Wickens' (1993) Goal 
Complementarity Theory 
Experiment 3 was concerned with direct testing of goal complementarity theory 
(Wharton et aI., 1993). On initial inspection this theory seemed to be the most 
convincing in that it provides a clear rationale for both how and why DG instructions 
promote success on the task. The study systematically manipulated the relationship 
between the DAX and MED rules so that in some conditions they were no longer 
strictly complementary. Contrary to the basic tenet of the theory (i.e., that it is the 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive relationship between the two rules which promotes 
success) in one "non-complementary" condition performance was similar (and indeed 
marginally superior) to that in the standard, complementary condition. This finding 
was interpreted in line with contrast class theory, in that it was argued that in the non-
complementary but facilitatory DG condition the sought-after MED rule provided 
clear contrast class information to the reasoner, whereas in the standard DG condition 
contrast class information provided by the MED rule was less clear cut. 
A focussed follow-up study was conducted that further explored the goal 
complementarity theory using different rules. This study offered additional evidence 
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for contrast class ideas in that facilitation was greatest when MED feedback provided 
the strongest contrast class cue to the DAX rule, while in the DG-4 condition where 
the MED rule did not provide useful contrast class information performance was very 
poor. It was again noted that while support for the triple heterogeneity theory (VaIIee-
Tourangeau et aI., 1995) was somewhat limited, data analysis did show some level of 
support for this account, and therefore triple heterogeneity theory needed to be 
considered in more detail in further experiments. It was suggested, however, that 
whilst it was possible that a wide search of the triple-space was a useful preliminary 
step in identifying contrast class triples (which in turn leads to success on the task) 
such broad triple search may not in itselfbe the root cause of task facilitation. 
It was at this stage, with support for the notion of contrast class information 
playing a critical role in successful rule discovery, that it became important to identify 
a theoretical explanation for the effect. It was noted that it might be possible for 
Oaks ford and Chater's (1994) iterative counterfactual model (ICM) to go some way to 
explaining the effect, although it was also acknowledged that the original model was 
concerned with hypothesis testing using SG instructions and would therefore need to 
be extended to include DG instructions. 
10.2.4 Generalising the Contrast Class Theory to Other Rules 
Evidence had now been accumulated suggesting that when the original 
"ascending numbers" DAX rule was used in the DG paradigm then the generation of a 
"descending" contrast class triple seemed to be the critical determinant of successful 
rule discovery. It was therefore decided that before developing the contrast class 
theory further it would be prudent to ensure that the effect was not merely an artefact 
of the DAX rule being used. Experiment 4 was therefore a simple implementation of 
the 2-4-6 task using SG versus DG rules and Gorman et aI.' s (1987) more difficult 
"three different numbers" rule. Analysis of the data showed DG facilitation with this 
more difficult rule, and also demonstrated that using this alternative rule production of 
a contrast class triple remained predictive of success on the task. 
It was additionally shown that generating a wide range of triples was also 
associated with success on the task, although modelling of the data showed that this 
effect disappeared once production of a contrast class triple was controlled for. The 
evidence for competing theories of DG facilitation seemed again to favour the contrast 
class theory of the effect, although it was clear that triple heterogeneity theory should 
not be discarded. 
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10.2.5 Testing the Contrast Class Theory ofDG Facilitation 
Evidence for both contrast class theory and triple heterogeneity theory presented 
up to this point had been a result of post hoc analyses of triple generation profiles, 
rather than a consequence of direct manipulations of available contrast class cues. To 
address this weakness it was decided to explore contrast class theory empirically. 
Contrast class theory proposes that it is the production of a triple which varies on the 
salient ascending/descending axis which promotes success on the task. The aim of 
Experiment 5 was therefore to test contrast class theory by providing MED 
information of varying utility to participants and examining the effect of the 
information on success rates. 
Results provided strong evidence for contrast class theory in that those given 
useful (i.e., "descending") contrast class information were significantly more 
successful than those given non-useful (i.e., "equal numbers") contrast class 
information. Indeed, it was found that non-useful contrast class information impeded 
performance on this DG version of the task, with the result that success rates were 
similar to those normally reported using SG instructions (e.g., Tukey, 1986, Wason, 
1960). 
This study provided no evidence that varied triple testing was predictive of task 
success. However, this null effect was interpreted as indicating that participants in this 
study did not actually need to engage in hypothesis space searching as they had been 
provided with a contrast class cue in the first place. As such, participants were already 
at a more advanced stage of the hypothesis testing process than would typically be the 
case, and being at this advanced stage obviated the need for a broad triple search. 
Overall, then, it remains possible that under standard DG instructions a wide search of 
the hypothesis space is a key precursor to the generation of a useful contrast class 
triple. 
10.2.6 Testing Contrast Class Theory by Manipulating Information across 
More than One Axis 
In addition to providing evidence for the contrast class theory, Experiment 5 also 
led to a suggested extension to Oaks ford and Chater's (1994) ICM which illustrated 
how implementation of DG instructions would affect the model, and specifically why 
contrast class triples are generated. This model (see Figure 10.1) proposed that when 
generating a MED hypothesis, participants focus on a single attribute of their working 
DAX hypothesis so as to generate a MED hypothesis which varies on this axis only, 
leading to the generation of a positive example of this MED hypothesis. A prediction 
deriving from the model is that the most useful MED triple would be one which 
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varied from the DAX hypothesis on a single axis only. Experiment 6 empirically 
tested this idea by comparing the performance of participants given MED exemplars 
which varied on either single or multiple axes. As predicted, performance was best for 
those participants given exemplars with useful "single axis" contrast class 
information. Post hoc analysis of triple generation profiles again showed no evidence 
that varied triple testing was predictive of success on the task, which offered further 
support for the idea that a wide exploration of the triple-space may simply be a 
precursor to generating contrast class information rather than being an important 
predictor of success in itself. 
10.2.7 Exploring the Generation of Contrast Class Information 
The final experiment explored the idea implicit in the extended ICM (E-ICM) 
that after producing a plausible DAX hypothesis participants move to generating and 
testing a MED hypothesis which is formed by seeking the "opposite" of their DAX 
rule, and that this "opposite" will vary from their DAX rule on single axis. It was 
found that when presented with complex number rules the majority of participants 
generated opposite rules which did indeed vary on just one axis, and that this axis was 
one for which a logical contrast is most easily brought to mind. 
10.2.8 Summary of Empirical Evidence 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis appeared to suggest that none of 
the contemporary theories of DG facilitation presented in the introduction provided a 
wholly convincing account of the phenomenon. As a result, and in the light of new 
effects noted in the reported data analyses, an extension to Oaksford and Chater's 
(1994) ICM was proposed. This new model, termed the extended iterative 
counterfactual model (E-ICM), appeared to provide a comprehensive explanation of 
the DG effect, and aspects of the reported research attempted to test core predictions 
deriving from the model. 
It was further proposed that Vallee-Tourangeau et al.'s (1995) triple 
heterogeneity account may have a role to play in explaining the DG facilitation effect 
in that a wide search of the triple-space may be a preliminary stage in generating a 
contrast class triple, which the E-ICM suggests is the critical determinant of success 
on the task. Although not previously discussed it is also possible that information 
quantity (Wharton et aI., 1993) may playa similar role in the 2-4-6 task, in that the 
increased triple generation evident in both successful SG participants and DG 
participants may be an artefact of wide triple-space search and therefore underpins the 
generation of a contrast class triple. 
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The evidence presented in this thesis does not offer direct support to the notion 
that these alternative theories of DG facilitation can be subsumed within the E-ICM 
model which has been proposed, but neither does it exclude this possibility. However, 
while evidence for both the triple heterogeneity theory and information quantity theory 
appears to be less convincing than for the contrast class theory, some support for both 
is evident, both in this thesis and in the literature more generally (e.g., Vallee-
Tourangeau et at. 1995; Wharton et at. 1993). As such these theories cannot be 
discarded and need to be included in any account of DG facilitation. The suggestion 
that strategies may change within a hypothesis testing session fits well with the work 
of Roberts (2000; 1993) and Siegler and Chen (2002), who view reasoning as 
involving a range of potentially overlapping strategies. This approach is taken in the 
present proposals relating to the E-ICM. 
10.3 Contrast Class Theory and the Extended Iterative 
Counterfactual Model 
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that it is the production of a 
contrast class triple which is of critical importance in determining success on Wason's 
rule discovery task. For contrast class theory to be a convincing account of DO 
facilitation it is important to be able to explain both why DO instructions promote the 
generation of a contrast class triple and why this is not the case with SO instructions. 
A clear rationale for why production of a contrast class triple promotes success on the 
task is also required. 
It is suggested that DG instructions promote generation of a contrast class triple 
by the following mechanism. Following the generation and testing to satisfaction of 
the DAX hypothesis, the participant turns their attention to discovering the MED rule. 
Unlike the DAX rule (for which an example triple is given) the participant has no 
explicit information on which to base their MED rule. They therefore use the implicit 
information that the DAX and MED rules are different and that the DAX rule is 
something like "numbers rising by 2". Oaksford and Stenning (1992) have shown that 
when considering the negation of a complex statement participants generally negate 
only a single aspect of the original statement. They suggested that in everyday life 
people use a combination of world knowledge and intonation to disambiguate which 
constituent of the sentence should be negated. In the 2-4-6 task such cues are not 
available to the participant, instead they must use information contained within the 
DAX rule to cue them to a relevant negation. The most common initial DAX rule is of 
the form "numbers rising by two" which contains two axes which may be negated: 
"ascending" and "by two". It is much easier to access the logical opposite of 
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"ascending" than "by two", and it is therefore very likely that this would be the 
component of the statement which would be negated; indeed evidence from 
Experiment 7 supports this notion. It is therefore suggested that it is by this 
mechanism that DG instructions promote the generation of a contrast class triple. This 
mechanism relies wholly on the direct instruction to seek a second rule, and it is 
therefore clear that SG instructions would not directly promote generation of a 
contrast class triple. 
The second point which needs to be clarified for the contrast class theory to be a 
convincing account of DG facilitation is to show how the generation of a contrast 
class triple promotes success on the task. In the early stages of this thesis it was argued 
that such a triple increases the salience of the "ascending" aspect of the DAX rule. A 
more focussed explanation was developed however, in which it was shown how 
contrast class theory could be incorporated into the most psychologically plausible 
account of hypothesis testing behaviour in the 2-4-6 task: Oaksford and Chater's 
(1994) iterative counterfactual model (ICM). The revision to the ICM suggests that 
the processes by which the DAX hypothesis is generated and tested remain in place, 
that is, participants extract a property from the initial DAX exemplar (e.g., "even 
numbers"), generate a complement to this (e.g., "odd numbers") and then produce a 
positive instance of this complementary hypothesis. DAX feedback informs the 
participant that their initial DAX hypothesis is incorrect, so the instance is added to 
the list of DAX instances and another common property extracted which is tested in 
the same way. If, however, MED feedback is given, the participant knows their DAX 
hypothesis is plausible and they move into the positive sub-loop in which examples of 
the DAX hypothesis are generated and tested, until a preset criterion level of 
confidence is reached. 
It is at this point that the extension to the model is proposed; rather than 
announcing their DAX rule the DG participant now moves to the generation and 
testing of the MED hypothesis. As noted above, it is suggested that the participant 
uses information from DAX to generate a MED hypothesis which varies from the 
DAX hypothesis on a single axis. This newly generated MED hypothesis is then tested 
using a positive test strategy (see Figure 10.1). If DAX feedback is given the 
participant is alerted to the over-restricted nature of their DAX hypothesis and 
therefore returns to the generation and testing of DAX hypotheses. If, however, MED 
feedback is given the participant moves into the MED positive sub-loop and tests 
instances of their MED rule until a criterion level of confidence in their MED 
hypothesis is reached. The participant now compares their DAX and MED 
hypotheses, seeking common properties. If a common property is found the participant 
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will seek to relieve the tension caused by the sharing of a commonality between the 
two hypotheses which are perceived to be different by returning to the testing of the 
DAX hypothesis, generating a complement to it and passing through the stages of 
DAX and MED testing until no further common properties are perceived. At this point 
the DAX and MED hypotheses are announced and the study is over. 
It is clear that this approach will promote a more diligent search of the problem 
space in terms of both the number and type of triples produced as the participant 
moves through the stages of the model and therefore both the information quantity 
(Wharton et aI., 1993) and triple heterogeneity (Vallee-Tourangeau et aI., 1995) 
theories can be subsumed within this model. This is an important point as although 
strong evidence was not found for either account in this thesis, both theories have 
previously found support in the literature (e.g., Tukey, 1986; Vallee-Tourangeau et al.. 
1995; Wharton et aI., 1993). Both theories have been characterised as being 
descriptive rather than explanatory (Gale & Ball, 2005; 2006), and it is encouraging to 
be able to provide a theoretical mechanism by which such effects may be explained. 
10.4 Evaluation of the Extended Iterative Counterfactual Model 
This thesis has proposed an extension of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) iterative 
counterfactual model (ICM) to incorporate DG instructions. It has been proposed that 
when presented with DG instructions reasoners typically initially engage in 
discovering the DAX rule and only when they are reasonably confident of its veracity 
do they move to exploring the MED rule. The extension to the model suggests that the 
strategies used to generate a MED hypothesis are similar to those used in generating 
the DAX hypothesis. According to the ICM, when searching for a SG rule participants 
extract a list of common properties from the list of DAX instances and select one of 
these properties to produce a complementary hypothesis (H') which they then test 
using a positive example. Feedback from this instance is used to inform either further 
testing of the original DAX hypothesis (if feedback was "no") or to development of a 
refined DAX hypothesis (if the feedback was "yes"). Thus, generation and refinement 
of the DAX hypothesis proceeds by focussing on single common properties of the list 
of DAX exemplars. 
The extension to the model proposed in this thesis builds on this strategy of 
considering a single axis at a time by suggesting that MED hypotheses are derived 
from DAX hypotheses by identifying a single property of the DAX hypothesis and 
varying it to generate the MED hypothesis, which is then subjected to testing. The 
suggestion that MED rule generation mirrors DAX rule generation is psychologically 
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plausible; it is likely that such a strategy would reduce the cognitive load which might 
be caused by using different strategies for DAX and MED hypothesis testing and 
generation. That there is a level of cognitive constraint in successful hypothesis testing 
behaviour can be adduced from the recent work of Vallee-Tourangeau and colleagues 
(Vallee-Tourangeau & Payton, 2008; Vallee-Tourangeau & Penney, 2005) who 
showed that when some of the mental load involved in the rule discovery task was 
externalised success rates in the SG version of the task rose. In addition to the 
empirical evidence which has been presented in this thesis supporting the notion that 
MED hypothesis generation is concerned with varying a single axis at a time, Tschirgi 
(1980) showed that when presented with hypothesis testing tasks in which multiple 
causative agents are imputed then reasoners adopt a strategy of "varying one thing at a 
time". 
For the E-ICM to be a convincing account of DG hypothesis testing strategies it 
is important that it is able to account for all ofthe effects reported in the DG literature. 
In Experiment 3 and its associated follow-up study although participants were given 
DG instructions the relationship between the DAX and MED rules was varied such 
that they were no longer strictly complementary. Contrary to the predictions of goal 
complementarity theory (Wharton et aI., 1993) facilitated performance was still found 
in one of the non- complementary conditions. How, then, can the E-ICM account for 
this finding? It is proposed that initial DAX and MED hypothesis generation and 
testing remain as for the standard DG instructions. However, with the revision of the 
relationship of the rules it is now possible that participants will generate an instance of 
their MED hypothesis (Box 17, Figure 10.1) which they are told "fits" neither the 
experimenter's DAX nor MED rule. They must now reject their MED hypothesis 
(Box 22, Figure 10.1), but contrary to the process when standard DG instructions are 
used, they can no longer add this instance to the list of DAX instances. In fact, this 
iteration of triple generation and feedback provides very little information about their 
DAX hypothesis. It is therefore likely that the reasoner will now return to their DAX 
hypothesis and use this to generate a new MED hypothesis (see Figure 10.1). By this 
process the definition of the MED rule (and by default the DAX rule) can be refined. 
The enhanced performance using DG-3 instructions can be attributed to the fact that in 
the standard DG condition triples which are not necessarily descending in nature (e.g., 
"three equal numbers") will still be given MED feedback, and that this feedback may 
cause the reasoner to move prematurely into the MED positive sub-loop. Positive 
testing of a non-descending hypothesis will not reveal the over-restricted nature of the 
MED hypothesis (which, of course, should be "any non-ascending triple") which in 
turn may lead to erroneous DAX rule announcement as demonstrated in Experiment 5. 
The enhanced performance in the DG-3 condition can therefore be attributed to 
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the "descending" definition of the MED rule preventing premature movement into the 
positive MED testing sub-loop. 
The very poor performance on the DG-4 version of the task can also be 
explained by contrast class theory (and by extension the E-ICM). When using DG-4 
instructions the relationships between the rules was varied such that in addition to 
allowing triples to be DAX, MED, neither or both, information on the MED rule was 
no longer informative regarding the DAX rule. For example in Experiment 3 the MED 
rule was "odd numbers", which does not contrast with the "ascending numbers" DAX 
rule. Indeed, by introducing a definition of MED which varies from DAX in the type 
of rule used (i.e., object regularities versus relational regularities; see (Cherubini, 
Castelvecchio, & Cherubini, 2005) performance levels were reduced below those 
typically reported when using SG instructions. One view of performance rates when 
using such DG--4 instructions is that the participant is effectively engaged in tackling 
two SG tasks simultaneously. A second (and perhaps more contentious) view is that 
participants may now be engaged in a disjunctive reasoning task, the type of reasoning 
task which Evans (1989) views as the most difficult of all. Indeed, in his review of the 
literature on the THOG problem (Wason & Brooks, 1979) Evans (2007) suggests that 
this difficulty may be due to the fact that participants are required to reason 
simultaneously about two mutually exclusive hypotheses which violates the 
singularity principle of hypothetical thinking. Evans' explanation fits very neatly with 
the E-ICM account of the DG--4 success rates reported here. 
10.5 Testing the Extended Iterative Counterfactual Model 
The final three chapters of this thesis tested some of the predictions derived from 
the E-ICM model and provided further evidence for the contrast class theory of DG 
facilitation. Stronger testing of the model involving the collection of direct evidence 
about the hypothesis testing strategies of reasoners would be a useful next step. This, 
however, could be difficult. Collection of verbal protocols is one possibility, although 
questions have been raised in the literature about the validity of such verbal data. For 
example, Gagne and Smith (1962) showed that requiring participants to verbalise their 
thoughts when working on the Tower of Hanoi problem improved performance by 
reducing the number of moves taken to reach the solution when compared to a silent 
control group. On the other hand, Schooler and EngstIer-Schooler (1990) showed that 
verbalisations hindered performance on insight problem solving, an inhibitory effect 
which they referred to as "verbal overshadowing". Schooler and Engstler-Schooler 
suggested that such verbal overshadowing may arise because processes that are not 
easy to verbalise are involved in developing a solution to insight problems, and 
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therefore the requirement to verbalise can lead to participants focussing on easy to 
verbalise but not necessarily helpful processes. In a more recent study Fleck and 
Weisberg (2004) explored the use of verbal protocols in Duncker's (1945) candle 
problem and found no difference on a number of measures of success between those 
required and those not required to verbalise their thoughts. In a comprehensive review 
of verbalisations on the performance of experts on a variety of tasks Ericsson (2006) 
concluded that provided careful instructions were employed it is possible to elicit 
valid non-reactive reports of participants' thoughts during a cognitive task (see 
Ericsson & Simon, 1980 for detailed instructions for eliciting valid verbalisations of 
the ongoing cognitive processes). Evidence regarding the validity of the use of verbal 
protocols during reasoning tasks is, therefore, contradictory, and if such a tool was 
used careful controls and instructions would need to be implemented to ensure the 
validity of any data collected. 
A second approach that could be adopted - and one that is more in line with 
standard methodologies used in Wason's 2-4-6 task (e.g., Vallee-Tourangeau & 
Payton, 2008; O. Vartanian, C. Martindale, & J. Kwiatkowski, 2003b; Wason, 1960) 
- would be to ask participants to record their hypotheses and reasons for test choice on 
their record sheet. Such an approach would allow closer exploration of why particular 
triples are chosen, and to assess more directly which hypothesis is being tested. When 
this methodology is employed, however, examinations of these reasons show that 
rather than providing reasons for a triple choice participants tend to respond with their 
current hypothesis. Gorman et at. (1987) adopted a slightly different approach and 
asked participants to predict whether triples would be DAX or MED before receiving 
feedback, while Tweney et at. (1980) asked participants to label each triple as either 
confirmatory or disconfirmatory. While useful data can be, and, indeed, has been, 
collected using such instructions, they do not capture the second-to-second processing 
which may be occurring during engagement with the task. One possibility which may 
be useful would be to ask participants to record which rule they are trying to find with 
each triple generated. E-ICM would predict that participants would initially test DAX 
hypotheses and then move to MED hypothesis testing. Post hoc examination of 
participants' protocols would allow testing of the idea that if a participant states they 
are looking for a MED rule and receive DAX feedback their next triple should be an 
attempt to redefine the DAX rule in the light of the extended list ofDAX instances. 
Another alternative, based in a Bayesian analysis of the task, would be to ask 
participants to state their current hypotheses and also to request them to place 
confidence ratings in these hypotheses. According to both the Bayesian philosophy of 
science and Oaksford and Chater's (1994) ICM confidence in DAX hypotheses should 
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gradually rise as participants generate examples of these hypotheses whilst in the 
positive sub-loop. It would be expected that once the participant is reasonably 
confident in their DAX hypothesis they would move to testing of the MED rule; 
confidence in this would initially be low, but again would rise as they worked through 
the MED positive sub-loop, Such a process would inevitably be rather complex and 
would need careful instruction and implementation to ensure that intrusive 
requirements do not affect performance on the task, as well as careful coding of 
confidence ratings relating to the testing of hypotheses, It is of note that Tukey (1986) 
used a similar methodology in his investigation of hypothesis testing strategies, but 
the limitations in his dataset did not allow conclusions to be drawn regarding 
participants' confidence in their hypotheses. In addition, Tukey's participants were 
given SG instructions, and while data regarding the number of triples to first 
announcement were not reported it is likely that in common with many other studies 
employing SG methodologies his participants may have "spoken too soon", 
10.6 DG Facilitation and the Philosophy of Science 
The literature review earlier in the thesis (see Chapter 1) introduced some ideas 
from the philosophy of science regarding the method by which scientific discovery 
advances. In the original version of the 2-4-6 task Wason (1960) set out to discover if 
participants adhered to the then contemporary norm of scientific testing, that of 
falsification (Popper, 1959). Wason designed the task such that the initial exemplar 
would induce an overly-restricted rule (Wetherick, 1962), and that the only method of 
discovering that this rule was erroneous was by attempting to disconfirm it. 
Participants in Wason's original study appeared to demonstrate a maladaptive 
hypothesis testing strategy; that is, the majority of participants engaged in what Wason 
characterised as an "enumerative" strategy rather than the more informative 
"eliminative" strategy. 
Wason's original interpretation of performance on the task as being due to 
confirmation bias pervaded the literature surrounding the task for some time, with 
attempts to improve performance being focussed on trying to eliminate confirmatory 
behaviour in participants with generally mixed results (e,g., Gorman & Gorman, 1984; 
Gorman, Stafford, & Gorman, 1987; Kareev et aJ., 1993; Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 
1977; Mynatt et aL, 1978; Tweney et aL, 1980). It was shown that while instructional 
manipulations were successful in promoting generation of disconfirming triples this 
did not always translate into improved success rates (e.g., Tweney, Doherty, Womer, 
Pliske, Mynatt, R.Gross et aL, 1980). In contrast, participants in Gorman et aL's 
(1992b) study did show an improvement when he did not provide feedback on 
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participants' rule announcements: instead he instructed participants to decide for 
themselves if they were right. Gorman interpreted this as showing than once 
participants could no longer appeal to the experimenter to confirm or disconfirm their 
hypothesis (which he noted was much more powerful than producing triples to 
evaluate a hypothesis) then confirmation became a much stronger heuristic for 
successful solving. 
In its original form the 2-4-6 task was, therefore, seen as modelling scientific 
discovery, for which the strongest methodology was to use a Popperian falsificatory 
strategy (Popper, (1959), and the evidence suggested that participants were unable to 
adopt such a strategy in the laboratory. The DG variant (Tweney, Doherty, Womer, 
Pliske, Mynatt, R.Gross et aL, 1980), however, promoted much higher success rates 
on the task despite its close similarity to the original SG variant. Earlier in the thesis 
(see Chapter 1) it was argued that this was because the DG variant changed the 
demands of the task such that rather than a Popperian falsificiationist strategy being 
the most valuable the demands of the task could now be couched more naturally in a 
Bayesian form (Howson & Urbach, 2006) in which two competing theories are pitted 
against each other. Note, however, that a Bayesian approach can be taken to the SG 
form of the task. Recall that according to the Bayesian approach evidence is collected 
regarding a hypothesis, with belief in this hypothesis varying according to the strength 
of the evidence. When couched in Bayesian terms, however, each triple that is tested 
is assessed on the information gain from the test rather than being a simple 
falsification. The expected value of the information gain is, however, a rather complex 
calculation; for each test the range of possible outcomes needs to be known (in this 
case whether the triple "fits" or "does not fit" the rule) and also the probability of each 
outcome if the hypothesis is true or false. These data allow the calculation of the 
diagnosticity of each possible outcome using the following formula: 
p(DI H) 
p(DI-H) 
In non-algebraic form this can be expressed as the probability of observing the 
outcome (datum) D given the hypothesis H is true, divided by the probability of 
observing the outcome D given that the hypothesis is not true. The result of this 
calculation informs the reasoner how much to change their belief in H should the test 
produce the outcome D. Clearly the test must be selected before the outcome is known 
so the expected outcome is influenced by the a priori probability of each outcome 
which can be derived from estimates of 
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along with the a priori belief in H. By calculating these values it is possible to 
calculate which test is infonnative and discern when further testing is unlikely to yield 
additional infonnation. A Popperian approach, however, only requires the reasoner to 
judge whether the result of a test will falsify their hypothesis, that is, 
p(H I D) = 0 
when applied to the focal hypothesis. 
Given the comparative simplicity of the calculation for a Popperian approach it 
would be expected that this would be the strategy of choice for the 2-4-6 task. 
However, while the calculation appears to be relatively simple the difficulty of this 
approach seems to be in producing a triple which would falsify a current hypothesis 
(Poletiek, 1996a). On the other hand, given the difference in the complexity of the 
calculations required for a Bayesian approach it is unlikely that reasoners would be 
able to deploy such an approach to the task (cf. Klayman, 1995). Tukey (1986) offered 
some support for the idea that a non-Bayesian approach is taken. In his study he asked 
participants to ascribe labels to triples they had generated in tenns of their role in 
testing a current hypothesis. He found that very few triples were generated with a view 
to increasing certainty in a hypothesis, which Tukey interpreted as indicating a non-
Bayesian approach to the task. Note, however, that the "assess" label used to denote a 
Bayesian approach referred only to "increasing" certainty that a hypothesis (rather 
than an alternative) is correct, a label which is perhaps more confinnatory than 
Bayesian in its connotations. Similarly, if the ICM (M. Oaksford & N. Chater, 1994) 
is taken as reflecting hypothesis testing behaviour then it could be argued that the 
inclusion of the positive sub-loop in the model suggests that reasoners do not engage 
in Bayesian testing; infonnation collected at this stage of the testing process has a low 
diagnostic value in tenns of the hypothesis being true. Note, however, that reasoners 
may be attempting a Bayesian approach as they are collecting infonnation which is 
used to adjust the strength of their belief in their hypothesis; it may be that reasoners 
naturally adopt a Bayesian approach but the complexities of the calculation prevent 
the approach from being fully implemented. The positive sub-loop of the ICM also 
indicates that participants do not use wholly Popperian principles to test their focal 
hypotheses as there is no attempt in this phase of the hypothesis testing cycle to falsify 
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their current hypothesis, rather they collect evidence which supports it, even though 
the initial counterfactual stage of the process is falsificatory in nature. 
The )CM therefore suggests that in the initial stages of hypothesis testing a 
Popperian approach is taken. A hypothesis is adduced from a list of instances which 
conform to the DAX rule and is tested, initially using a counterfactual strategy (which 
also leads to the generation of new hypotheses if the working hypothesis is 
disconfirmed). Once a plausible hypothesis is produced the participants then move to 
the positive sub-loop in which the non Popperian positive test strategy (Klayman & 
Ha, 1987, 1989) is used to generate instances of their hypothesis until a preset level of 
confidence is reached when the rule is announced. It is likely that in the SG form of 
the task it would be this testing of triples in the positive sub-loop which led to Wason 
(1960) identifying the "enumerative" testing strategy. The positive sub-loop is an 
interesting aspect of this account of people's SG hypothesis testing strategy in that it 
not only presents hypothesis testing in the SG task as possibly having Bayesian 
elements but it also mirrors the real life hypothesis testing strategies as reported by 
Mitroff (1974) and Tweney (1985). Both Mitroff and Tweney note that in the initial 
stages of research, scientists tend to try to confirm their hypotheses before moving to a 
falsificatory strategy. It might be that when the SG variant of the 2-4-6 task is 
employed participants disengage from the task before moving into the disconfirmatory 
stage, although it is unclear why this might be so. 
In its DG variant the task can be characterised as facilitating a Bayesian 
approach in that two hypotheses are considered and evidence for these two hypotheses 
is collected and considered. According to the E-ICM success on the task is not due to 
negative testing of the DAX hypothesis, rather it is a result of positive testing of the 
MED hypothesis. According to the E-ICM evidence regarding the DAX hypothesis is 
collected before moving on to explore the MED hypothesis. The MED hypothesis is 
derived from the DAX hypothesis and, as such, can be seen as being related to it. 
While it is true the DAX and MED hypotheses are not competing in a true Bayesian 
sense, the fact that two hypotheses are related does allow for data to be collected and 
evaluated in the light of both of the hypotheses; that is, a priori calculations of the 
diagnosticity of possible tests do not need to be carried out. Information gained from 
the each test is of symmetric value to the two hypotheses under consideration, thus the 
demands of the DG variant may promote a simplified form of Bayesian hypothesis 
testing. 
The interpretation of DG instructions as transforming a Popperian task to one 
that is Bayesian, together with the greatly enhanced performance in the DG variant, 
tend to suggest that a Bayesian approach to scientific discovery may be more useful 
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than a strategy of falsification. However, this observation should be tempered by the 
knowledge that most studies employing Wason's 2-4-6 task have used lay participants 
rather than scientists (see however Mahoney & DeMonbreun, 1977 for a study in 
which the perfromance of scientists and ministers is compared), and there remains the 
issue of ecological validity. A scientist engaged in research is aware that any 
published work will be open to peer review and testing by contemporaries, and it is 
therefore likely that they will be careful to test any hypothesis thoroughly before 
publishing. It would seem likely in such circumstances that thorough testing and 
evaluation would be likely to include elements of falsification. In this respect it is 
reasonable to suggest that although aspects of the 2-4-6 task mirror scientific testing, 
the lack of context in which scientific progress is made both in social terms and in the 
knowledge base which surrounds scientific discovery in the laboratory point to some 
shortcomings of it as a model. Thus, in this task at least, more note should perhaps be 
taken of Popper's (1959) observation that scientific discovery is a special case of 
everyday reasoning; perhaps the demands of the 2-4-6 task more closely model 
everyday reasoning than scientific reasoning. 
10.7 The "Hypothetical Thinking Framework" and Performance on 
the DG Task 
In Chapter I Evans' (2006) hypothetical thinking framework as related to the 2-
4-6 task was discussed. According to this theory poor performance on the task can be 
attributed to a combination of heuristic and analytic processes. The participants' initial 
erroneous hypotheses are caused by a heuristic relevance effect, in that information in 
the initial 2-4-6 exemplar is assumed to be relevant to the task (cf. Cherubini et aI., 
2005), with the effect that a sufficient but not necessary rule is generated. The analytic 
system does not intervene to revise the model generated by the heuristic system as the 
singularity principle leads to the consideration of a single hypothesis which is then 
evaluated according to the satisficing principle (Evans, 2007). In the case of the 2-4-6 
task the initial hypothesis is found to have satisfied the demands of the task and is 
therefore accepted without consideration of further alternatives. 
As was noted in Chapter I the dual process account is a weaker version of the 
"dual system" account of cognition which proposes that the two processes have 
differing evolutionary histories and originate in different neural substrates (Evans & 
Over, 1996; Stanovich, 2004). As such, it would therefore be expected that 
performance which appeared to be maladaptive by normative standards could be 
explained in terms of evolutionary advantage. This view is in line with the argument 
made earlier that the 2-4-6 task is more closely aligned with everyday reasoning than 
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scientific reasoning, as in evolutionary terms it is important to avoid costly errors 
(even at the expense of missing potentialIy useful benefits), whilst scientific discovery 
demands higher levels of reasoning which leads to solutions more closely 
approximating to the "truth" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Evidence for this view 
comes from the work of Friedrich (1993), who in a wide ranging review of the 
hypothesis testing literature showed that when examined from the standard of the type 
of pragmatic logic required to negotiate through the social world it could be argued 
that the positive test strategy is superior to other strategies when identifying 
appropriate solutions in everyday life. According to Friedrich's (1993) Primary Error 
Detection and Minimisation (PEDMIN) analysis, people are more likely to be 
concerned with error reduction than truth detection, and that this concern shapes the 
questions people ask, and typically guides them towards sufficiency testing. 
According to the PEDMIN approach the fact that people tend to focus on false 
positives rather than false negatives is due to false positive errors being likely to be 
more costly than false negatives. This is illustrated by the example given by both 
Klayman and Ha (1989) and Friedrich (1993) that when buying a new car it is better to 
miss some perfectly good cars than buy one which is unreliable. The PEDMIN 
analysis then offers some support for the idea that hypothesis testing behaviour can be 
interpreted as resulting from evolutionary pressures to avoid errors, a view which can 
be subsumed within Evans' (2006) hypothetical thinking framework. Leyens, 
Dardonne Yzerbyt, Scaillet, and Snyder (1999) make a similar argument for the role 
of confirmation and disconfirmation and the development of in-group bias. Thus in 
terms of social cognition, arguments have been made for non-normative approaches 
having evolutionary advantages, providing indirect support for the dual process 
account of the task. 
For Evans' (2006, 2007) hypothetical thinking framework to be a convincing 
account of hypothesis testing behaviours it also needs to account for performance 
using DG instructions. In Chapter 3 it was suggested that one way in which facilitated 
performance on the DG variant of the task could be accounted for would be that the 
requirement to find two rules would overcome the singularity principle. It was 
suggested that DG instructions lead to a more Bayesian approach as the two 
hypotheses are tested alternately, and participants' confidence in their two hypotheses 
varies as a function of the evidence collected. It was further suggested that this 
Bayesian approach would promote more triples of a greater variety as participants 
generated tests of their hypotheses. 
It could be argued, however, that this latter view is somewhat undermined by the 
results of later experiments presented in this thesis which showed that the facilitatory 
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effect of DG instructions was apparent even when the number of triples required was 
held constant across instruction mode. Contrary to this argument is the notion that the 
requirement to generate a specific number of tests may have affected participants' 
"natural" hypothesis testing strategies, leading them to construct tests more carefully 
if they felt testing was limited, and thereby promoting more diagnostic testing (in the 
DG conditions) or persistence in the positive test sub-loop (in the SG condition) after 
reaching their criterion level of confidence. However, the notion that a wide variety of 
triples is important in the DG paradigm was also undermined in Experiments 5 and 6 
which showed that triple heterogeneity was of itself not related to task success. 
How, then, can Evans' (2006, 2007) hypothetical thinking framework account 
for DG facilitation? The basic premise that DG instructions overcome the singularity 
principle remains intact. The singularity principle claims that people can only think 
about one possibility or mental model at a time, due to hypothetical thinking requiring 
the use of the analytic system which is limited in capacity and sequential in nature 
(Evans, 2007). Evans emphasises that it is the combination of a single hypothesis 
being considered at one time along with the satisficing principle (i.e .. that the 
hypothesis is "good enough") which leads to poor performance. According to the 
hypothetical thinking framework, the fact that the initial sufficient hypothesis induced 
by the exemplar satisfies the requirement of the task means that alternatives do not 
need to be brought to mind and tested (a view similar in its functional consequences to 
Friedrich's, 1993, PEDMIN analysis of the task). The E-ICM presented in this thesis 
suggests that testing of the DAX and MED hypothesis is sequential; that participants 
are testing either the DAX or the MED hypothesis and not both. It could be argued 
that evidence from a MED test providing diagnostic information as to the boundaries 
of the DAX rule is, in fact, an unforeseen consequence for the participant that was not 
anticipated when they designed their MED test. Thus although information from a 
MED test can impact on knowledge of the DAX rule, the participant is at any stage 
still only testing one hypothesis at a time. According to this analysis DG facilitation 
can be accommodated within the hypothetical thinking framework, as, indeed, can the 
E-ICM. 
10.8 Future Directions 
This thesis has been concerned with exploring DG facilitation within Wason's 
(1960) 2-4-6 task. It began by systematically testing contemporary accounts of the 
effect with a view to discriminating between them. The results of these studies 
suggested that no single account could provide a wholly adequate account of the 
effect. As a result of this work a new model was drawn up which extended Oaks ford 
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and Chater's (1994) ICM to account for the effect of DG instructions. It has been 
suggested that the E-ICM can be accommodated within Evans' (2006) dual processing 
account of hypothetical thinking, although these ideas are somewhat tentative. Further 
work is required to test predictions derived from the E-ICM, the role of contrast class 
triples in success on the SG variant of 2-4-6 task, and the relationship between the 
number and range of triples generated and the production of a contrast class triple. 
The exploration of the role of contrast class triples on the SG variant of the task 
is an obvious first step; data presented here regarding contrast class information has 
largely been pooled across instruction mode and success on the task. It is therefore of 
importance to check that contrast class information promotes success on the SG 
version of the task. It would be expected that such an effect would be evident, and 
also that such triples are not commonly produced. One aim of the thesis would thus be 
fulfilled; the development of a convincing explanation of DG facilitatory effect would 
go some way to explaining poor performance on the SG variant of the task. This in 
tum could lead to the development of manipulations which promote success on the 
SG version of the task. It is of note that Vallee-Tourangeau and New (1997) produced 
a scenario-based version of the task which successfully manipulated the types of 
triples produced with resultant differential performance on the task, a finding which 
was replicated by Sutherland, Lucas, and Gale (1998) in a probabilistic version of the 
same task. However, reporting of results did not include analyses of the presence of 
descending triples in either of these studies, and it is known that scenario-based 
instructions can affect performance on a variety of reasoning tasks (see e.g., Griggs & 
Newstead, 1982; Wason & Shapiro, 1971). It would therefore be useful to explore this 
effect more fully. 
A second route of enquiry would be to explore the role of descending triples 
when constraints imposed by this programme of study are relaxed. For example, with 
the exception of Experiment 1, all participants were required to produce an exact 
number of triples. That this may affect naturalistic hypothesis testing strategies has 
been noted several times in this thesis. As the contrast class theory had not been 
developed when the triple number restriction was introduced it would be useful to 
explore this aspect of hypothesis testing behaviour along with any concomitant effect 
on triple variety. In addition, throughout the experiments reported in this thesis only a 
single attempt at announcing the rule was permitted. However as Vallee-Tourangeau 
and Payton (2008) note, this prevents participants developing their hypothesis testing 
strategies when told that their hypothesis is incorrect. This is an important avenue for 
further exploration as it has been argued that it is likely that strategies for hypothesis 
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testing may vary as a session progresses (e.g., 2000; Roberts, 1993; Siegler & Chen, 
2002). 
In the literature review it was noted that two aspects of hypothesis testing 
behaviour have been identified: the context of discovery and the context of 
justification (Reichenbach, 1938). Although this thesis has been concerned with both 
aspects of behaviour, no attempt has been made to discriminate between the two 
aspects; indeed, hypothesis testing behaviour has been presented as a cyclical activity 
in which the two aspects are intimately entwined. Contrast class theory, however, is 
mostly concerned with the context of discovery; it is suggested that it is the production 
of a contrast class triple which leads to the production of the correct rule. This leads to 
the intriguing possibility that it might be possible to disentangle these two aspects of 
hypothesis testing behaviour. One possibility worthy of consideration would be the 
use of an eye tracking methodology to assess what information is used in hypothesis 
formation. For example, it would be possible to present participants with protocols 
from imaginary participants and then use eye tracking data to infer what data was used 
in generating hypotheses. 
In terms of exploring the E-ICM more fully it has been suggested that verbal 
protocols would be one possible methodology which might be usefully employed to 
elucidate the processes involved in hypothesis testing and how they relate to E-ICM. 
Although potential problems with the approach have been highlighted, there remain 
alternative ways to enhance the methodology and diminish its intrusiveness, for 
example, by collecting participants' working hypotheses and their reasons for test 
choices. 
To generalise the findings presented in this thesis it would be useful to apply 
contrast class theory to other hypothesis testing domains outside of the 2-4-6 task. 
Gorman et aJ.'s. (1984) New Eleusis task represents an example of a paradigm that 
could facilitate such generalisation, although there would need to be careful 
consideration as to what would constitute a contrast class test in this more complex 
rule discovery context. 
One further theme which has emerged from the thesis is that strategies which 
participants employ may vary as they progress through the task, a position in line with 
both the ICM and E-ICM which suggest that participants move from using 
counterfactual testing to generate hypotheses to positive testing of generated 
hypotheses. Such a notion is also in line with recent work in other reasoning domains 
such as those involving deductive inference (e.g., 2000; Roberts, 1993; Siegler & 
Chen, 2002). This is an area which could bear fruitful examination. Vartanian. 
Martindale, and Kwiatkowski (2003b) showed that creativity was associated with 
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success on the 2-4-6 task, with more creative participants being differentially more 
successful than less creative participants. Although it is not clear by what mechanism 
creativity fostered success on the task such findings suggest that differing strategies 
may impact on success. Perhaps more creative participants are able to move between 
strategies more effortlessly and it is this aspect of their creativity which underpins 
success on the task. It is of note that in their analyses Vartanian et al. showed that their 
participants tended to move from a confirmatory strategy to a disconfirmatory 
strategy, which is again further evidence that participants are able to vary their 
hypothesis testing strategies as they progress through the task 
Related to the idea that strategies may change within a hypothesis testing session 
IS the idea that there may be differences in strategies across participants. Indeed 
informal observation has led to the tentative conclusion that there are at least two 
distinct approaches to the task: one of exploring the hypothesis space (most commonly 
employed) and a less common approach of exploring the experiment space (cf. Klahr 
& Dunbar, 1988). These approaches are manifest by either a tendency to produce 
triples slowly, interspersed by periods of thought (hypothesis exploration), or by 
producing a series of triples fairly quickly followed by a much longer period of 
thought (exploring the experiment space). 
These latter observations fit with the work of Klahr and Dunbar (1988), who 
used a more naturalistic task which involved discovering the purpose of a button on a 
remote control device they called "Big Trak". Klahr and Dunbar characterised their 
participants as either "experimenters" or "theorists" depending on the approach taken 
to the task. All participants started off by deploying similar strategies, that is, using 
hypotheses to guide search in the experiment space. They differed, however, in the 
way that new hypotheses were developed once the initial hypothesis was abandoned. 
Experimenters produced new trials to allow a search for regularities in experimental 
outcomes while theorists searched the hypothesis space for a new hypothesis. Klahr 
and Dunbar suggested that one key determinant of the approach taken by their 
participants was prior knowledge; they found that all of the "theorists" but only one 
"experimenter" in their Study 1 had previous programming knowledge which could be 
drawn on in developing hypotheses. This suggests that a level of expertise may 
underpin the strategies employed across participants in their task. However, it is 
unlikely that expertise would underpin any apparent differences in strategy using the 
2-4-6 task as it is unlikely that there would be differential levels of expertise in such a 
general number rule discovery task. It would be interesting, therefore, first to explore 
if apparent differences are evident across participants on the task (which would be 
predicted both from findings in other problem solving tasks and from informal 
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observation of participants), and what particular participant characteristics underpin 
the use of differing strategies. 
Several times within the thesis it has been hinted that one factor which may 
affect a participant's performance on the 2-4-6 task is working memory capacity. For 
example, it has been argued that indirect evidence for working memory constraints 
affecting performance is provided by the work of Vallee-Tourangeau and colleagues 
on the role of external representation in the task (e.g., Vallee-Tourangeau & Payton, 
2008; Vallee-Tourangeau & Penney, 2005). Vallee-Tourangeau and colleagues 
showed that when some of the mental work involved in the 2-4-6 was externalised 
success rates in the SG variant rose. One possible criticism of Vallee-Tourangeau and 
his collaborators' work is that the external representation used also constrained the 
hypothesis and experiment space as the external representations prevented numbers 
over 18 being used in triple generation (in one study; other studies had smaller 
maximum numbers). However, as Vallee-Tourangeau and Payton note, even with this 
reduced triple-space there are still over 6,000 possible triples in their graphical version 
of the task, and success rates in the control group which did not have access to 
external representations were similar to those reported using standard instructions. 
Studies which systematically examine the effect of working memory capacity on the 
task may well be a useful avenue for future work. 
10.9 Conclusion 
This thesis has explored contemporary theories ofDG facilitation (e.g., Tweney, 
Doherty, Womer, Pliske, Mynatt, R.Gross et al., 1980) in Wason's (1960) rule 
discovery task with the view that a satisfactory explanation for the DG effect would 
go some way to explaining poor performance in the standard paradigm. Within the 
thesis a new account of the DG facilitation effect - the contrast class theory - has been 
developed which has been situated within an extended version of Oaksford and 
Chater's (1994) ICM. More broadly it has been argued that an explanation of the DG 
facilitation may lie within a restructuring of the problem which promotes the use of a 
simplified form of Bayesian testing of competing hypotheses. Direct manipulations 
have undermined both positivity bias theory (Evans, 1989) and goal complementarity 
theory (Wharton et al., 1993), and it has been shown that although there is some 
evidence for both information quantity theory (Wharton et al., 1993) and triple 
heterogeneity theory (Vallee-Tourangeau et al., 1995), neither provides a wholly 
adequate account of the effect. These theories can arguably be subsumed within the 
contrast class theory as developed within this thesis, although it has been 
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acknowledged that further work needs to be done to explore the viability of this 
approach. 
Along with suggestions for testing the E-ICM developed in this thesis, other 
fruitful avenues for exploration have been suggested which aim to examine the 
contrast class theory within the 2-4-6 task as weB as in other domains. More generally, 
ideas relating to individual differences in strategy use on the task have been presented. 
It is clear that a great deal more research can still usefully be carried out in order to 
explore hypothesis testing behaviour within the laboratory context. 
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